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Abstract 
American non-presidential primary elections remain an understudied, but very important, 
part of our political process.  In this study, I examine the state of the political science 
literature and provide two main contributions.  First, I describe in detail all of the primary 
election laws used across the United States from 1945 to 2012 and analyze the 
consequences of using one kind of law over another.  I find that, contrary to expectations, 
closed primary rules may result in more competitive primary elections than open 
primaries; furthermore, states with closed primary rules appear to get more moderate 
representation on average in the U.S. Senate.  Due to changing legal standards, more 
states may be more likely to adopt in the future a “top-two” primary system which 
California used for the first time in 2012.  I also analyze the first implementation of the 
“top-two.”  Proponents of the new law suggested that it would help elect more pragmatic 
legislators.  I find, though a unique survey of California voters, that they sometimes 
achieved their goal.   
  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements - - - - - - - - iii 
Abstract - - - - - - - - - iv 
List of Tables and Figures  - - - - - - - vi 
Introduction  - - - - - - - - - 1 
Chapter 1:  Primaries in Political Science  - - - - - 10 
Chapter 2:  State Laws, 1945–2012 - - - - - - 52 
Chapter 3:  Laws, Competitiveness, and Representation  - - - 148 
Chapter 4:  A Peek Into the Future: 2012 California Survey  - - - 178 
Chapter 5:  Voter Behavior in California’s 2012 Top-Two Primary  - - 247 
Concluding Remarks - - - - - - - - 307 
References - - - - - - - - - 311 
  
vi 
 
Tables and Figures 
Fig. 2-1 - - - - - - - - - 104 
   Massachusetts Party Enrollment 
 
Fig. 2-2 - - - - - - - - - 111 
   Nebraska Sample Ballot 
 
Fig. 3-1 - - - - - - - - - 152 
   Margins of Victory 1968–2012 
 
Fig. 3-2 - - - - - - - - - 153 
   Distribution: Percent Margin of Victory 
 
Fig. 3-3 - - - - - - - - - 154 
   Types of Primary Laws Used 1946–2012 
 
Tab. 3-1 - - - - - - - - - 158 
   Margin of Victory and Primary Type 
 
Tab. 3-2 - - - - - - - - - 160 
   Regression: Top of the Ticket, Margin of Victory, Narrow Categories 
 
Fig. 3-4 - - - - - - - - - 162 
   Margin of Victory and Per Capita Income 
 
Tab. 3-3 - - - - - - - - - 163 
   Regression: Top of the Ticket, Margin of Victory, Broad Categories 
 
Tab. 3-4 - - - - - - - - - 164 
   Regression: U.S. Senate Only, Margin of Victory 
 
Tab. 3-5 - - - - - - - - - 166 
   Regression: Top of the Ticket, Margin of Victory, Open Seats Only 
 
Tab. 3-6 - - - - - - - - - 167 
   Regression: Top of the Ticket, Margin of Victory, Logit 
 
Fig. 3-5 - - - - - - - - - 170 
   U.S. Senate, Average Ideological Distance 
 
Fig. 3-6 - - - - - - - - - 170 
   Distribution of State Mean Ideological Distances 
  
vii 
 
Tab. 3-7 - - - - - - - - - 172 
   Regression: Average Ideological Distances, Broad Open Category 
 
Tab. 3-8 - - - - - - - - - 173 
   Regression: Average Ideological Distances, Anti-Party Category 
 
Tab. 3-9 - - - - - - - - - 174 
   Regression: Average Ideological Distances, Narrow Categories 
 
Tab. A3-1 - - - - - - - - - 176 
   Number of States Changing Laws in Given Year 
 
Fig. 4-1 - - - - - - - - - 181 
   Respondents by Date 
 
Tab. 4-1 - - - - - - - - - 182 
   Number of Respondents, Percent by Cell Phone 
 
Tab. 4-2 - - - - - - - - - 183 
   Data Quality, Core Survey Questions 
 
Tab. 4-3 - - - - - - - - - 184 
   Voting Preferences 
 
Tab. 4-4 - - - - - - - - - 186 
   Opinions on the Top-Two 
 
Tab. 4-5 - - - - - - - - - 188 
   Basic Demographics 
 
Tab. 4-6 - - - - - - - - - 190 
   Religion and Church Attendance 
 
Tab. 4-7 - - - - - - - - - 192 
   Economy, Education, and Related 
 
Tab. 4-8 - - - - - - - - - 194 
   Total Party Registration 
 
Tab. 4-9 - - - - - - - - - 195 
   Registration by Party and District 
 
Tab. 4-10 - - - - - - - - - 196 
   Party Identification 
 
  
viii 
 
Tab. 4-11 - - - - - - - - - 197 
   Party Registration and Party Identification 
 
Tab. 4-12 - - - - - - - - - 198 
   Policy Preferences 
 
Tab. 4-13 - - - - - - - - - 201 
   Probit for Party ID 
 
Fig. 4-2 - - - - - - - - - 204 
   Party ID 
 
Fig. 4-3 - - - - - - - - - 204 
   Ideological Self-Placements 
 
Fig. 4-4 - - - - - - - - - 204 
   Issue Scale 
 
Fig. 4-5 - - - - - - - - - 206 
   Issue Scale by Party ID 
 
Fig. 4-6 - - - - - - - - - 207 
   Democratic Party Issue Scale Detail 
 
Tab. 4-14 - - - - - - - - - 209 
   Outlook and Opinion 
 
Tab. 4-15 - - - - - - - - - 211 
   Probit: California Economy Getting Worse 
 
Tab. 4-16 - - - - - - - - - 213 
   Identifying Politicians  
 
Tab. 4-17 - - - - - - - - - 214 
   Correct Identifications, Survey Language 
 
Tab. 4-18 - - - - - - - - - 215 
   Participation Beyond Voting 
 
Fig. 4-7 - - - - - - - - - 219 
   Number of Candidates in Districts 
 
Tab. 4-19 - - - - - - - - - 221 
   Preferences in AD5 
 
  
ix 
 
Fig. 4-8 - - - - - - - - - 224 
   Bigelow and Oller 
 
Tab. 4-20 - - - - - - - - - 224 
   Rankings in AD5 
 
Fig. 4-9 - - - - - - - - - 226 
   Placements in AD5 
 
Tab. 4-21 - - - - - - - - - 228 
   Preferences in AD8 
 
Tab. 4-22 - - - - - - - - - 229 
   Rankings in AD8 
 
Fig. 4-10 - - - - - - - - - 229 
   Placements in AD8 
 
Tab. 4-23 - - - - - - - - - 231 
   Preferences in AD41 
 
Fig. 4-11 - - - - - - - - - 232 
   An Anti-Rusnak Advertisement  
 
Tab. 4-24 - - - - - - - - - 233 
   Preferences by Survey Day in AD41 
 
Tab. 4-25 - - - - - - - - - 233 
   Rankings in AD41 
 
Fig. 4-12 - - - - - - - - - 234 
   Placements in AD41 
 
Fig. 4-13 - - - - - - - - - 236 
   Candidate Baca (AD41) 
 
Fig. 4-14 - - - - - - - - - 236 
   Candidate Brown (AD41) 
 
Fig. 4-15 - - - - - - - - - 237 
   Candidate Ensley (AD41) 
 
Fig. 4-16 - - - - - - - - - 237 
   Candidate Beach (AD41) 
 
  
x 
 
Tab 4-26 - - - - - - - - - 238 
   Preferences in AD47 
 
Tab. 4-27 - - - - - - - - - 239 
   Rankings in AD47 
 
Fig. 4-17 - - - - - - - - - 240 
   Placements in AD47 
 
Fig. 4-18 - - - - - - - - - 241 
   Placements in AD47 for Brown and Baca by Survey Language 
 
Fig. 4-19 - - - - - - - - - 242 
   Democratic Self-Ideological Placements, All Five Districts 
 
Tab. 4-28 - - - - - - - - - 244 
   Preferences in AD50 
 
Tab. 4-29 - - - - - - - - - 244 
   Rankings in AD50 
 
Fig. 4-20 - - - - - - - - - 245 
   Placements in AD50 
 
Tab. 5-1 - - - - - - - - - 249 
   The Intersection between Tactical and Crossover Voting 
 
Tab. 5-2 - - - - - - - - - 253 
   Voting by Ideological Proximity & Party of Candidate and Voter 
 
Tab. 5-3 - - - - - - - - - 255 
   Crossover Vote by Situation 
 
Tab. 5-4 - - - - - - - - - 257 
   Ideological Proximity: A Few Example Voters 
 
Tab. 5-5 - - - - - - - - - 260 
   Missing Ideological Placements by Party of Candidates and Voters 
 
Tab. 5-6 - - - - - - - - - 262 
   Detail of Choice Type by Registration and District 
 
Tab. 5-7 - - - - - - - - - 266 
   Bivariate Statistics for Crossover Voting 
 
  
xi 
 
Tab. 5-8 - - - - - - - - - 269 
   Situation Crossover Voting (Details) 
 
Tab. 5-9 - - - - - - - - - 272 
   Probit: Crossover Voting 
 
Fig. 5-1 - - - - - - - - - 274 
   Interpreting the Issue Scale from the Binary Probit 
 
Tab. 5-10 - - - - - - - - - 276 
   Crossover Votes: Candidates and Results 
 
Tab. 5-11 - - - - - - - - - 280 
   Probit: Alternative Crossover Voting Models 
 
Tab. 5-12 - - - - - - - - - 281 
   Predicted Probabilities from the Alternative Models 
 
Fig. 5-2 - - - - - - - - - 286 
   Imputed Butler Placements 
 
Fig. 5-3 - - - - - - - - - 286 
   Unmodified Butler Placements 
 
Fig. 5-4 - - - - - - - - - 287 
   Imputed Torgan Placements 
 
Fig. 5-5 - - - - - - - - - 287 
   Unmodified Torgan Placements 
 
Fig. 5-6 - - - - - - - - - 292 
   Scaled Placements, AD5 
 
Fig. 5-7 - - - - - - - - - 293 
   Scaled Placements, AD8 
 
Fig. 5-8 - - - - - - - - - 293 
   Scaled Placements, AD41 
 
Fig. 5-9 - - - - - - - - - 295 
   Scaled Placements, AD47 
 
Fig. 5-10 - - - - - - - - - 296 
   Scaled Placements, AD50 
 
  
xii 
 
Tab. 5-13 - - - - - - - - - 301 
   Multinomial Probit: AD41 and AD50 
 
Tab. 5-14 - - - - - - - - - 303 
   Probability of Candidate Support: AD41 and AD50 
 
Tab. 5-15 - - - - - - - - - 305 
   Convergence Test: AD41 and AD50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“#PrimaryGraham” 
INTRODUCTION 
 Just a few weeks ago, Republican Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky rose on the 
floor of the United States Senate and did not sit down again until nearly thirteen hours 
passed; his talking filibuster delayed the nomination of a new CIA director and drew a 
great deal of attention to his concerns over the use of unmanned drone strikes against 
American citizens.  As Senator Paul continued his filibuster in the evening, other 
Republicans, including the Senate minority leader, expressed their support for his effort 
attacking the administration’s policies. Meanwhile, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham 
of South Carolina and Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona had dinner with 
McCain’s 2008 Democratic opponent and current occupant of the White House, President 
Barack Obama.  The following day, Senators McCain and Graham criticized Senator Paul 
for his “ridiculous” filibuster.  Senator Graham’s comments irked partisan Republicans. 
 In these days of instant politics, of course politicians and engaged citizens took to 
Twitter.  Most tweets applauded Senator Paul, marked with the hashtag 
“#StandWithRand.”  Politico reported another trend, though: “laced throughout the 
thousands of tweets cheering on the filibustering Kentucky Republican was a vicious, 
visceral anger aimed squarely at the South Carolinian up for reelection next year.  The 
rallying cry hashtag: #PrimaryGraham.”1  Within twenty-four hours, based on a single 
dispute with a fellow Republican, engaged partisans mobilized to threaten Senator 
Graham.  Their tool?  The primary election.  While Graham will likely survive the 
                                                          
1
 For this story, see: Friess, Steve.  2013.  “Lindsey Graham’s very bad day on Twitter.”  Politico.  March 
7.  Available online at: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/lindsey-grahams-very-bad-day-on-twitter-
88602.html#ixzz2NfnfZFmR (last accessed 04/06/13).   
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controversy, with the aid of a six million dollar war chest and the absence of a credible 
opponent, not all politicians are so lucky.   
 Most American states use a two-stage election process.  A primary election 
selects the nominees of each party and a general election pits those nominees against each 
other.  Other democracies do not necessarily use the same system; in Britain, parties 
wholly control who stands for parliament; the British government does not run a state-
expense primary round.  Americans have not always used this system either; the 
Constitution does not mandate primary elections.  Primaries grew endogenously in the 
American political process.  The modern era of primaries—in which just about all states 
use them to select U.S. Senatorial candidates and state governors—did not really become 
established until even after the Second World War. 
 Since the Constitution and Congress allows each state considerable freedom to set 
its own election laws, every state conducts primary elections slightly differently.  Many 
little laws grouped together make a “primary election law”; primaries usually draw on 
several subsections of each state’s election code.  The state code must describe who may 
run for office, how candidates get on the ballot, how their names appear, in what order 
their names appear, if they must be certified or endorsed by a political party and what 
they must do if they are not; the laws have to describe who may vote, for which 
candidates they may vote, how voters’ ballots look, what kind of machines voters may 
use, how voters identify themselves as partisans if they do so at all, how long before an 
election partisans must change their registration to participate if that is even required, 
how soon voters may change their registration after a primary… it is a long list.  States 
appear to have come up with near infinite variations, deciding on such important matters 
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as whether or not the sale of alcohol should be allowed on primary election day if it is 
prohibited on general election day (here’s looking at you, Delaware). 
 In my view, nomination procedures divide into four basic types: open primaries, 
closed primaries, nonpartisan primaries, and conventions.  In an open or closed primary, 
the candidates of each party compete against each other; the winner of each party primary 
advances to the general election.  In an open primary, voters can choose on election day 
whether they want the Democratic, Republican, or other party ballot.  For a closed 
primary, voters register with parties ahead of time and are only allowed their own party’s 
ballot.  Nonpartisan primaries let everyone vote for all candidates; typically the two 
candidates with the most votes advance (like in California, Washington, and Louisiana).  
Conventions bypass the primary process altogether.  Each of these types can be modified 
by other rules: do voters make their party choices privately?  What are nonpartisans 
allowed to do?  Do parties get much control over the process?  Are there multiple rounds 
of the party primary?  
 I set out to investigate how all these different laws affect political outcomes.  As 
the case of Senator Graham illustrates, the threat of a primary election challenge can 
loom over sitting legislators and enforce party discipline.  If a party’s current standard 
public ideology fits poorly with the general electorate, primaries may damage the party’s 
ability to run to the middle.  After Republican Ohio Senator Bob Portman signaled his 
shift to support gay marriage, one article noted that most Republican political consultants 
breathed a sigh of relief, instead of objecting: “Strap a Washington-based Republican 
political consultant into a polygraph, and overwhelmingly you’ll find someone who 
favors comprehensive immigration reform, would likely accept some modest changes to 
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current gun laws and thinks that right-wing primary candidates are among the biggest 
tactical problems facing the GOP.”2  The primary system may help ideological purists.  
After Republicans had a particularly unsuccessful 2012 election season, the possible role 
of primaries in the contest between ideological purity and electoral success represents one 
of the central political questions of today.   
 The notion that primaries drive extremism paints primaries in a negative light; 
alternative more positive views also exist.  Primaries may also be viewed as an anti-elite 
democratizing weapon against political corruption.  If the hallowed “smoke-filled-back-
room” is the alternative, primaries at least bring politics more into the light of day.  
Primaries give voters a way to combat their own party leadership as well as the other 
party.  It expands their choices from just changing teams to either changing teams or 
changing their own team’s quarterback.  For the Republicans angry at Senator Graham, 
he would still likely remain the lesser of two evils when compared to a Democrat; 
primaries give these citizens an opportunity to at some point in the electoral process 
support a candidate that holds their own views. 
 The first chapter of this dissertation reviews what political scientists have written 
about primaries.  The field remains large and the contributions, while valuable, are few.  
Researchers in this area have yet to settle on a standard set of definitions to map the 
infinite possible primary variations into a few broad categories.  The small formal theory 
literature has approached the questions about primaries from very different angles; 
researchers have yet to form a consensus on a theoretical framework either.  The 
                                                          
2
 Burns, Alexander.  2013.  “GOP elite embraces Portman gay marriage switch.”  Politico.  March 15. 
Available online at: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/gop-elite-embraces-portmans-gay-marriage-
switch-88936_Page2.html  (last accessed 03/15/13).   
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empirical results, hampered by costly data acquisition, are all over the map.  Furthermore, 
the times are indeed changing; as the legal framework in which primaries take place 
evolves, so do the important questions.  In 1998 political scientists might have thought 
the “blanket” primary would be the wave of the future; by 2002 Cain and Gerber would 
edit a volume that would serve as a post-mortem for a law declared unconstitutional by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.   
 Difficulties with data constrain research into primary elections.  Finding out what 
law a particular state used in any given year proved to be much more difficult than I ever 
imagined, and perhaps explained why most studies in the literature confined themselves 
to a short time horizon.  The second chapter describes what I have discovered about how 
states operated elections for U.S. Senate and governor from 1945 (so, in time for the 1946 
elections) up to 2012.  I also categorize these laws in a database using different 
categorization schemes than some of the previous literature, attempting to learn from the 
experience of previous researchers.   
As others in this field have said, I will repeat: in putting together a database like 
this, it will likely contain some errors.  To some extent, finding changes in old laws is 
like hunting for a needle in a haystack, where the needle may not exist.  States do not 
publish news books of laws in every year; even the extensive Los Angeles Law Library 
did not always have the legal resources on hand to precisely pinpoint a law in a year.  
Furthermore, two other difficulties arose.  States frequently may not have implemented 
their election laws quite as written and some laws gave parties choices—choices not 
recorded in the books of laws.  Methodologically, I found every available resource and 
then looked for changes.  This remains the standard technique among most studies, 
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although I believe I used more resources to gain a more detailed picture.  I supplemented 
law searches with political science literature and historical newspaper accounts.  While 
there remains room for improvement in the database, it represents the most 
comprehensive database of its kind available in the current literature.   
In the third chapter, I put this database to work on two of the important questions.  
First: do different types of primaries produce more competitive general elections?  I look 
over 1968 to 2012 and examine the effects of primary type on general election 
competitiveness.  If some types of nomination procedures tend to produce more viable 
candidates than others, they should produce closer general election outcomes.  Second: 
do different types of primaries produce more extreme or moderate candidates?  I pair my 
database of state laws with data drawn from the DW-NOMINATE scores to analyze 
representation in the U.S. Senate from 1946 to 2012.  The results are surprising: 
generally, closed primary rules produce more competitive general election outcomes and 
more centrist ideological representation in Congress than open primaries.       
The data analyzed in the second and third chapter includes several primary types 
rendered unavailable now by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Over the last half-century, the 
court has continued to refine the understanding of the relative rights of states, parties, and 
voters.  For better or worse, the great state of California has been center-stage for many 
of the recent controversies: the fall of the blanket primary in 2000 and the rise of the top-
two nonpartisan primary.  California, one the largest and most populous states, sends 12 
percent of the Representatives to the U.S. House; it is commonplace to hear the state 
mentioned as one of the world’s largest economies.  What happens in California affects 
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the rest of the country.  In 2012, California used a top-two nonpartisan primary for the 
first time.   
California turned to the top-two primary in part because the courts ruled other 
laws unconstitutional.  While states could have adopted many different primary variations 
in 1946, fewer choices are available today.  For proponents of primary election reform 
interested in reducing partisanship, the top-two remains one of the few likely choices.  If 
California retains the law, already in use in Washington starting in 2008 and used in 
Louisiana since the 1970s, other states may adopt the same rule.  The study of the top-
two primary in California is also a look into one possible future of primary elections 
nationwide.   
The fourth chapter describes in detail a survey I conducted with Dr. R. Michael 
Alvarez.  This survey focuses voter behavior in five California State Assembly primaries.  
I selected these five districts not because they are representative of all California districts, 
but because they highlight the potential for success and some of the limits of the new 
primary law.  This chapter describes in detail the implementation of this survey, as well 
as providing some supporting analysis.  While the earlier chapters take a more zoomed-
out perspective on primaries, this chapter zooms back in and emphasizes the details of 
local politics.  Since the state of Washington just recently adopted the top-two, and no 
reasonable person thinks of Louisiana politics as anything other than unique, it is difficult 
to predict from the historical record what effects the top-two in California might have.  
The survey takes a first pass at uncovering those effects. 
The fifth chapter continues the investigation into the top-two primary; in 
particular, it addresses how voters made up their minds to support candidates.  The main 
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emphasis in this chapter is on “crossover voting,” partisans of one party voting for 
candidates of another.  One of the ways proponents of the top-two could realize their 
objective (more moderate candidates winning elections) would be for partisans of a weak 
party to abandon their preferred candidates and vote for electable moderates of the other 
party.  The data tells a slightly more complicated story: crossover voting does happen but 
not quite like that.  Most crossover voters indicate that they are voting for the 
ideologically closest candidate that they perceive.  Nevertheless, there is an aspect of 
pragmatism to their sincerity—since these apparently sincere crossover votes tend to 
occur when tactical defections would make sense.   
The top-two did have some successes.  Still, because coordination among 
crossover voters proved difficult, those successes tended to occur because of divided or 
nonexistent serious candidacies from the weak party not because of crossover voting.  
The limits of voter strategic participation limit the success of the top-two primary in 
nominating moderates (if, indeed, that is a desirable goal as the proponents suggest).  The 
observation that the law did not solve all problems should not minimize the impact it had 
on solving some; the results in this chapter help explain what Californians can expect out 
of future contests with the top-two.   
 The last two chapters balance out the multi-state analysis.  Overall, the results 
from the multi-state results provide a cautionary tale about expectations from primary 
reform.  Some laws may have unintended consequences, or at least surprising 
consequences.  That open primaries would produce less competitive elections and more 
extreme representation than closed primaries certainly surprised me and runs counter to 
many of the hypotheses in the literature (although not always the results).  The top-two 
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seems to have, so far, at least worked as intended.  Still, it is too early to write the final 
story for the top-two; now that they are elected, these candidates voters viewed as more 
pragmatic or moderate have to interact with an institution that has its own set of 
incentives and rules.   
 Even so, the results suggest that the top-two may provide “benefits” beyond what 
any system in our past fifty years of electoral history provided.  The nonpartisan primary 
format really does “change the game.”  Of course, I put “benefits” in quotation marks 
because these are hypothesized benefits, subjective to normative judgments and further 
empirical review (is it actually a good thing to elect more moderate candidates?).  This 
work is just one small, if significant, step towards the important first stage: in response to 
the question “how will this law affect outcomes,” I can now provide a better answer than 
political science could before.        
 
 
“Party primaries were invaded and controlled by men of a different 
or of no political persuasion, and from other districts of the city.  
Sometimes this was done peaceably and with a show of decency 
and order; or again it was accompanied by violence and disorder of 
the most outrageous character.  Both sneaks and sluggers were 
employed as the occasion dictated.”3 
 
CHAPTER 1: PRIMARIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 In their 1928 study of the origins and then-current application of primary election 
laws, Merriam and Overacker reviewed the turbulent history of nominating procedures in 
the United States.  They noted that “in the early days of the Republic the nominating 
system, as now known, did not exist” (Merriam and Overacker 1928, pp. 1).  It grew 
through fisticuffs (as noted in the epigraph) and other misadventures from a private party-
controlled system to one run by state government and regulated by law.  Indeed, even as 
they wrote in 1928, the practice of nomination by direct primary remained in its 
infancy—although contemporary authors could hardly be expected to see it that way.4  
Since then, American nominating procedures have matured legally, clarifying the relative 
rights of what Persily called the “three actors… in every party regulation case: a party 
organization, a voter, and the state” (2002, pp. 304).  Political parties have also perceived 
their interests differently; candidates and party officials have continued to adjust their 
strategic visions.
5
    
 Primary election laws have changed as their legal environment shifted and 
political actors developed new strategies.  Nor is this the study of a completed process; 
                                                          
3
 Merriam and Overacker (1928), pp. 5.   
4
 The origin of the term “primary” is even a bit obscure; Ware points out that before about 1900 a primary 
was called a “Crawford County System” after a Pennsylvania county that was an early adopter (in 1842) of 
what we now think of as primary elections.  See Ware (2002, pp. 58 and pp. 97).      
5
 For an example from presidential nominating politics: the Democratic Party’s decision to start up the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission in response to the 1968 Democratic Convention disaster (as discussed later 
in this chapter).    
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the framework in which states set the laws (as legal entities, and as the enforcement 
power of the will of whichever parties control them) continues to evolve.  Several of the 
important court cases did not take place until the 2000s, and important issues remain 
unresolved.  Highly motivated consultants, party activists, and candidates—as well as 
some outside reformers—continue to try to find ways to exploit the rules and push the 
envelope to gain advantages for implementing preferred policy outcomes.  California’s 
switch to the top-two primary will not be the last major change in state primary laws in 
the coming years.  While Merriam and Overacker could well write that the nominating 
system they had in 1928 did not exist at the founding of the Republic, it can also be said 
that the systems we have now did not exist in 1928.  These ongoing changes drive the 
need for new research. 
Nevertheless, primaries remain understudied.  In the preface to the 1928 volume, 
Charles Merriam wrote “for a number of years I have urged that a comprehensive survey 
of the nominating system be undertaken… it has never been possible, however, to obtain 
the funds necessary for this important piece of research, and there seems to be no 
immediate prospect that such a thoroughgoing investigation will be made” (1928, pp. vii-
viii).
6
  Little did he know.  In 2002 Alan Ware noted “it might be imagined, given the 
significance of the direct primary, that much original research, on its adoption by the 
states, would have been undertaken.  In fact, it is a subject that attracts virtually no 
attention.  Not since 1928, when the last edition of Charles Merriam’s Primary Elections 
was published… has a major study appeared” (2002, pp. 2).  Since the 1970s, political 
                                                          
6
 Charles Merriam wrote the preface, although both Merriam and Overacker are credited with the work.   
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scientists have studied aspects of primary elections but the subject deserves, as Ware 
noted, more attention than scholars have so far granted it. 
The theoretical argument – “why primaries matter” – is pretty simple.  The only 
qualifications to run for United States Representative for any particular state, as set out in 
Article 1 Section 2 of the United States Constitution, are that the individual be at least 
twenty-five years old, a citizen for seven years, and a resident of that state.  The formal 
qualifications for most public offices in the United States are similarly few.  A great 
number of Americans are eligible to run, yet few appear on the general election ballot.  
While not everyone desires to obtain public office, presumably many more are willing 
and are capable than ever appear on the ballot.
7
  The nominating procedures – in most 
cases, a primary election – represent the barrier between ‘the many’ who would have the 
interest and the ability and ‘the few’ among whom voters may select in November.  To 
the extent that some candidates are better qualified, or more capable, or more 
representative of the electorate than others, and to the extent that the primary laws 
influence which candidates do enter and win the primary, then the primary laws directly 
affect the quality and character of our representative government.  This chapter provides 
a review of what we know about how primary election laws influence political outcomes. 
How We Came to Have Primaries in the First Place 
 Although I do not concern myself a great deal with what happened before 1945 in 
this study, the literature on the origin of primaries has an inescapable influence.  
Primaries did not appear, like Athena, fully formed; they were not exogenously imposed 
on states.  Understanding how they came about matters for the quantitative analysis I 
                                                          
7
 For example, if offered, the author of this study would happily accept a position in the United States 
Senate, although he remains doubtful of his prospects of winning a primary election.   
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perform in Chapters 2 and 3; in particular, it would be problematic if states systematically 
selected primary types based on the criteria I want to test (generating “selection bias”).  
Fortunately (for my research; for the citizens, a more nuanced judgment may be 
required), this does not appear to have been the case; while the main accounts of “why 
we have primaries” may differ in some of the particulars, they certainly agree in 
presenting a complicated and varied process by which states adopted different rules.   
 Merriam and Overacker (1928) argue that the direct primary came about, in part, 
as an innovation to solve the problems associated with the stress population growth put 
on the system of American government.  As they note in their opening chapter, 
individuals became candidates through a variety of means before the advent of the direct 
primary; when parties involved themselves in this process, they did so as private 
organizations.  Private organizations had less recourse under the law to control behavior; 
they noted that in the early days of party efforts to organize nominations “bribery of 
voters in an election, although subject to severe penalties under the law, did not constitute 
an offense in a primary or caucus and was not punishable.  Voters might be bought and 
sold with no pretense of concealment, for there was no remedy or penalty at law” (1928, 
pp. 6).  This problem sounds somewhat similar to the problem faced by drug dealers 
today: since their product is illegal, and therefore the government cannot enforce property 
rights, they have to enforce “property rights” via their own violence.  Merriam and 
Overacker noted that the early party-organized primary election, “having become one of 
the most important steps in the process of government, was open to every abuse that 
unscrupulous men, dazzled by prospects of almost incredible wealth and dictatorial 
power, could devise and execute” (1928, pp. 7).   
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 One solution: a party could voluntarily ask a government entity to regulate a 
primary.  California passed the first of these laws, enabling a party to appeal to state 
power—“An Act to Protect the Elections of Voluntary Associations and to Punish Frauds 
Therein”—in 1866 (Merriam and Overacker 1928, pp. 8).  Other states would follow, 
although Merriam and Overacker do not argue that these voluntary laws were particularly 
effective.  At some point in the 1870s “the Union League Club of Philadelphia offered a 
prize for the best essay on the subject of party nomination”;  Merriam and Overacker 
describe the winning idea: “The successful competitor offered a plan by which all 
candidates should be chosen by direct, plurality vote of the political party, and all such 
nominations should be made on a fixed day, by all parties, and should be conducted 
under the same rules and regulations as control of the regular election” (1928, pp. 11).  
This solution – a near perfect description of a traditional “closed” primary election law – 
would eventually be implemented in most states.  The process of creating a mandatory 
direct primary in most states, though, would not begin in earnest until around 1900.  
Some states today that have “challenge primaries” (like Connecticut) only barely meet 
those qualifications; states like California and Washington that have gone to a 
nonpartisan top-two primary actually have evolved beyond that description.   
 In his investigation of direct primaries (in the non-South, a region which Merriam 
and Overacker also noted experienced a different process), Ware cautioned against 
adopting the whole of Merriam and Overacker’s description of the next step: the 
implementation of mandatory primary laws.  He wrote “one of the weaknesses of much 
that has been written about direct primaries since [1928] is that political scientists have 
relied too heavily on Merriam’s account of what happened, or on the rather different 
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version of that account produced by his most outstanding graduate student, V. O. Key” 
(Ware 2002, pp. 2).
8
  Ware tells a slightly different story than the traditional ‘party v. 
reformer’ tale.  He argued “parties do not institutionalize just because, in some sense, it is 
necessary for the political system to work efficiently, or even to work at all.  They 
institutionalize because a sufficient number of politicians within those parties come to 
understand that their own interests are affected by present arrangements” (2002, pp. 22).  
He contends: 
The direct primary, then, was not an isolated reform that happened to be 
enacted when parties were sufficiently weak that their opponents could 
overcome them (‘heroically’).  It was a reform that had its origins in 
changes in American society that, by the 1880s, were starting to pose 
severe problems for party politicians.  The efforts by those politicians to 
devise procedures and regulations for dealing with them culminated in a 
reform that, much later, many politicians wished had not been enacted and 
which they tried to repeal.  The direct primary was to have many 
consequences for the conduct of party politics – its most important long-
term consequence being to reduce the role of party in American politics.  
Yet is wholly misleading to deduce from those adverse consequences, and 
from the opposition of politicians in the 1920s to the direct primary, that is 
introduction must have been imposed on the parties, and have been 
opposed by them.  As will be seen, the truth was less dramatic, in that the 
direct primary’s introduction did not usually involve a pitched battle 
between antiparty reformers and party leaders, but much more complex 
assessments of where personal and party interests might lie (2002, pp. 22). 
   
While Ware does give a role to political culture and to anti-party reformers, he rightly 
points out the obvious: if all-powerful party machines opposed imposing direct primaries, 
and direct primaries are imposed, then either they must not be all-powerful or they must 
not have opposed them.          
                                                          
8
 Ware went on to say: “Key’s work was flawed because it is clear that, except for the South, he had not 
actually examined the process by which primary elections were introduced” (pp. 2).  Ware thinks Merriam 
(and, later, Merriam and Overacker) overstated the importance of Wisconsin’s 1903 primary law, 
neglecting developments in Minnesota (1899) and elsewhere that came first.  This makes La Follette of 
Wisconsin “pivotal” in the development of direct primaries, overstating his importance in Ware’s opinion 
(see Ware 2002, pp. 114).     
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 Ware also observed that instituting a direct primary and establishing legal control 
over party activities are not the same.
9
  “Between the early 1880s and late 1890s,” he 
wrote, “party nominations shifted from being a matter that was run largely on an informal 
basis to one that operated, in most states, within a system of party rules and, more 
especially, state law” (Ware 2002, pp. 93).  To get to the state mandated semi-closed 
primary (a typical type of primary law in use in 2012) both events had to occur.  Parties 
could have had some sort of legal control without resorting to direct primaries.  Resort to 
direct primaries they did, though; Ware breaks this process (in the North) down to two 
phases: something more like an experimental phase from 1900 to 1906 and then a more 
rapid expansion between 1907 and 1915.  By 1915, “only three states – Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, and New Mexico (a territory until 1912) – had not adopted the direct 
primary in some form” (Ware 2002, pp. 117).  Ware contends that the direct primary 
seemed like a reasonable solution to the difficulties of using any other kind of nomination 
system (the main alternative: caucuses) to select candidates in the era, so politicians were 
willing to implement it. 
 To develop his argument that the ‘reformers vs. urban machines’ story is 
inaccurate, Ware specifically outlines how direct primaries came to be implemented in 
the five states with the largest cities in 1900: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Missouri, 
Illinois, and New York (see Ware 2002, starting pp. 131).  About one of these examples, 
Pennsylvania, Ware writes that “the Republican dominated legislature needed to pass 
legislation to restore public confidence in the party.  Party nominations were an area in 
which there was public disquiet, and some form of public control of elections would have 
                                                          
9
 See his Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.   
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to be enacted.  However, they were not under pressure to concede vital party interests in 
doing so, and had direct nominations been seen as contrary to the interests of the party it 
is inconceivable that they would have been traded away” (Ware 2002, pp. 144).  The 
Pennsylvania example is particularly salient because it arises also in Ware’s chapter on 
party competition as a stimulus for primary reform; some, like V.O. Key (Ware is 
referencing Key’s 1958 Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups; for a discussion of their 
differences, see Ware 2002, pp. 195) argued that primaries arose in the absence of 
competition.  Ware makes the reverse argument; in some places (although not all), 
competition between parties made parties more open to considering reform efforts.      
 After 1915, the “establishment” tide flowed out again on direct primaries; Ware 
noted that opponents of the direct primary launched repeal efforts in nineteen states in 
1925 (Ware 2002, pp. 227).  The opponents suggested primaries “could not provide for 
balanced tickets (and, thereby, the demands for representation by particular localities and 
ethnic groups), could greatly increase the cost of nomination for some offices, and could 
lead to the selection of unqualified, unsuitable, or unelectable candidates” (Ware 2002, 
pp. 230).  Ware lists several reasons that the primary persisted: (1) once it became the 
status quo, it was more difficult to dislodge; (2) it remained popular;
10
 (3) women 
preferred primaries and by the 1920s had the vote.
11
  If parties did not like the direct 
primary by the 1920s, though, Ware argues that they would like it less and less as time 
went by; “the main impact of the direct primary was not experienced until the 1960s… 
                                                          
10
 His evidence: referendums to get rid of direct primaries tended to fail (Ware 2002, pp. 229).    
11
 Ware (2002, pp. 229) cites Merriam, Charles E.  1923.  “Nominating Systems.”  Annals of the Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 106.  Ware wrote “women formed only about 5 or 10 percent of delegates 
to conventions but constituted 40 percent of primary voters.”      
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[when] changes in campaign technology fundamentally shifted the balance between 
candidates and parties” (2002, pp. 244).   
 Merriam and Overacker (1928) and Ware (2002) and other authors note that the 
history of primaries in the American South (generally, the eleven states of the 
Confederacy) worked slightly differently.  Many southern states developed a different 
institution: the “southern runoff primary.”  This type of primary election requires a 
second round (the “runoff”) within each party if no candidate of that party gets at least 
some threshold of the vote.  Voters, then, potentially go through three elections: the 
original primary, a runoff, and then the general election.  Bullock and Johnson (1992) 
point to the theoretical advantage of this type of system: no candidate can be elected to 
office without obtaining some minimal threshold of support (normally 50%).  While they 
admit that this does not overcome all theoretical potential downsides, it may help mitigate 
some.
12
   
 The southern runoff is the subject of some academic debate, mainly over the 
intentions of its supporters and its effects.  Bullock and Johnson (1992) list four common 
“myths” (hypotheses?) about the runoff primary: “the leader-loses myth, the incumbent-
loses myth, the female-loses myth, and the minority-loses myth” (pp. 27).  They identified 
the “historical intent of the runoff as a means to ensure majority support in the 
Democratic Party” and noted “many southern states adopted the majority-vote 
requirement during the first part of the century—after both Republicans and Populists had 
ceased to be a serious threat in statewide contests” (pp. 159).  That is, the Southern runoff 
                                                          
12
 They direct the reader’s attention to the discussion of the “Condorcet Paradox” in Riker, William H.  
1982.  Liberalism against Populism.  San Francisco: Freeman. pp. 74-77 as well as Black, Duncan.  1958.  
The Theory of Committees and Elections.  London: Cambridge University Press.  See Bullock and Johnson 
(1992) pp. xiv.     
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came about for the reasons Key (1949, 1958) suggested and that Ware (2002) identified 
as limited to the south. 
 Not all political scientists agree.  Kousser posed the question: “Was the adoption 
of the run-off primary part of a general ‘progressive’ move to democratize elections, or 
was it an episode in a reactionary crusade to eliminate any chance of black influence in 
politics by perpetuating one-party rule?” (1984, pp. 23).  He meant the question 
rhetorically; later in the article, he commented “the most obvious answer is that very little 
in the South since 1619 has been devoid of racial motives” (pp. 24).  Kousser cited the 
biographer of South Carolina's Ben Tillman, who apparently indicated that he selected 
the direct primary in 1896 “as the most satisfactory means of allaying discontent within 
the Democratic ranks and of reducing the danger of political appeal to the Negro” 
(Kousser 1984, pp. 24).  While Kousser notes that direct evidence of intent is difficult to 
come by – the policies were often adopted in closed-door meetings of which there are 
apparently no records – the “the indirect evidence from the pattern of adoptions of the 
run-offs suggests that racial motives for choosing the device were hardly absent” (see 
Kousser 1984, pp. 26).   
While Bullock and Johnson (1992) give an example of how detractors of the 
runoff primary could conclude the rule harms the interests of black candidates.  In a 1982 
Democratic congressional primary in South Carolina, “black state legislator Mickey 
Michaux polled 44 percent of the vote… in the runoff Michaux’s vote total rose by 2,800 
but he still lost to [the other candidate] by a 54 to 46 percent margin” (Bullock and 
Johnson 1992, pp. 102).  The inference is that all the white voters coalesced around the 
white candidate, making it all but impossible for a black candidate to win unless the 
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primary electorate contained a majority of blacks.  Bullock and Johnson find little support 
for this hypothesis generally; at least, they certainly do not find overwhelming support in 
favor of the notion that minorities always lose.  Nevertheless, the weak evidence for the 
effect does not change the original intent, as argued in Kousser (1984).  
The motives of the political actors who imposed direct primaries – in the South or 
otherwise – are not just matters of history.  They also explain the present.  It is not the 
case that politics worked one way and then, from the 1950s onwards (the period on which 
I focus) politics worked completely differently.  Interested political actors faced the same 
problem in 1899 (the mandatory direct primary in Minneapolis) and 1950 (the first year 
of my own dataset) and 2009 (when California’s legislature agreed to put the top-two 
primary on the ballot).  The arguments presented in Merriam and Overacker (1928), 
further developed in Ware (2002), and extended to the South in Bullock and Johnson 
(1992) and Kousser (1984) do have one theme in common – disagreements amongst 
themselves notwithstanding.  Primary election laws came about in many places for 
specific political purposes.  Explanations range from implementing good government, to 
reforming political machines, to gaining an advantage in competitive elections, to solving 
party organization problems, to advancing the cause of one particular faction or race, and 
on to others.  In the history of primary election laws, assuredly all of these motives 
affected some of the actors at some time.   
We should not, then, expect primary election laws to remain set in stone from this 
time forward.  If the early history of primary elections is to serve as a guide, we should 
instead expect more changes.  While Ware (2002) noted the role of technology in making 
modern campaigns more candidate-centric, allowing primaries to play an even larger role 
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in diminishing the power of parties, we may experience further changes in technology, 
demographics, or law that will alter this balance.  One of the challenges in understanding 
the literature about the effects of different types of primary laws, reviewed below, is that 
these effects are very temporal.  One study conducted on a type of law in the 1970s may 
have produced a different outcome if conducted in the 2000s; if candidates had the 
capacity to more easily speak directly to voters in 1970 than they did in 1870, how much 
easier is that in the era of Facebook and Twitter?  Going forward, will parties find a way 
to use the new “Super-PACS” to regain more control over nominations, regardless of 
primary type?
13
  And so on.  Nevertheless, since political actors continue to make 
decisions about changing primary election laws, political science should at least be able 
to provide a preliminary answer about the consequences of choosing one type of electoral 
institution over another. 
 For the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the history provides some comfort.  
Most states adopted primaries generally between 1900 and 1945.  While states after 1945 
continue to change their primary laws, many states with open or (broadly speaking) 
closed primary types had the basics of those laws in place by then.  Many of these laws 
came about because of specific political contexts which would have changed a great deal 
by the time of my study.  The pressing political concerns of Alabama and Wisconsin in 
1904 were both likely quite different from each other – and quite different from the 
political issues of 1946 and 2012.  Both states adopted an open primary format.   
                                                          
13
 The result of the decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
This allowed unlimited spending by “independent expenditure” groups as long as they were not 
coordinated with a particular campaign.   
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 The rest of this chapter focuses on the political science literature about primary 
elections.  The main questions are all derivatives of: now that we have primaries, what 
are the effects?  I have grouped the literature around some of the central questions: do 
competitive primaries hurt their party?  How do different primary laws affect turnout?  
What is the relationship of primary laws and voter registration?  Do some laws produce 
more moderate candidates than others?  What is the role of crossover voting?  Since 
presidential primaries have a very different purpose and structure than other primary 
elections, I also spend some time discussing the differences between presidential 
nominating procedures and the non-presidential nominations that are the focus on this 
work.  As mentioned in the introduction, the main political question of today seems to be 
whether the Republican Party will be able to nominate more competitive candidates in 
the next primary seasons, so I intend to focus this research on the notions of 
competitiveness and moderation.   
Consequences of Primary Competitiveness 
   One of the more obvious potential downsides to a competitive primary election, 
from a party perspective, is that your own candidates spend time slinging mud at each 
other.  In the primaries leading up to the 2012 presidential election, Republicans Newt 
Gingrich and Mitt Romney (as well as Rick Santorum) battled fiercely.  One report in 
The Hill summarized the situation before Florida’s presidential primary as: “Newt 
Gingrich and Mitt Romney may be on a path toward mutually assured destruction, and 
both are refusing to unilaterally disarm… the candidates socked each other over whose 
finances were more unscrupulous, whose ads more repulsive, whose position more anti-
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immigrant.”14  The mudslinging, in any case, did not lead Mitt Romney to the White 
House; examples like this help frame the hypothesis that the personal attacks damage 
candidates in primaries. 
 There are more potential problems beyond just incidental campaign damage.  
There’s a “spatial modeling” problem too, also illustrated by the 2012 primary season.  
Mitt Romney had to fend off attacks in Republican primaries from the right; at one point, 
he remarked that he was “severely conservative” in an effort to appeal to Republican 
primary voters.  When he got to the general election, President Obama had not forgotten 
the remark.  As the Politico reported, “‘He’s trying to go through an extreme makeover,’ 
Obama said. ‘After running for a year in which he called himself ‘severely conservative,’ 
Mitt Romney’s trying to convince you that he was severely kidding.’”15  In the sense of 
the median voter theorem (see Hotelling 1929 and Black 1948) and spatial modeling (see 
Downs 1957), one can imagine a competitive primary forcing a candidate to locate too 
far off the median to be able to recover for the general election.  Owen and Grofman 
(2006) developed a recent model of this process for primaries that even allowed primary 
voters to care not just about policy but also about victory; unsurprisingly, they still find 
that they “almost always get nonconvergence – with the most likely result, the location of 
the winning candidates of each party near their own party medians” (pp. 560).16   
                                                          
14
 See Lederman, Josh.  2012.  “As Florida primary fight turns personal, Republican insiders fear for party 
unity.”  The Hill.  Published online January 29.  Available online at: http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-
box/gop-presidential-primary/207221-as-florida-race-turns-personal-gop-insiders-fear-for-party-unity (last 
accessed 02/13/2013).   
15
 See Epstein, Reid J.  2012.  “Obama says Romney was ‘severely kidding.’  Politico.  Published online 
October 11.  Available online at: http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/10/obama-says-romney-was-
severely-kidding-138178.html (last accessed 02/13/2013).     
16
 They make a good point in their article as well: “Moreover, by allowing primary voters to care both 
about what policies candidates espouse and the likelihood that a candidate will win the general election, we 
have avoided the peculiar dichotomy of the standard Downsian approach wherein voters are posited to care 
only about their policy proximity to the candidates at the same time that candidates are posited to care only 
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 While I focus on non-presidential primaries in the analysis in later chapters, the 
unsuccessful candidacies of Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum, and Mitt Romney highlight 
the same challenges that candidates in non-presidential primaries face.  Atkeson (1998) 
addressed the specific hypothesis that competitive primaries damaged the eventual 
nominee and finds little support for this hypothesis.  In the context of modern presidential 
politics, this makes sense: in 2008, for example, the country seemed riveted by the 
contest between then-Senators Obama and Clinton; Republican candidate Senator John 
McCain seemed unable to get a word into the conversation for months and eventually lost 
the general election.  President Obama was able to overcome apparent errors – such as his 
remarks that small town Pennsylvanians “get bitter” and “cling to guns or religion” – 
without too much difficulty.
17
   
It is possible that presidential politics and state politics work differently; 
Bernstein (1977) found evidence that divisive primaries hurt the party’s nominees in 
Senate elections from 1956–1972.  Born (1981) and Atkeson (1998) rightly criticize 
studies like Bernstein’s (and others of its type) for treating “divisive” as a binary variable 
with an arbitrary cutoff (see Born 1981, pp. 642).
18
  Born found “some support” for “the 
conventional belief that divisive primary battles harm a party’s general election chances”; 
in particular, divisive primaries hurt incumbents in the House races he studied from 1962 
to 1976 (see pp. 659–660).  The divisiveness, though, “leads only to minor electoral 
                                                                                                                                                                             
about winning” (pp. 560).  Disappointingly, as I hope I will successfully argue here, their model does not 
sufficiently take into account different types of primaries – a common problem.      
17
 See Smith, Ben.  2008.  “Obama on small-town Pa.: Clinging to religion, guns, xenophobia.”  Politico.  
Posted  April 11.  Available online at: 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0408/Obama_on_smalltown_PA_Clinging_religion_guns_xenoph
obia.html (last accessed 02/13/2013).        
18
 Born raises another important technical issue as well: “But, a party’s November showing, in fact, might 
exert a reciprocal influence on the intensity of competition within the primaries themselves.  Potential 
contenders for a nomination may well have reasonably accurate expectations about the fall election 
outcome and weigh these expectations heavily in determining whether or not to run” (Born 1981, pp. 643).   
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damage” (pp. 660).  I think for practical purposes, this is an area in which the theoretical 
consequences apply both the presidential and non-presidential elections: what candidates 
have to do to win their primary should have some effect on their general election chances, 
although what effect will be highly variable based on the details of that specific primary.               
 Adams and Merrill (2008) present a theoretical argument about why competitive 
primary elections may actually help parties.  If competition takes place over two 
dimensions – policy space and “valence” qualities (roughly, competence or charisma) – 
and the candidate quality is unknown, “relative to a procedure where party elites 
handpick a nominee – even one located at the median of the general electorate – holding 
a primary may increase a party’s chance of winning the general election.  This is because 
in many plausible scenarios the strategic advantage arising from the primary electorate’s 
ability to select a high-quality nominee… outweighs the strategic disadvantage that the 
primary pulls the party’s nominee away from the center of the general electorate” (pp. 
345).  The explanation for 2008 and 2012, then, would be that in 2008 the competitive 
Democratic primary season helped secure a high quality candidate (President Obama) 
without forcing him into too many trade-offs; on the other hand, perhaps the 2012 
campaign on the Republican side involved more spatial trade-offs and acquired a 
candidate who, while better qualified than his opponents, still had to face the high-
valence President Obama.  
 The theoretical expectations framed in Owen and Grofman (2006) – that 
competitive primaries constrain candidates away from the median voter – are empirically 
tested in Hirano et al. (2010).  They ask “do members of congress take more extreme 
policy positions after the introduction of mandatory direct primary laws in their state?” 
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(pp. 170).  They find that “primary elections do not have a large impact of [Members of 
Congress]’s roll call voting positions, even when the ideological composition of the 
primary electorate appears to be relatively extreme or when the threat of primary 
competition appears to be particularly strong” (pp. 172).  Note that they are not referring 
to the differences between types but to the imposition of laws at all. 
 The first step in Hirano et al. examines the imposition of primary laws and 
polarization.  They use seven states that introduced direct primary laws for congressional 
elections somewhat late: “Connecticut (1956), Delaware (1970), Indiana (1976), New 
Mexico (1940), New York (1968), Rhode Island (1948) and Utah (1938)”; for Indiana 
and New York they note that those states used primaries for House (not Senate) elections 
earlier and so they drop them from the House analysis (pp. 174).
19
  What they find is that 
“if anything, the estimates… suggest that [Members of Congress] in these states took 
more moderate positions after primaries were introduced in their states.  Thus, mandatory 
primaries do not appear to have had any more of a polarizing effect on roll call voting 
behavior compared to the previous nominating procedures used in these states” (pp. 174).  
Moreover, they also found “the evidence that low turnout is related to senators with more 
extreme roll call voting positions is weak at best” and that the ideological positions of the 
general electorate had more to do with polarization than the ideological positions of the 
primary electorate (pp. 179–180).  Further, they found “little evidence that the 
competitiveness of primaries when senators are first elected is related to their 
                                                          
19
 As I will describe elsewhere, but is worth briefly noting here, this is a very unrepresentative sample 
selection of states.  Connecticut, New York, and Utah are all prominent examples of “Challenge Primary” 
or strong “pre-primary endorsement” states --- see McNitt (1980) --- in which a primary only occurs if the 
delegates to the party conventions are insufficiently agreed upon a candidate.  New York also sports other 
unusual rules like cross-filing.  Furthermore, the late adoption of the primaries in all of these states (relative 
to the states adopting primaries in earlier years) would also suggest that there may be something different 
about their politics that is unmeasured here.      
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contribution to polarization during their first elected term in office” (pp. 183).  They do 
find one “positive finding”: their “research underscores a central conjecture of political 
science, namely, general election competition creates pressure for ideological 
convergence and moderation” (pp. 189).  They do not find, though, much evidence that 
imposing primary election laws increases polarization.    
 Something left unexplored empirically in Born (1981), Atkeson (1998) and 
Hirano et al. (2010) and theoretically in Adams and Merrill (2008) and other similar 
works: type of primary law.  This is not necessarily something “missing” in a pejorative 
sense; the papers make fine academic contributions.  The field of study is just large 
enough to make some aspects of it beyond the scope of any particular study.  The types of 
primaries can make a difference, though, particularly at the margin.  As Adams and 
Merrill describe a trade-off between getting high-quality candidates and forcing them to 
commit to more extreme policy positions through primaries, it would seem reasonable 
that some types of primaries may make this trade-off more extreme.  In the context of the 
2012 presidential cycle, this question would be rephrased as: would Mitt Romney not 
have had to move as far rightward if all the Republican primaries had been more “open” 
rather than more “closed” primaries?20  Hirano et al. choose to focus in detail on two 
other aspects: the underlying polarization of the electorate and “the degree to which 
[Members of Congress] face electoral threats from primary challengers” rather than to 
investigate differences in primary type (2010, pp. 1717).  Before dismissing the effect of 
competitive primaries on polarization, though, two further advances are required: first to 
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 It should also be noted here that works like Owen and Grofman (2006) and Adams and Merrill (2008) 
clearly contemplate partisan primaries; the argument would be much more complicated in a nonpartisan 
runoff like the laws now in place in Washington State and California (and that have been used periodically 
in Louisiana).    
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not treat pre-primary nominating systems as equivalent
21
 and, second, to control for 
primary type.  One possibility to explain the null results in Hirano et al. (2010) is simply 
that the types of primaries included had opposite effects and, when treated as equivalent, 
effectively canceled each other in their empirical investigation.
22
     
 McNitt (1980) examined the levels of competition for different types of 
nomination procedures: conventions, endorsing (pre-primary) conventions, and direct 
primaries.  He pointed out that a careful study of nomination procedures requires not just 
separating out the formal primary rules (as he does) but also considering the whole 
institutional context.  He analyzed gubernatorial and senatorial nominations from 1954 to 
1974, an era of considerable institutional diversity.  He found, as expected, that primaries 
generated more competition than conventions (pp. 260–261).  He also found that open 
primaries “do not fit the logical expectations of greater competition” (pp. 261).  Overall, 
he observed that most nominations were not very competitive and that the effects of 
conventions could be overstated: “endorsing conventions are more likely to block minor 
candidates than to force major competitors out of the contest” (pp. 262).  Still, for pre-
primary endorsement conventions, “the convention choice usually wins the primary”; so 
if the measure of interest is not ‘competitiveness’ but ‘victory,’ then it is important to 
consider whether or not a state has those kinds of institutions (pp. 266).  
 McNitt’s work best aligns with what I find in the subsequent chapters.  While he 
focused on competition for nominations and I focus on the effects those nominations 
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 An observation which should follow from reading Merriam and Overacker (1928) or Ware (2002).  
22
 The methodological observation: compare b(x1+x2) to b1x1 + b2x2.  If b1 = -1 and b2 = +1, and they 
treat b = b1 + b2, they will find b = 0 and arrive at a null effect when the truth is quite different.  It’s 
certainly ex-ante possible that more closed primaries could increase polarization when compared to 
previous nominating systems but that more open primaries could decrease it through crossover voting or 
appeals to independents.     
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have on general election competitiveness, these two notions are linked.  Taking the 
Adams and Merrill (2008) point, if competitive primaries may provide higher quality 
candidates (at the cost of an ideological trade-off) the low competition McNitt found in 
open primaries may relate to the lower levels of general election competitiveness I find 
for states with open primary rules.  In any event, McNitt also provided a great service by 
categorizing primary laws by type for one of the periods of my database; I made 
considerable use of his research to supplement other sources in defining which type of 
primary each state used when.   
Primary Laws and Turnout 
 Another major open question about primary law type is whether one kind of law 
stimulates more mass participation than another.  Jewell (1977) set out to investigate if 
the variables that affect turnout in primaries were at all different than those for general 
elections.  Jewell observed that measuring turnout in primaries can be difficult; because 
of differences across institutions, some primaries have a smaller potential pool of voters 
than others (for example, a strictly closed system versus an open system).  Unopposed 
candidacies also cause a problem.  Jewell calculated the turnout as a percent of voting age 
population and as a percent of two-party general election vote (see pp. 242).  He 
considered these primary election systems: closed, closed with at least a six month pre-
election partisan registration freeze, open, open with the voter declaring partisanship at 
the polls, and “open-blanket” meaning that the “voter may vote in both primaries” (pp. 
242; see Jewell’s Table 1).  He found that “there are not dramatic differences between 
states with open and closed primaries, but closed primaries with long waiting periods for 
shifting registration (some of which have now been abolished) have had low turnout 
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rates; open primaries with no required party identification have high turnout; and 
Washington and Alaska – states with a blanket primary – have particularly high turnout” 
(pp. 243).
23
  Like McNitt (1980), Jewell (1977) provided an invaluable resource for 
descriptions of primary laws from post-war through the 1970s.            
 Rothenberg and Brody addressed turnout in presidential primaries.  They 
concluded “closeness does count in primaries” (1988, pp. 267).  That is, despite our 
theoretical view that voters must only participate out of a sense of duty (Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968) – since the probability of casting the pivotal vote even in a close 
primary is very near zero – voters seem to participate more in what appear to be close 
contests.  Furthermore, in the view of Rothenberg and Brody, the institutional “context” 
of primaries stimulated turnout; for example, increasing (by 1988) numbers of delegates 
to presidential conventions had to vote for the winner of the primary.  That increased the 
perception of the importance of presidential primaries; if the delegates could freely ignore 
the primary result, voters would be less inclined to participate.   
Primary Laws and Voter Registration 
 Voter registration requirements and primary election laws are closely linked areas 
of research.  In particular, to conduct a closed or semi-closed primary election, states 
must register voters by party.  The easy availability of party registration lists (frequently 
then also considered public records – so this constitutes a public affirmation of 
partisanship) may make campaigning different in important ways in states with such lists.  
That is, the tool necessary to facilitate running a closed primary may also facilitate 
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 Jewell also noted the impact of pre-primary endorsements: “some of the states where organizations make 
endorsements in primaries have lower turnout, as well as less frequent contests, but there are some 
exceptions: Utah, North Dakota, and California have high turnout despite the use of endorsements” (1977, 
pp. 244).  For a more extensive argument about pre-primary nominations or endorsements, see McNitt 
(1980).       
31 
 
turnout or microtargeting (for a discussion of the effects of registering with a party in 
California, see Sinclair 2013).  Burden and Greene (2000) argue that the act of registering 
also increases a sense of partisanship.  In some states – like in Connecticut, as discussed 
in the next chapter – policymakers may have thought that voting in a party primary would 
also increase a sense of partisanship; getting voters in the door at the primary (higher 
turnout, trying to create more open primaries) might help a party win in the general 
election.                      
Primary Type and Candidate Moderation 
 In my view, the main question to answer about different types of primaries is if a 
rule produces more moderate or more extreme candidates.  This will be a focus 
throughout the later chapters—both through the multi-state perspective and in examining 
California’s top-two primary.  The answer matters not just for the competitiveness of 
general elections—under the theory that more moderate candidates are more likely to 
win—but for the larger point about what policies ultimately the government adopts.  In 
the larger view, Americans should care about their elections not just because of the name 
of the winning team—but because the winners actually get to impose policies that affect 
the lives of everyday citizens.  Investigating how primary laws affect the ideological and 
partisan characteristics of candidates addresses a very important question. 
 As a general rule, political science tends to think about elections in a one-
dimensional spatial model, even though formal models have been extended into multiple 
dimensions.  Even in just a single dimension, the models require some relatively strong 
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assumptions.
24
  Practically speaking, it makes sense to think of the single dimension only 
when considering something like strength of partisanship or ideology; even something as 
simple as contemplating specifically both the amount spent on a policy and the way to 
pay for it requires two dimensions (see Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970, pp. 428, for 
that example).  Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook observe that “dominant positions, in 
general, do not exist for a multi-dimensional world” (1970, pp. 428).  Informally, this 
translates to ‘bad things happen in multiple dimensions.’  This is not to say that this sort 
of research is unproductive or unlikely to obtain useful results; Calvert summarized the 
literature and observed “the multidimensional voting model is substantially robust against 
important changes in its key assumptions” (1985, pp. 70).  Nevertheless, it is sufficiently 
complicated to make formal predictions of the outcomes in an n-dimensional policy space 
for a variety of types of primary election laws very difficult.
25
 
 In practice, political science has tended to address the problem of defining “more 
moderate candidates” in the context of primaries more like the way Justice Potter Stewart 
dealt with defining pornography: “I know it when I see it.”26  There’s less of an agreed-
upon definition as a general notion of what constitutes moderation.  Most papers do not 
attempt to pair empirical analysis with a multi-dimensional notion of candidate placement 
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 For the median voter theorem to work, you have to assume voters have “single peaked preferences.”  
That is, there exists an ideal point for each voter from which each point farther away is increasingly less 
preferred.  It also assumes only two candidates.  Cox (1987) showed that “multicandidate equilibria under 
plurality rule must be noncentrist” (pp. 82).  Cooper and Munger (2000) demonstrate with simulations that 
if many candidates enter closed primaries the winners can be very ideologically extreme in a 1-dimensional 
ideological space.   
25
 One of the real modeling challenges with any of these sorts of models is to figure out how to deal with 
candidate entry in a way that captures the important dynamics of the process.  After all, one of the 
questions about different primary types is whether they encourage or discourage candidate entry at certain 
points in the issue-space.  Palfrey (1984) devised a model in which two parties would not position their 
candidates at the median in order to prevent entry of a third party.  For another criticism of the standard 
electoral models, see Wittman (1983); he allows candidates to care about both implementing specific 
policies and about winning.       
26
 See Justice Potter Stewart’s concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).   
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in an issue space; instead, practical shortcuts are employed.  Gerber and Morton (1998) 
used a very practical approach to empirically investigate the effects of different types of 
primary laws on the ideological location of candidates.  U.S. congressional elections from 
1982 to 1990 provided the data for Gerber and Morton’s analysis.  To measure the 
ideology of the winning candidates, they used ADA scores (ideological measures 
developed by a political group, Americans for Democratic Action).  To get a measure of 
district ideology, they used the “average of the percent in the district voting for Mondale 
in 1984 and for Dukakis in 1988” (pp. 314).  While not a measure of n-dimensional 
preferences, this is a very good solution.  It allows them to use a lot of data for which 
other measures of preferences are not readily available and almost assuredly correlates 
with a reasonable notion of ideological preferences.         
 Gerber and Morton employ a relatively simple classification scheme.  For their 
purposes, “a primary is considered open if participants either do not need to declare party 
affiliation as a prerequisite to participating in a primary election or may do so on election 
day” (pp. 306).  In this category, they include blanket primaries, nonpartisan primaries, 
and more traditional open primaries.  They defined a primary “as closed if participation is 
limited to voters who declare their affiliation to the party a specified period prior to the 
election” (pp. 306).  They define a primary “as semi-closed if new registrants are allowed 
to both register and choose their party on the day of the primary or if independents are 
allowed to participate” (pp. 306).  They do though, later in their analysis, include 
variables to separate out the southern runoff primaries, the nonpartisan blanket primaries, 
and some geographic controls that may pick up some regional variance in types of rules 
as well.       
34 
 
 Gerber and Morton emphasized the role of crossover voting (partisans voting in 
the other party primary) as a potential causal mechanism for why different primary laws 
would produce different outcomes.  They wrote that “primary system rules affect the 
identity of the median voter in the parties’ primaries by affecting the cost to voters of 
engaging in particular forms of strategic behavior” (pp. 310).  Like other research in this 
area (see the more extensive section below on crossover voting) they acknowledge the 
existence both of “sincere” crossover votes and “strategic” votes and the participation of 
nonpartisans as potential sources for moderation.
27
 
 They expected closed primary systems to “produce more extreme general election 
winners relative to their constituencies’ general election median voter, then more open 
primary systems” (pp. 312).  They also expected open primaries to produce more 
moderate general election winners than closed primaries.  That is in line with the 
conventional wisdom on the subject.  The innovative part of their argument is the 
expectation that semi-closed primaries will produce the most moderate winners.  Their 
idea is that “sincere crossover voting [will] dominate in semi-closed primaries” but that 
there is more of a risk of raiding and other strategic behavior that will harm the interests 
of moderate candidates in open primaries relative to semi-closed primaries.  The results 
work out more or less in line with their original hypotheses; especially in the fullest 
specification they offer (see pp. 319).  Semi-closed primaries produce the most moderate 
candidates while closed primaries produce the most extreme candidates.   
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 Gerber and Morton do use the terms differently than some other researchers, though.  They think of a 
“sincere” vote as one intended to help that candidate and a “strategic” vote as one intended to help another 
candidate in the next stage.  This is actually a really conceptually meaningful way to think about types of 
votes (it corresponds with our normative understanding that it is better to have elections in which votes 
indicate support).  Unfortunately, what they mean by “strategic” voting is what most other papers call 
“raiding.”  Most other papers use a more restricted definition of a “sincere” vote as well, leaving the 
remainder to be “strategic” but “non-raiding” votes.      
35 
 
 Gerber and Morton (1998) found not only important differences between broad 
types of primary laws—“open,” “closed,” and “semi-closed”—but also effects for the 
subcategories of “blanket” and “runoff” as well.  They noted “our research illustrates that 
the important feature of a system is not just whether it is nominally open or closed; 
rather, the specific institutional details of the system may be critically important” (pp. 
322).  Furthermore, they also argued “our results also have implications for subsequent 
theoretical analysis of multistage electoral processes.  They underscore the importance of 
modeling the institutional details of election systems and the effects those institutions 
have on voter and candidate incentives in both the registration and voting stages” (pp. 
322).                
 The Gerber and Morton paper represents an important advance in our 
understanding of the effects of primary election laws.  They emphasized, correctly in my 
view, the importance of the specific details of a state’s primary election laws.  Their main 
result—that closed primaries produce more extreme candidates than the alternatives—
generally fits with theoretical expectations.  Even if we do not expect in every election to 
precisely get the results of the median voter theorem, it seems reasonable to expect the 
desire to win an election to assert a centralizing tendency within the eligible electorate.  If 
the electorate is restricted to less moderate voters, they candidates that emerge should be 
less moderate.  Nevertheless, their article still leaves room for further research in four 
important areas: (1) they used data only from 1982 to 1990, placing their results in a 
particular political and institutional context; (2) their measure of moderation in 
candidates and districts could be improved; (3) their point that “details matter” could be 
carried further to capture even more of the available institutional details; (4) in the time 
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frame considered by Gerber and Morton, very little change in primary rules occurred 
within states—not true at time periods before and after.28      
 One of the advantages of the Gerber and Morton (1998) approach, though, is that 
they do use a general election outcome—the ADA score of the winner—to measure the 
effects of the primary election law.  Grau (1981) made an effort to observe how often 
primaries were even competitive; frequently, candidates run unopposed.  The nominating 
system has effects not just within a competitive election but also for whether or not a 
competitive election occurs at all.  So when measuring the ideological position of 
candidates in primaries, it is important to keep in mind that candidate entry is an 
equilibrium result.    
 A closely related problem to the moderation of the candidates is the 
representativeness of the primary electorate.  Obviously, these two questions—if we are 
to believe that basic spatial modeling applies—should be related.  The more the primary 
electorate looks like the general election population, the more towards the middle the 
median voter of the primary electorate should be.  The more extreme the electorate, the 
more extreme the winner should be.  Norrander (1989) did not find much difference 
between presidential primary voters and general election voters, but did not control for 
primary type.  Geer (1988) noted that presidential primary voters were not importantly 
different than the party supporters, if the party supporters are defined as potential voters 
in the general election.  Ranney (1968) came to a similar conclusion studying an open 
1966 gubernatorial contest in Wisconsin, although he reversed course in a later study.  He 
later wrote “it is clear that presidential primary electorates, like those in primaries for 
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 It seems that Gerber and Morton (1998) coded all states with the same laws from 1982–1990; Table 1 in 
their paper (pp. 307) displays the laws as of 1990.   
37 
 
lesser offices, are demographically quite unrepresentative of their nonvoting fellow 
partisans”; this also extended to issue preferences as well (Ranney 1972, pp. 36).  
Kaufman et al. (2003) found “open primaries can result in a more ideologically moderate, 
and a more ideologically convergent, electorate.  Through the adoption of open primaries, 
Republicans’ primary electorates often wind up less conservative than their party 
following and Democratic primaries less liberal than theirs” (pp. 471–72).  They arrived 
at this conclusion using exit polling data from 1988–2000 in presidential election years 
(where available, which was somewhat limited
29
), and having defined three types of 
primary institutions: closed, open (including closed, with same-day registration), and 
‘modified-open’ – a catch-all category for the semi-closed and similar rules.       
 Recently, scholars have returned to analyzing Gerber and Morton’s (1998) 
hypotheses with new data and methods.  Kanthak and Morton (2001) modified the Gerber 
and Morton (1998) analysis and found that “semiclosed and semiopen primaries lead to 
more moderate candidates than do closed primaries in general, while pure-open primaries 
actually lead to more extreme candidates than do closed primaries” (pp. 129).  They also 
found that “nonpartisan elections and blanket primaries also lead to more moderate 
candidates” (pp. 129).  While the results are slightly different, they still have the main 
sense of those in Gerber and Morton: the ‘middle ground’ rules produce the most 
moderate outcomes.  Alvarez and Sinclair (2012) used network analysis to look at the 
behavior of legislators elected under California’s blanket primary.  They found that 
legislators elected under the blanket primary were more likely to compromise with other 
legislators, one measure of moderation.  They wrote “freshmen elected under the blanket 
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 They have a total of 113 primaries; see Kaufman et al. 2003 (pp. 458) for a description of their data.   
38 
 
primary system are simply more likely to agree with other legislators” (pp. 553).  This 
conclusion generally supports the hypotheses advanced in Gerber and Morton; support 
for those hypotheses is far from universal, though. 
 McGhee et al. (2012), using a different measurement strategy, found “little, if 
any,” effect of election type on political moderation (over 1992–2008).  They observe 
that for all the different institutional variants that they are very few theoretical 
expectations generated in the literature and that this literature has not grown in a 
systematic way: some papers consider some aspects, other papers different types of 
considerations, but none address all of the important distinctions (pp. 7).  For their 
purposes, McGee et al. used estimates of ideal points for state legislators, put into a 
common space (for details, see 2012, pp. 9).  To measure district preferences, they used 
presidential vote share.  They divided the types of primaries into five categories: pure-
closed, semi-closed, semi-open, pure open, and nonpartisan.
30
  They computed their main 
result – mostly a null finding – with an OLS model and state and year fixed effects (as 
well as alternative models for robustness checks, including using their presidential vote 
data and a time-trend interacting with primary type).  They also use the California 
Democratic Party v. Jones decision to test for potential problems with endogeneity: 
California, Alaska, and Washington all adopted various systems in response to the 
Supreme Court ‘shock.’  Lastly, they also tried pooling some of their primary types 
together.  Overall, their results “suggest that these systems have little consistent effect on 
                                                          
30
 They define a “semi-open” primary as an open primary with public choice rather than private party 
choice (see pp. 7).  They also seem to mix the blanket and the top-two under the “nonpartisan” label.  They 
are following up on Kanthak and Morton (2001).        
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legislator ideology” (pp. 9).31  They concluded: “it is difficult to say precisely why the 
effect of open primaries is so weak.  The logical basis for a moderating effect is simple 
and plausible… and there is little evidence to support it” (pp. 10).        
 These studies highlight the need for more research in this area.  The Gerber and 
Morton (1998) research and the Kanthak and Morton study cover 1982–1990.  The 
McGhee et al. (2012) study covers 1992 to 2008.  Commonly, these studies draw on very 
limited data resources for describing primary laws (like Bott 1990, for Gerber and 
Morton 1998 and Kanthak and Morton 2001).  McGhee et al. (2012) seem to have 
supplemented their database with telephone calls to state elected officials and some 
additional information.  Nevertheless, possible explanations about the diversity in the 
findings quickly spring to mind: these studies do not cover the same periods of time, do 
not use the same (or particularly sophisticated) state categorization schemes, and use 
different measurements of ideology.  These are important studies that advance the field; 
the deficiencies in the literature merely point to the need for ongoing research.  While this 
study does not resolve all of these difficulties either, I do provide some additional 
advantages: a longer time horizon and a more detailed database of state laws.  In the 
analysis in Chapter 3, in particular, I have also made trade-offs that these authors have 
not: in particular, by using state-level “top of the ticket” offices instead of multi-districted 
legislative offices, I lose observations per state per election year.  Furthermore, I am 
using again a different measure of ideology not directly comparable to these studies.  In 
the study of primary elections, it remains early days; this work helps to solve some 
problems but others remain.   
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 Note that in this version of their working paper, they have a problem with page numbers: this is the 2
nd
 
page 9.  
40 
 
Crossover Voting, “Raiding,” and Strategic Behavior 
 Research using state or district-level data uses the aggregated outcomes of many 
small decisions made by each individual voter.  Indeed, many of the hypotheses for the 
election-level (rather than individual-level) analyses are drawn from beliefs about how 
voters will respond to different electoral incentives.  The use of individual-level data, 
typically drawn from surveys, can help validate those approaches.  It is always possible 
that one type of primary system or another has an unintended effect because some other 
variable intervenes between the voter and the measured aggregate outcome.  In particular, 
researchers need to engage with the study of crossover voting at the voter-level to try to 
make sense out of the results about open primaries.        
 One of the obvious ways that open primaries could produce more moderate 
successful candidates is through “crossover voting.”  Roughly speaking, a “crossover 
vote” is one cast for candidates of one party by voters of another.  Wekkin (1988) 
observed that some confusion existed over the term: do independents or nonpartisans 
count as crossover voters?  Wekkin (1988, pp. 112) suggests following in the line of 
research (culminating in Keith et al. 1992, “Myth of the Independent Voter”) that treats 
independent leaners as partisans.  In studies that use partisan registration as the key 
definition rather than partisan identification, no such differentiation is possible without 
the application of additional data.  In any event, the study of crossover voting is made 
more difficult by the many institutional contexts in which this poorly defined behavior 
takes place.  Nevertheless, most of the literature in this area addresses two concerns: first, 
how much crossover voting takes place?  And, second, what amount of crossover voting 
is “raiding,” or crossover votes intended to harm the party receiving them?      
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 Alvarez and Nagler (1997) make one of the more extensive analyses of crossover 
voting in the United States.  Using both individual-level data (surveys and exit polls) as 
well as aggregate election totals, they found that crossover voting did not occur 
frequently, primary type did not dramatically influence the quantity of crossover voting, 
and that very few voters engaged in strategic behavior.  Alvarez and Nagler made an 
important argument, comparing the legal and practical definitions of crossover votes; 
they wrote, “crossover voting in a closed primary may sound like a logical inconsistency: 
but many voters in closed Democratic primaries will profess to identify with the 
Republican party when asked, and will vote for the Republican presidential candidate in 
the general election.  The same is true for many voters in closed Republican primaries” 
(pp. 6).  They are exploiting the difference between registration, frequently the formal 
requirement for voting in a party primary, and party identification, which has no 
enforceable legal significance.
32
  Alvarez and Nagler also articulated three separable 
reasons for casting a crossover vote, connecting this type of voting with the strategic 
voting literature: “sincere voting” or voting for a most preferred candidate who happens 
to be of the other party, “second-best vote” or abandoning weak candidates of your own 
party for a chance to pick a reasonable alternative in the other party, and “raiding” or 
voting for a weak opponent to advantage your own party (pp. 6).  That is, not all strategic 
behavior in primaries must include crossover voting and not all crossover voting must 
include strategic behavior.  They also commented that voters would need a good deal of 
information to reasonably engage in strategic behavior (rather than just voting for their 
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 This is not to say that no primary rules attempt to use measures of identification: i.e., something like 
voters having to attest to their intention to support a party’s candidates.  Such rules are of exceptionally 
dubious legal standing.   
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most preferred candidate) and, for that reason, would not expect much strategic behavior 
in primaries.   
 Alvarez and Nagler (1997) fall into the relatively large set of studies regarding 
crossover voting in presidential primaries instead of in the state primary.  They focus on 
the 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 presidential primaries.  Interestingly, they face two major 
hurdles to advancing their own argument, both related to the available data.  First, many 
of the surveys on which they could draw ignore “leaning” independents, which Keith et 
al. (1992) identified as “hidden partisans.”  If self-identified leaning independents 
registered with a party (this is certainly possible; see, for a California example, Alvarez 
and Sinclair 2013, Sinclair 2013) and counted as partisans (per Keith et al.) and should it 
be the case that they were more likely to cross over in an open rather than closed primary 
– then perhaps Alvarez and Nagler would arrive at different conclusions.  That is, it is the 
party registrants with the weakest ties to the party that we should, ex ante, suspect of 
crossing over to vote and who would seem most likely to be affected by differences in the 
rules.  Second, the focus on presidential primaries puts the emphasis on relatively high 
information elections.  They point out the difficulty, in 1992, of gauging Clinton’s 
probability of winning – an important piece of information for a strategic voter (pp. 7).  If 
that is to be a difficult choice, what about a local legislative race that features none of the 
national polling or media attention?  It may be the case that in lower information settings 
the rules make more of a difference.  Nevertheless, with the survey data available to 
them, they conclude that “open primaries do not lead to a substantively large increase in 
crossover voting over closed primaries” (pp. 27).   
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 Alvarez and Nagler attempt to rectify the emphasis on presidential elections in 
their analysis of surveys by also looking at ecological evidence
33
 in Washington (State) 
and Ohio.  The advent of the blanket primary (in use 1998–2000) motivated their 
research; Washington already used such a system in 1997 and Alvarez and Nagler looked 
to their experience to form expectations for the new California law.  Using 1992, 1994, 
and 1996 county-level vote totals in Ohio and Washington, Alvarez and Nagler showed 
“that there was not a great deal of crossover voting in the aggregated data” (pp. 33).  
They also find that the blanket primary – a peculiar kind of primary law – did not 
produce vastly different results, consistent with their overall finding that state primary 
laws did not generate very different results.        
 Alvarez and Nagler followed in a long tradition of analyzing crossover votes in a 
presidential primary.  Hedlund (1977) addressed the usual questions – who were the 
crossover voters, and to what extent were they raiding? – with regard to Wisconsin’s 
open 1976 presidential primary.  He found very few partisan crossovers, although he did 
find that independents participated, “probably [diluting] the desires of party identifiers” 
(pp. 513).  Presaging Myth of the Independent Voter (1992), he also found that the 
independents had similar characteristics to the partisans in whose primary they 
participated.  Additionally, consistent with the other literature (for example, Ranney 
1972, pp. 36), Hedlund found “no evidence… to document the contention that there was 
a widespread mischief vote” (pp. 513). 
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 Using election totals aggregated by county rather than individual survey data.  Methodologically, they 
look to King (1997) --- that is, they were both well aware of the difficulties of using aggregate data to make 
individual-level inferences and used the best technology available at the time.     
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 Kaufman (2003), as part of their analysis into the composition of the electorate 
under different primary rules (discussed above), investigated crossover voting in the 2000 
presidential primaries.  They found that “far more crossover voters are present in open 
primary states than in closed primary states, but the effects are vastly different for the two 
parties” (pp. 469).  They identified two other important trends as well.  First, what they 
called “modified-open” --- the general term in use would be “semi-closed” --- primaries 
“proved to be an important stimulus to crossover voting” (pp. 469); this at least matches 
the theoretical predictions and results in Gerber and Morton (1998).  Second, Kaufman et 
al. also found that “early and competitive primaries see far more crossover action than 
later, less competitive ones” (2003, pp. 469).  This would suggest that the crossover 
voting is not entirely insensitive to strategic considerations.   
 Theoretical predictions for crossover voting remain elusive.  In a model limited to 
a single ideological dimension, two parties, and fixed candidate positions, Chen and 
Yang (2002) found that:   
…in an open primary, the strategic behavior of voters can substantially 
affect the outcome of the primary.  This, however, does not mean that it is 
harmful.  When nonparty members participate to manipulate the result of 
the primary, and when the party members do not react to it, the strategic 
voting behavior will indeed harm the party in the sense that the more 
extreme candidate might thereby win the primary.  But if the party 
members also vote strategically, it can actually coordinate their votes and 
increases the winning chance (relative to when all voters vote sincerely) of 
the party.  The total effect on the outcome, however, depends on the 
relative size and positions of the parties, as well as the turnout rates of 
different types of voters, and is hard to predict.  Our results also imply that 
smaller parties, parties whose candidates are more extreme, or parties 
whose members are less active, are more vulnerable to strategic voting in 
an open primary (pp. 22).    
 
The Chen and Yang model, by assuming fixed candidate positions, avoids the problems 
of multi-candidate strategic location.  The assumption of fixed candidate positions – i.e., 
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the reverse of the Downs (1957) model that had strategic candidates but not voters – is 
very strong.  Even with it, the outcome “is hard to predict.”   
Oak (2006), with the aid of formal models, found that semi-closed primary 
systems helped moderates but that fully open systems might actually produce more 
extreme outcomes than a closed system; Oak argued “for instance, the let moderates may 
believe that an extremist candidate is going to win their party’s primary.  In order to 
minimize the ‘damage,’ they may crossover and vote for the moderate rightist.  But such 
behavior will cause a drop in the number of the left moderates participating in the left 
party’s primary and thus contribute towards the victory of the left extremist” (pp. 171).  
In Oak’s view, this “reconciles a paradox found in the empirical literature,” comparing 
the Gerber and Morton (1998) paper with other work that finds crossover voters select 
moderate candidates (pp. 171).  Oak, too, relies on a single-dimensional policy space, two 
parties – and simplifies voters into five categories (reminiscent of The American Voter, 
1960).  Still, Oak predicted “in the presence of tension between extremists and moderate 
factions…, either there is no crossover voting or the crossover is moderating in nature” 
(pp. 186).            
 The general sense of the literature is that “raiding” remains quite rare.  Wekkin 
(1991) found that crossover voters were unlikely to be “mischievous voters.”  
Nevertheless, it is also important to separate mischievous intentions from mischievous 
results.  To the extent that crossover voters have differing policy preferences from the 
party they invade – whether to vote for a first-choice candidate (“sincere crossover”), or 
to voter strategically for an acceptable and electable alternative, or to vote for a weak 
general election opponent for their own party (“raiding”) – they do shift the median voter 
46 
 
of that primary.  Furthermore, depending on the institutional context, the effects can vary.  
For example, a crossover voter in an open primary or semi-closed primary who crossed 
over specifically to vote sincerely for, say, a moderate senatorial candidate is then stuck 
voting in all the other races of that party – including those with no candidates they 
support.  On the other hand, voters in either a blanket or nonpartisan top-two primary can 
switch back and forth between parties (see Sides et al. 2002, Alvarez and Nagler 2002). 
 While the general consensus is that little raiding (and even not very much 
crossover voting in general) takes place, further research should continue to build on the 
existing foundation.  First, more states (like California and Washington) have adopted 
nonpartisan top-two primaries which remove all barriers from effective crossover voting; 
as these types of rules become more common, parties and candidates will continue to 
innovate new and better ways to encourage it.  In combination with the advent of better 
microtargeting techniques (see Issenberg 2012), the importance of crossover voting may 
increase.  Second, as with all measurements of rare behaviors, more data will produce 
better estimates.  Third, most of the studies of crossover voting take place within a span 
of approximately thirty years, a particular political and institutional context.  We should 
not expect that rates of crossover voting will remain constant but instead should vary with 
the political and institutional incentives offered.          
Presidential Nominations 
After Carl Albert adjourned the 1968 Democratic National Convention 
sine die, a good many Democrats and Democrat-watchers left Chicago’s 
tear-gassed streets and stink-bombed hotels convinced that something was 
terribly wrong with the traditional way the party had gone about choosing 
its presidential nominee.  The Democrats’ subsequent loss of the election 
gave them about the only benefit the losing party ever gets: a chance to 
make major changes in its structure and procedures without having to 
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clear them with an incumbent President.  Surprisingly, the party did not let 
the chance slip away.
34
 
 
 Presidential nominations take place using the primary in a way entirely different 
from most state-run primaries for other offices.  Technically, presidential candidates are 
still selected at party conventions, comprised of individual delegates given voting rights 
according to party rules.  Some of those party rules commit delegates based on the results 
of the primary but these rules vary by party and by election year.  The presidential 
nominating season is further complicated by the sequential nature of events; states jockey 
for position on the nominating calendar and candidates pay varying amounts of attention 
to each contest, depending on their overall strategy to secure the required number of 
convention delegates.  While the direct primary really became ascendant by the 1920s 
(see Ware 2002) in most states for state offices, the modern presidential nominating 
process did not really take root until after the 1968 Democratic National Convention (per 
the epigraph, from Ranney 1972).     
 The early nominating contests – the Iowa Caucuses and New Hampshire Primary 
– have earned some attention in the presidential nomination literature.  Adkins and 
Dowdle (2001) suggest that this emphasis may be overblown; in an effort to predict the 
ultimate nominee, the results of the Iowa caucus do little to better the prediction when 
combined with other reasonable variables (see pp. 438).  The results of the New 
Hampshire primary are a bit more meaningful, although “the reality is that momentum 
generated by these contests only seems to assist also-ran candidates in displacing other 
also-ran candidates” (pp. 442).  Political scientists have studied momentum (see Aldrich 
1980, Bartels 1987) in the sequential Presidential contests; however, there is no 
                                                          
34
 Ranney (1972), pp. 21.   
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equivalent concept for non-Presidential primaries.  New Hampshire generates interest not 
just because it is an early primary but also because it is often referred to as an “open” 
primary – although it actually would be more correctly identified as a “semi-closed” 
primary.  Fowler et al. found “despite conventional wisdom that undeclared voters make 
primaries more volatile, we find few differences in the way the two groups of voters 
responded to campaign stimuli” (2003, pp. 159).  More specifically, they find that “there 
do not appear to be systematic differences between partisan registrants and undeclared 
registrants in terms of their probability of voting in a party primary or of voting for a 
particular candidate” in the 2000 primary (pp. 160).               
 Cooper (2001) investigated the effects of having staggered presidential primaries.  
She used a simulation approach, with three alternatives: sequential primaries, a national 
primary, and a national primary with a runoff (really, a Southern-Runoff style election).  
She found “sequential primaries estimate voters’ preferences more efficiently than either 
of the other two alternatives.  On average, sequential primaries select nominees closer 
both to the position of the median party voter and to the position of the median voter in 
the general electorate” (pp. 775).  
 Meinke et al. (2006) tried to explain why some states would pick caucuses rather 
than primaries for their presidential nominating procedures.  They made the very true 
observation that “delegate selection rules are endogenous to the politics that they govern” 
– and that party leaders faced a fundamental trade-off between “long-term electoral 
goals” and their own selection power (pp. 191).  Norrander (1993) also found that “more 
ideologically extreme candidates did better in caucuses than in primaries” (pp. 361).  
While these papers are not specifically about nomination procedures for state offices, the 
49 
 
same observation applies to the selection of primary election law type.  If more open 
procedures (semi-closed, open, blanket, or nonpartisan) primaries produce a more 
moderate electorate (Kaufman et al. 2003, Gerber and Morton 1998) and party leadership 
values both winning and the ideological position of the winner, the same kind of tension 
can arise with state primary selection as well.  It may be the case that party leadership 
faces a trade-off between electoral success and ideological purity.  
Conclusion     
 When considered, different types of primary rules do produce different outcomes.  
McNitt (1980) demonstrated that the whole institutional context matter; there are 
differences in competitiveness not just for open or closed primaries but for states that 
have pre-primary nominations and those that do not.  Jewell (1977) presented evidence 
that some types of primaries have higher turnout than others.  Southwell (1988) found 
that primary rules only had an effect when one party had an uncontested primary (letting 
loose the crossover voters).  Gerber and Morton (1998) and Kanthak and Morton (2001) 
argued that different types of primary laws can produce more or less moderate 
candidates, although McGhee et al. (2012) disagreed.  Kaufman et al. (2003) generally 
supported the findings in Gerber and Morton and helped provide evidence for a causal 
mechanism: they argued that different primary types produced different electorates.      
 One problem in the study of primaries is the absence of a good theoretical model 
to consider the complexities of the institutional rules, the variability of voters, the 
motivations and strategic alternatives for candidates, and the pre-primary entry procedure 
– all at once.  The entry procedure is particularly important.  Candidates do not appear in 
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primaries randomly.  Nate Silver summarized what already began to take place in 2013 
for the U.S. presidential contest in 2016: 
But long before Republican voters in Iowa and New Hampshire cast their 
ballots, the potential nominees will be competing against one another in 
the so-called ‘invisible primary.’ In this stage, which is already under way, 
they hope to persuade party insiders that they represent the best path 
forward for Republicans in 2016. The more successful they are at doing 
so, the more they will be rewarded with money, endorsements and the 
talent to run their campaigns, giving them a huge advantage once voting 
actually does begin three years from now.
35
 
 
A model that satisfactorily addresses the effects of different types of primary laws on the 
pre-primary jockeying between potential candidates does not exist.  Nevertheless, the 
literature demonstrates clearly the need to at least conceptually attempt to address this 
issue – or qualify results in the absence of a solution.  For example, Cooper and Munger 
(2000) allow twenty candidates (ten in each closed primary) into their simulation-based 
demonstration that primaries can produce outcomes very far away from the median.  It is 
the exceptionally rare primary season and office with twenty entrants.  On the other hand, 
candidates rarely position themselves so neatly (as in the spirit of Palfrey 1984) for two 
candidates to completely prevent entry of a third in all races.  Further still, Grau (1981) 
observed that many candidates ran unopposed.  In some cases one candidate manages to 
deter entry entirely, in other cases a few viable candidates will enter, and in a very few 
cases many candidates will enter and chaos will ensue.      
 Challenges like including entry, and insufficient institutional detail, do not just 
apply to formal theory work; these issues also plague the empirical research.  The study 
of primary elections is not easy; to make some aspects of the problems tractable 
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 See Silver, Nate.  2013.  “Marco Rubio: The Electable Conservative?”  The New York Times, Feb. 19.  
Available online at: http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/marco-rubio-the-electable-
conservative/?hp (last accessed 02/19/13).  Silver refers to Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and 
John Zaller.  2008.  The Party Decides.  University of Chicago Press.     
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researchers have limited themselves to smaller periods of time, a subset of states, only 
certain offices, or only part of the process.  Researchers also are attempting to hit a 
moving target: what a primary election is continues to change.  In 1946, politicians in 
California would hardly recognize the nonpartisan top-two of 2012 as a primary election 
at all, since primaries originally served the main purpose of selecting party candidates. 
The next chapter represents an effort to improve our existing understanding of 
primary elections by overcoming one of the main challenges: the lack of institutional 
detail over a long period.  Political scientists disagree over the main argument, whether 
one type of primary produces more moderate outcomes than other.  Gerber and Morton 
(1998) and Kanthak and Morton (2001) represent one side, which finds important effects 
for primary law types even if those effects are not arranged in the linear fashion that the 
nomenclature (closed, semi-closed, semi-open, open) would suggest.  On the other side, 
other scholars (see McGhee et al. 2012) have found no effect for primary type.  The 
following chapters make a contribution to this literature first by addressing one potential 
reason for the unexpected results in the existing literature: perhaps the categorization 
scheme misses important details about the implementation of state primary laws.  Second, 
the later chapters (4 and 5) take a detailed look at the new “top-two” primary in 
California, better placing this new law in the broader context of the literature.  This is not 
– to borrow from Churchill – the beginning of the end of research into primary elections; 
I merely hope to contribute to the end of the beginning.   
 
 
“A.R.S. § 16-806 (2011). Proscription of Communist Party of United 
States, its successors, and subsidiary organizations 
 
The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such party 
regardless of the assumed name, the object of which is to overthrow by 
force or violence the government of the United States, or the government 
of the state of Arizona, or its political subdivisions shall not be entitled to 
be recognized or certified as a political party under the laws of the state of 
Arizona and shall not be entitled to any of the privileges, rights or 
immunities attendant upon legal political bodies recognized under the laws 
of the state of Arizona, or any political subdivision thereof; whatever 
rights, privileges or immunities shall have heretofore been granted to said 
Communist Party of the United States as defined in this section, or to any 
of its subsidiary organizations, by reason of the laws of the state of 
Arizona, or of any political subdivision thereof, are hereby terminated and 
shall be void.” 
 
CHAPTER 2:  STATE LAWS, 1945–2012 
While compiling a database of state primary election laws, I had to make trade-
offs between attention to detail and the usefulness of the database.  Every state conducts 
elections slightly differently; the goal of this database was to group laws that were 
“similar enough” together to make statistical analysis possible while still capturing what I 
believed to be the important differences between the types of laws.  For example (above), 
Arizona formally prohibits the participation of the Communist Party in its state politics – 
a prohibition with likely little bearing (or possibly constitutional footing) today; I have 
not included information on the formal status of the Communist Party.  Other scholars 
(like Gerber and Morton 1998) have attempted similar categorization exercises, although 
typically for much shorter periods of time or at a much lower level of specificity.  In 
particular, with this dataset I attempt to break through the tradition of treating primary 
laws as if they were on a single-dimensional scale from “most open” to “most closed.”   
 As Kanthak and Morton (2001) and Gerber and Morton (1998) both noted, the 
tendency to array primary laws along that dimension can create false expectations about 
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monotonicity.  Gerber and Morton (1998) inquired: If a semi-closed primary produces 
less extreme candidates than a closed primary, does an open primary produce less 
extreme candidates still?  They thought not.  To avoid this, I have created a variable that 
takes into account the basic base type of primary, following three key derivative types: 
partisan, nonpartisan, and convention.  A convention obviously is not a primary at all.  A 
nonpartisan primary is just a very different institution than an a party primary; since it 
can pit candidates of the same party against each other in the general election, the 
nonpartisan primary could potentially generate factions within parties.   
Partisan primaries come in several types: open, blanket (a type of open primary), 
semi-closed, and closed.  The only difference between an open primary and a blanket 
primary is the duration with which a voter must identify with a party: for an open 
primary, that affiliation must last through the whole ballot while in a blanket primary the 
affiliation can switch between contests.  A semi-closed primary is just a closed primary 
that allows unaffiliated voters.  In recent years after some court decisions, some states 
have gone to a “party choice” system that allows each party to choose whether or not to 
use a closed or semi-closed primary.  With party choice, it is necessary to establish what 
the party decided, another feature recorded in the database.  These different types within 
partisan primaries capture varying degrees of openness.   
There are other dimensions to consider.  First, in several types of primaries, voters 
may be able to keep their partisan preferences to themselves: the question is to what 
extent the primary is “private choice.”  A nonpartisan primary is private choice by 
default, as is an open blanket primary.  Some open systems can be private choice as well.  
Second, some states require large pre-primary hurdles for candidates to make it onto the 
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primary ballot.  These impediments can vary in size and typically involve passing 
through a party convention.  This has little to do with what rule voters use; this has 
entirely to do with how easy it is for candidates to even get that far.  For example, for a 
long time both Connecticut and Utah had high barriers to candidate ballot access but 
Connecticut used a closed primary and Utah used an open primary.  Third, some states 
use a “runoff” rule that forces party candidates to get above some fraction of the vote to 
win their party’s primary (this is an extra – second – primary election, not to be confused 
with a nonpartisan two-round election).  Some states have runoff primaries under both 
open and closed rules.  Fourth, in rare cases parties allowed candidates to “cross-file” and 
potentially win both party primaries; this type of rule is compatible with many different 
types of voting schemes.
36
  What follows is my effort to describe the primary laws from 
the 1946 primaries through the 2012 primaries in each of these dimensions: basic primary 
type, openness and closed-ness, the extent of private choice, degree of pre-primary 
requirements, runoff rules, and cross-filing.                   
Alabama 
 
 Alabama proves to be one of the easier states to code: the state used a traditional 
“southern runoff” primary over this entire period.  I have coded it as an “open” party 
primary with a runoff from 1946–2012.  The Secretary of State’s website confirms that 
this system is still in use, in much the same way as it has been for about a century.  Since 
this process does require asking for the party ballot, Alabama’s open system is not 
“private choice.”  There are only two complications: parties formally can choose if the 
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just too uncommon.    
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second round of their primary is ‘open or closed’ and the state does not actually mandate 
the use of the direct primary.   
Technically, as mentioned in Bott (1990), parties have a choice between the 
runoff primary and a convention.  McNitt (1980) observed that the Republican Party used 
the convention option through 1968.  I have not coded this differently in the database, 
though; instead, I have treated the Republican Party in Alabama from 1946–1968 as I 
treat other minor parties throughout the database: I ignore the separate rules that apply to 
them.  In many states, minor parties have different ballot access requirements.  Since, 
though, any ballot access requirements that applied to the Republicans in the 
segregationist South would have yielded the same lopsided general election results, I do 
not think this causes too much of a problem.  Once the Republicans started to even 
contemplate competitiveness, they adopted the direct primary.   
At the moment, the two major parties differ on who they allow to vote in the 2
nd
 
round.  If a runoff occurs, Democrats prohibit anyone who voted for the Republicans in 
the first round from participating.  The Republicans do not.
37
  This split tradition goes 
back at least as far as 2004.
38
  It appears very difficult to actually enforce these rules 
without registration by party; this is likely more of a social norm than an actively 
enforced rule.  In the data set, I do not account for whether or not the second round is 
open or closed by party.   
The runoff primary in Alabama generates controversy through the state’s troubled 
history of racial inclusion.  In the 1960s and 1970s, black voters and politicians re-
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 The Alabama 2012 Voter’s Guide, published by the Secretary of State, has this information: 
http://www.sos.state.al.us/downloads/election/2012/2012VoterGuide.pdf (last accessed 03/13/13).   
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 The Alabama 2004 Voter’s Guide, published by the Secretary of State, can be found here: 
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entered the political sphere after the passage of the Voting Rights Act.  One news article 
described the first round of the 1966 primary as a disappointment for black Alabamans:  
Negroes sought nomination to their first legislative seats since 
reconstruction today in the Alabama Democratic primary runoff. 
 
Bloc voting was urged by both white segregationists and Negro leaders. 
 
... 
 
Victories by Mrs. Lurleen Wallace, wife of Gov. George Wallace, in the 
race for governor and Sen. John Sparkman D-Ala., in the first primary 
took much of the interest out of the runoff.  Mrs. Wallace, seeking to 
succeed her husband, defeated nine men in her landslide majority. 
 
... 
 
The primary taught Negroes a lesson in practical politics, [Dr. John] 
Nixon [of the NAACP] said.  'We don't have the vote in large enough 
number to elect (statewide) but we surely do have the power to deny.'   
 
The Justice Department retained its interest in Alabama's primary 
elections.  Atty. Gen. Nicholas Katzenback Monday ordered federal voting 
observers into the counties of Greene, Sumter, Marengo, Perry and Hale, 
where the observers were sent for the first primary.
39
 
 
If true at all, the “power to deny” would be relatively limited, as segregationists 
continued to fare well in Alabama politics. 
 Black voters in Alabama did not have the power to deny in 1970.  They thought 
they might.  One Democratic candidate for Governor, Albert Brewer, challenged famed 
segregationist George C. Wallace in the 1970 primary and had the support of black 
voters.  In May, around the time of the first of two rounds of the primary, one newspaper 
article reported:   
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Black leaders claim that Negro voters, whose numbers have increased by 
61 percent in Alabama since the federal voting rights act was enacted in 
1966, will make the difference. 
 
The predominantly Negro Democratic Conference gave its support to one 
of the candidates–reportedly Brewer–last weekend but made no public 
announcement of his name, choosing instead to pass the word along 
during the week at a series of local meetings. 
 
Joe Reed, the conference chairman and one of 14 Negroes running for 
seats in the all-white state legislature, said only that “the black voters will 
decide who will be the next governor of Alabama.”40 
    
Wallace came in second in the first round of the primary, with 42 percent to Brewer’s 43 
percent.  However, Brewer only managed to increase his share to 48 percent in the 
runoff; Wallace would win with 52 percent of the vote.
41
 
 Southern runoff primaries periodically produce salient examples of how 
institutional rules matter.  At least in 1970, the rules enabled a reversal of fortune.  Under 
a traditional one-round open primary, Wallace might have lost – although that is far from 
assured.  Since the 15 percent of Alabama voters who selected Charles Woods (the third 
candidate) likely knew Woods was unlikely to win, and they seem to have broken for 
Wallace in the second round, it is possible that these voters would have voted tactically 
for Wallace in the first round if the rules were not the same.  In any case, though, Brewer 
came in first place in the first round and second place in the second round; this runoff 
rule seems sufficiently important to consider to merit a variable in the dataset.   
Alaska   
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 Alaska entered the Union as the 49
th
 state in 1960, along with Hawaii.  Although 
the state apparently used a “blanket” primary in territorial elections before statehood, in 
1960 Alaska started out using a traditional open primary with private choice.  The official 
Alaskan primary election history produced by the state (the only state to produce 
something like this) mentions that “voters marked a box indicating they were voting 
Democrat or Republican.  If they voted for candidates from more than one party, their 
ballots were invalidated.”42     
 In 1967, Alaska reverted to the blanket primary.  Alaska used the blanket primary 
until the early 1990s.  The Republican Party objected to the blanket system and the state 
negotiated to use a variant of the ‘party choice’ primary.  Unlike in many states, though, 
the Republicans allowed nonpartisans to vote on their ballot while Democrats allowed 
nonpartisans, other partisans, and Republicans to vote on their ballot.  The coding scheme 
I devised does not well separate this type of party choice primary from others that are 
more restrictive.  The “party choice” variables for each party should be interpreted as “at 
least allowed nonpartisans,” although the Democratic ballot in Alaska would prove to be 
even more open than that.  Notably, Republicans held the governorship (Wally Hinkel) in 
the early 1990s, so the respective decisions of the parties mirrors the trend evident in 
some other states: strong parties tend to prefer closed primaries to gain ideological purity 
while weaker parties tend to prefer more open primaries to try to gain competitiveness.   
 In 1996 Alaska’s Supreme Court upheld the blanket primary, a short-lived in 
victory.  Due to the California Democratic Party v. Jones case in 2000, Alaska had to 
revert back to the rules used in 1992 and 1994 for the 2000 primary season.  Ironically, 
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because of the timing differences between California and Alaska, California still used the 
blanket primary in 2000; the court issued its decision in June.  The Alaska system 
allowed unaffiliated voters still to choose which ballot to select on election day but they 
now had to vote only on candidates of a single party.  The system also allowed each party 
to choose on a year-by-year basis who could vote on their ballot (which they did, 
incidentally, by allowing other parties to add their candidates’ names to the ballot).   
 The party choices vary quite a bit each year.  In 1992 and 1994, Democrats 
allowed Republican participation but Republicans did not allow Democratic participation.  
In 2002 the state ran a traditional semi-closed primary with same-day unaffiliated choice.  
In 2004 and 2006 Republicans only allowed nonpartisans and independents access to 
their ballot; the Democrats allowed everybody except Republicans (there are several 
minor Alaskan parties).  In 2008, 2010, and 2012 though, Democrats allowed 
Republicans to vote for their candidates.  The Alaskan system also could be considered a 
system of partitioned cross-filing; I have not coded it as a cross-filing system because 
most years Democratic candidates cannot appear on Republican ballots (unlike how 
California’s era of cross-filing worked).43    
 Alaska’s peculiarities have flummoxed political scientists for some time.  For 
example, McNitt (1980) has the state listed (correctly) as “open” before 1967 and as a 
“blanket” system afterwards.  Jewell (1977) has Alaska listed as “open/blanket” for 1950-
1976.  An article in the Congressional Quarterly incorrectly lists Alaska as “open” for 
1968.
44
  McGee et al. (2012; see their notes on their Table A8) treated Alaska after the 
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Jones decision as “semi-open” seemingly (this is not completely clear from their paper) 
treating both parties equally.  This helps further the contrast with California, which 
McGhee et al. classify as “semi-closed” (as do I) over the same period.  McGhee et al. 
also make the excellent point that the Jones decision created an exogenous reason to 
change primary laws in Washington and Alaska (how exogenous this is in California, 
since the parties sued, is less obvious).  So, while Alaska poses a lot of classification 
difficulty, the state may also offer some important variation to determine the effects of 
adopting different primary laws.  
Arizona 
 Arizona holds closed primaries.  NicNitt (1980) lists Arizona’s laws as “closed” 
from 1954 to 1974; Jewell (1977) lists the state as “closed” for 1950–1976.  Bott (1990) 
also identifies the state as using a “closed” rule, with a 50-day requirement to declare or 
change affiliation before the primary (pp. 22).  Bott (1990) further notes that there are no 
pre-primary party hurdles for candidates to pass in Arizona; the sum total of these rules 
builds to the most standard type of closed primary.  Kanthak and Morton (2001, pp. 119) 
also classify Arizona as fully closed.       
 Kanthak and Morton (2001) did not mention that Arizona had just changed its 
primary election law to be semi-closed via ballot measure.
45
  Starting in 1999, Arizona 
began to use a semi-closed system for non-presidential nominating primary elections; the 
state passed this law in 1998 with little enough fanfare that confusion continued to exist 
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 Proposition 103, 1998.  The text of the proposition and the ballot statements are available at:  
http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/info/pubpamphlet/Prop103.html (last accessed 03/15/13).  It passed 
(results available at: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/General/Canvass1998GE.pdf, last accessed 
03/15/13).  Notably both Republicans and Democrats supported it; the Libertarian party opposed it.  Also 
note that the text of the proposition violates the spirit of Tashjian and, if challenged under the same 
reasoning in California Democratic Party v. Jones would likely be overturned: the law requires that the 
primaries be semi-closed rather than closed (the objection of the Libertarians).    
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at least through the 2008 presidential primaries.
46
  This system does not have private 
choice; voters pick up a separate ballot.
47
 
 Apparently Republicans considered closing their half of the primary in 2010.  
That year John McCain faced a Tea-Party backed candidate, J.D. Hayworth, in the 
Republican Primary.  As in other states, the debates about the rules indicate a belief 
among the party elite that some rules favor some candidates.  In this case, it appears that 
some in the party elite wanted to close the primary to give the challenger against McCain 
a better shot; they presumed McCain would do better among the unaffiliated voters who 
selected the Republican primary.  One report summarized the situation as: 
Hayworth and McCain, who is seeking a fifth term, will gnaw on each 
other until the August primary, the rules of which are still unclear… 
Republican primaries have been open to unaffiliated voters, but in 
January, when Hayworth's candidacy was still embryonic, the state party 
opted for a closed primary, on the sound principle that party members — 
there are 1.12 million registered — should pick those who represent the 
party. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment 
guarantee of freedom of association, which "plainly presupposes a 
freedom not to associate," broadly protects parties' rights to define their 
identities by controlling their nominating processes. 
McCain understandably wants the primary open to non-Republicans: A 
closed primary would favor Hayworth, many of whose supporters are the 
sort of high-octane conservatives who will vote in an Arizona August…48 
Somehow, McCain’s camp won.49  Unaffiliated voters could choose either party primary 
on election day.
50
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 See Ryman, Anne.  2007.  “Independents can’t vote in Feb. 5 primary election: Growing Ariz. Political 
force shut out of presidential primary.”  The Arizona Republic.  December 26.  Online at: 
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/1226independents1226.html (last accessed 3/15/13).  
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 Will, George.  2010.  “McCain in fight.”  The Topeka Capital-Journal.  April 3.  Available online at: 
http://cjonline.com/opinion/2010-04-03/column_mccain_in_fight#.TwJur_KjdH0 (last accessed 03/15/13).     
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 If the Republican Party (or Democratic Party) wanted to close their primary, they 
would likely have a strong court case.  Between Tashjian (ability to  move to an semi-
closed system from a closed system) and Jones (blanket primary violates party’s 
association rights), it seems that both fully closed and semi-closed systems, when 
mandated by state law, are vulnerable to “party-choice” challenges.  It seems likely that 
the Arizona law exists as it does today because there is insufficient will in either party to 
mount and sustain a challenge in court.   
 For Arizona, I coded the primary through 1998 as “closed,” and then as “semi-
closed” afterwards.  Those types of systems do not operate with the same kind of private 
choice as some open primary states, so I have given the state a score of “0” for private 
choice.  I have also given it a score of “0” for a pre-primary nominating procedure; it has 
nothing like Colorado (mild) or Connecticut (severe).  Arizona also does not have 
runoffs.  Since Republicans did not close their primary in 2010, and the state technically 
mandates a semi-closed rule, I have not scored the ‘party choice’ variables --- although, 
in the analysis, I will attempt to capture the sense that these legally vulnerable rules exist 
with the acquiescence of both parties.  Voters also enshrined a preference for the status 
quo by defeating at the polls Proposition 121 (in 2012) that would have given Arizona a 
top-two primary system like California.
51
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 Despite some reporting to the contrary, a lawsuit challenging Arizona’s semi-closed primary law may 
never have been launched at all.  See Bodfield, Rhonda.  2010.  “State GOP looking to close primary to 
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Arkansas 
 Like many other southern states, Arkansas employs a runoff.  The only question 
with Arkansas is how to treat its affiliation rules: while the primary is technically 
“closed,” voters can change their affiliation on election day (see Lubecky 1987).  I intend 
to treat this, as Kanthak and Morton (2001) do; they call it a “semi-open” primary.  In my 
database, this is equivalent to calling an “open primary” without “private choice.”  Bott 
(1990) treats the primary as open, but Bott does not distinguish between “private choice” 
and “public choice” open primaries.  McNitt (1980) just groups all kinds of runoff 
primaries together; in a sense, I do much the same by treating Alabama and Arkansas as 
functionally equivalent (coding them the same).  While it seems that parties no longer 
have the choice to use a convention (like in Alabama, formally), as in Alabama, the 
Republican party may have been a late adopter of the primary; nevertheless, by 1968 the 
Republicans also used the primary rather than a convention.
52
  Arkansas, overall, presents 
a fairly straightforward case. 
California 
 California has experimented with several different types of primary systems.  
From 1914 to 1958, California ran “closed” primaries – but allowed “cross-filing,” a 
practice by which candidates could file to be the winner of both the Democratic and 
Republican primary (see Gaines and Cho, 2002).  Gaines and Cho mention that 
California Democrats in the legislature voted to remove cross-filing as soon as they had 
enough votes in the legislature, believing the system benefited Republicans; this is yet 
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another example of a party attempting to manipulate the rules to gain a (perceived) 
electoral advantage (2002, pp. 17).  This would not be the last time a party or faction tried 
this in California.   
 California used a traditional closed primary from 1960 to 1992 without incident; 
the closed primary would last through the 1996 election.  In 1992, however, moderate 
Republican Tom Campbell lost a narrow contest to the more conservative Bruce 
Herschensohn; Herschensohn would go on to lose the election to Senator Barbara Boxer 
(who holds this seat today).  The Los Angeles Times pointed out the obvious difficulty in 
unifying the party after a tough primary: 
Campbell, on leave as a Stanford Law School economics professor, 
greeted Herschensohn, a 56,000-vote winner-out of 2.3 million cast-
warmly and declared: “Bruce, I'm proud to be your friend and supporter. 
Call on me for anything I can do.”  
 
As recently as the weekend, Campbell was telling virtually every 
California family via television ads: “Bruce Herschensohn is lying.”53 
 
Herschensohn’s bigger problem, though, may have been that he was ideologically too far 
to the right to win.  After the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, which occurred two months 
before the primary, Herschensohn explained the riot by blaming human nature and the 
“rottenness” of the rioters; as a solution to the problem he proposed removing 
California’s waiting period to buy weapons.54  The election appears to be a classic case 
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displaying the theoretical problem with closed primaries: an unelectable and more 
extreme candidate won in the primary, losing the party the seat in November and possibly 
allowing a more extreme candidate from the other party to win the seat and hold it for 
two decades.   
 A frustrated Campbell backed proposition 198 in 1996 to introduce to California a 
“blanket” primary system like that used by Alaska and Washington.  Voters passed 
Proposition 198 and California used the blanket in 1998 and in 2000 despite an attempt 
by the legislature to weaken it with another ballot measure in 1998 (for more details, see 
Gaines and Cho 2002).
55
  The courts did what the people would not; in California 
Democratic Party v. Jones the United States Supreme Court found the blanket primary 
unconstitutional.  California would revert to a “party-choice” system, which functioned 
practically as a semi-closed primary.   
 Ironically, Campbell would run for Senate again in 2010 and, once again, lose in 
the primary to a Republican (Carly Fiorina) whom Boxer would again defeat; in that 
same election, California’s passed Proposition 14 to institute a top-two primary starting 
in 2012.  Campbell missed both opportunities to take advantage of more open systems 
that he supported.  The top-two ended up on the ballot as part of a deal to pass the 2009 
state budget.  Democrats did not quite have enough votes, so then Republican State 
Senator Abel Maldonado insisted on including the top-two as part of an agreement to 
pass the budget.  Maldonado championed the top-two in part because he had first been 
elected to the legislature under the blanket primary rules and thought it would produce 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(last accessed 03/15/13).   
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 The blanket primary used in 2000 differed slightly from that in 1998 in California, on account of the 
Presidential primary.    
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better governance if the candidates had an incentive to talk to all of the voters instead of 
just their own partisans.
56
  California did implement the top-two in 2012.  Furthering the 
irony of the ill-fortune of Republican moderates, Maldonado would lose himself in a 
2012 bid for Congress – although at the general election stage rather than during the 
primary.  For more detail on the top-two primary, see Chapter 4.     
 I have coded California as a “closed” primary system through 1996.  Up to 1958, 
I have also coded as having “cross-filing.”  In 1998 and 2000, I have coded California as 
having a blanket primary which is, by nature, a ‘private choice’ kind of affair.  The party-
choice primary of 2002–2010, though, included a public choice.  I have not coded 2012 
as having a ‘runoff;’ I have coded it as a nonpartisan primary.  The ‘runoff’ variable 
requires the potential for a third stage; I mean that variable to capture the southern runoff 
primaries.  I have coded the top-two as ‘private choice,’ although in some sense voters 
did have to request a partisan ballot.  The top-two does not apply to presidential elections; 
since 2012 was a presidential primary year, voters still had to select party ballot.  The 
Republican and Democrat ballots (aside from Party Central Committee and U.S. 
President) were identical; a voter who felt pressured to pick one or the other could then 
defect on all the down-ballot races if he or she so decided without anyone ever knowing.   
Colorado 
 Colorado’s primary rules are fairly typical of a closed and then semi-closed state.  
Kanthak and Morton (2001, pp. 121) observed that Colorado switched from “pure-
closed” and “semi-closed” in time for the 1992 elections.  As a consequence, Bott (1990) 
lists Colorado as closed.  Covering the earlier period, Jewell (1977) has the state listed as 
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“closed” as far back as 1950.  The rules for the semi-closed primary are “same-day 
nonpartisan affiliation”; the 2008 voter guide described the rules as “If you are 
participating in the Primary Election, you are required to be affiliated with a political 
party. If you are unaffiliated, you can declare a political party at the polls.”57  This type of 
semi-closed primary is certainly not “private choice.”   
 Colorado has implemented one more recent change not reflected in my database.  
Starting in 2009, Colorado allowed individual counties to decide to conduct all-mail 
primary elections.  Not all counties did so immediately; for example, El Paso County did 
not implement this scheme until 2012.
58
  In 2010, 46 of 64 counties used vote-by-mail.
59
  
This vote-by-mail system actually works like a combination of limited early-in-person 
voting (there are still a few physical locations available for the week before the election) 
and mail voting.  Oregon conducts all of its elections by mail, as do some parts of 
California (Alpine and Sierra Counties).  I have not included in the database a variable 
for voting type but I mention this change for the sake of completeness. 
 Colorado differs from other states because of the “precinct caucus.”60  While the 
primary rules are fairly straightforward, the precinct caucus appears to be a Colorado-
only invention.  It is a mild form of pre-primary party control over ballot access; it is less 
restrictive than the challenge primary but possibly still meaningfully restrictive relative to 
having nothing at all.  In a precinct caucus, party members get together and select 
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delegates to the county or district convention.  Candidates make it on the primary ballot 
either by going through this convention process or by acquiring enough signatures on a 
petition (Bott 1990, pp. 116).  The “winner” of the caucus system wins the first spot on 
the ballot; those who get access to the ballot by petition have to be placed lower.
61
   
 Colorado’s pre-primary precinct-caucus system does not present alternative 
candidates with a high barrier to entry.  Like some other states, Colorado separates parties 
into both “major” and “minor” parties; major parties have to participate in primaries 
while minor parties do not.  There are some other technical differences, including funding 
limits on minor parties, lower signature requirements to make it on the ballot, and so on.  
A candidate can easily make an “end-run” around their own party by forming an 
alternative minor party or running as an independent.  This happened in 2010 in the race 
between Democrat John Hickenlooper, Republican Dan Maes, and former Republican 
Tom Tancredo.  Maes, with Tea Party support, defeated establishment favorite 
Republican Scott McInnis in the primary; McInnis’ campaign “disintegrated” over a 
plagiarism issue.
62
  Dan Maes proved to be something less than a strong candidate: 
“Political newcomer Dan Maes won the GOP primary election, but he has since made a 
series of gaffes, including calling a public bicycle program in Denver part of a U.N. 
conspiracy.”63  As a consequence, Tancredo entered as a candidate of the American 
Constitution Party, effectively putting two Republicans on the general election ballot to 
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face one Democrat – with predictable results.  Maes did so poorly that he almost lost the 
Republican Party in Colorado “major-party” status.  While the pre-primary endorsement 
may help coordinate partisans on a particular candidate, it does not appear to block much 
access to the ballot. 
 While this chapter has little to do with presidential primaries, there is one 
historical note worth mentioning in that context in Colorado.  Colorado no longer holds 
presidential primaries; the state reverted to caucuses.  For a brief period, though, 
Colorado conducted a presidential primary – starting in 1992.  This is one of the few 
known cases of politicians paying attention to political scientists.  State Senator Mike 
Bird happened to co-teach a class at Colorado College with Professor Robert Loevy, who 
had recently written that Colorado missed out on influencing national politics by holding 
a caucus rather than a primary.  So Senator Bird asked Loevy to produce the bill and they 
passed it.
64
  The primary would last through the 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential cycles; 
due to low participation, the state canceled the primary before the 2004 election. 
 In the database, I have listed Colorado as a “closed” primary state with a weak 
pre-primary coordinating mechanism from 1946–1990.  From 1992 to 2012, I have listed 
Colorado as semi-closed with a weak pre-primary mechanism.  While Colorado could be 
considered “party choice” in the aftermath of Tashjian and Jones, the formal rules do not 
reflect this.  The current system seems to remain the preference of both parties; in a 
sense, it is “party-choice, semi-closed.”  With the database, though, I can easily recode all 
                                                          
64
 Story in: Loevy, Robert D.  1993.  “Colorado’s First Ever Presidential Primary.”  Presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 20.  Professor Loevy forwarded to me a copy 
of his paper.   
70 
 
“closed” and “semi-closed” elections to “party choice” for the analysis to reflect court 
decisions or to include dummy variables for court decisions.   
Connecticut 
 For a small state, Connecticut has had a large impact on the conduct of primary 
elections in the United States.  Connecticut adopted the mandatory direct primary much 
later than did other states and, even then, only barely adopted the primary at all.  
Connecticut voted in 1955 to adopt a “challenge primary.”  Primaries only occur after the 
party conventions and if the party fails to coordinate on a single candidate.  If one 
candidate has a sufficient amount of support in the convention, no primary occurs at all 
for that office for that party.  Even at the time, some viewed the challenge primary with 
suspicion: 
Title:  “Ribicoff Sees Skulduggery, Blackmail in Primary Bill” 
 
The House in Hartford yesterday passed and sent to the Senate a bill 
providing for primary elections. 
 
Only three Democrats, including State Rep. Marguerite L. Quimby of this 
city, voted for it. 
 
The action followed a press conference statement yesterday by Gov. 
Abraham A. Ribicoff that he had never seen a measure “so designed to 
promote political skullduggery and political blackmail.” 
 
… 
 
Speculation on Capitol Hill was rife as to how the bill will fare in the 
Senate, which Democrats control 20-16. 
 
… 
 
However, a high Democratic source predicted the bill would emerge from 
the Senate drastically amended. 
 
The source said the amendments would delete provisions for a post-
convention primary for state and national offices and instead provide for 
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mandatory primaries on the local level to name delegates to the state, 
congressional district and senatorial district conventions. 
 
… 
 
The passage in the House yesterday was after a three-hour debate during 
which each side charged the other with actually being opposed to 
primaries.   
 
Both parties supported a direct primary system in their election platforms. 
 
But Ribicoff said the whole thing made “no sense to me at all.”65 
                       
The supposition that someone who supported a challenge primary was doing the best he 
(or she) could do to oppose primaries is not completely off-base. 
 In any case, the challenge primary passed and the state ran closed primaries, 
whenever primaries did occur, through the 1980s.  In the early 1980s, then Senator 
Lowell P. Weicker and his friend Thomas J. D’Amore (the Republican state chairman at 
the time) thought the Republicans would benefit from opening up their primary to allow 
nonpartisans to participate.  Weicker, a moderate Republican, explained that he took this 
position to help the Republican Party compete with Democrats, under the theory that 
independents who voted with the Republicans in the primary would be likely to vote with 
the Republicans again in the general election.
66
  Connecticut’s primary law, though, 
stipulated fully closed primaries.  To generate a challenge, Weicker and his allies then 
passed a Republican Party rule allowing the unaffiliated to vote in their primary; this 
generated the necessary harm (by the state) to sue.  This culminated in the Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Connecticut case (1986). 
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 While it would be easy to see Weicker’s push to open Connecticut’s primary as 
party infighting – with Weicker leading a moderate faction – that does not seem to be the 
case.  This project started around 1983 or 1984; Weicker pointed out that he was the 
highest ranking member of his party at that point and, clearly, he had enough power to 
get the party to change its rules.  Instead, the pattern in Connecticut fits more with one 
party trying to gain an electoral advantage against another, although without much 
discussion about moderates or extremists (like in California Tom Campbell’s 
experience).  The New York Times covered the story: 
As the Republicans savored their victory, Governor O'Neill asked state 
Democratic leaders to make a survey of party members to see if they 
wanted to open their primaries to unaffiliated voters. 
 
In addition, Mr. O'Neill said he would submit legislation to the General 
Assembly, which convenes Jan. 7, that would open primaries for all 
elective offices to unaffiliated voters, if the parties chose to do so. 
 
Mr. O'Neill indicated, however, that he was still opposed to allowing 
unaffiliated voters to take part in primary elections. He said it would 
reduce the incentive for a voter to enroll in a party. 
 
''If you are going to open up the primaries at one level, they must be open 
at all levels, and that includes Federal, state and local offices,'' Mr. O'Neill 
said. 
 
The Republican plan would allow unaffiliated voters to participate in 
primaries for Federal and statewide offices, but not for municipal offices 
or the state legislature. 
 
… 
 
At present, a candidate must get 20 percent of the vote at a party 
convention to qualify for a primary. 
 
As of October, Connecticut had 555,798 unaffiliated voters, 670,468 
Democrats and 445,748 Republicans. 
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Mr. Weicker and Mr. D'Amore had wanted to bring in independent voters 
to stimulate voter interest in Republican candidates and to reverse a recent 
pattern of statewide election losses to the Democrats. 
 
In hailing the Court's 5-to-4 decision, Mr. Weicker said, ''It probably is the 
most significant piece of political news, not just to the Republican Party, 
but to the State of Connecticut, we've had as long as I've been in the 
business of government and politics.'' 
 
He said it would reverse what he called ''the abysmally low'' voter turnout 
in recent elections. 
 
''You're going to have the independent voters across the country, not just 
in Connecticut, having a voice in who the candidates will be,'' Mr. 
Weicker said. ''Hopefully, it follows that if they have a voice in who the 
candidates will be, they will participate in the elections themselves.'' 
 
Mr. O'Neill and the Democrats had contended that state law and not the 
parties should govern the nominating procedures. 
 
The Republicans filed suit in Federal court after the 1984 legislature, 
which was controlled by the Democrats, refused to change the law to 
allow the Republicans to admit independent voters to their primaries for 
Federal and statewide office.
67
 
     
 Ironically, though 2012, I have found no evidence that the Republican Party ever 
opened its primary to unaffiliated voters.  The party rules remain closed.
68
  As the 1980s 
progressed, the Republican Party drifted away from Weicker ideologically, a 
disillusionment further deepened by some personal animosity.  Weicker faced Joe 
Lieberman in the 1988 Senatorial election.  As Weicker explained it, he had campaigned 
against James Buckley in 1980; noted conservative William Buckley did not appreciate 
the lack of support for his brother and turned on Weicker in ’88 (Weicker 1995, pp. 179).  
Nor would William Buckley be the only conservative to attack Weicker when he was up 
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for election that year; in essence, Joe Lieberman outflanked Weicker on the right.  The 
AFL-CIO endorsed Weicker, a Republican, over Lieberman, a Democrat (Weicker 1995, 
pp. 178).  In essence, the conservatives wanted to send a message about ideological 
purity and they were willing to do it, not at the primary election, but with the general 
election.   
Weicker concludes his telling of the story of the 1988 election with two 
anecdotes.  In his 1995 book, he wrote: 
I lost to Lieberman by ten thousand votes, 50 to 49 percent.  The toughest 
part was being with my children as the results came in.  They were broken 
up and teary-eyed.  It was much worse for them than for me; I wasn’t 
happy but at least I could find a little humor in the situation, as when 
Claudia and I finally were alone for the first time that night, around three 
AM.  I put my arm around her and said, ‘Well, Claudia, this never 
happened with my first two wives.’ 
 
After the election, control of the state Republican party reverted to the 
conservatives.  They eliminated the inclusion of independents as voters in 
party primaries.  Republican primaries in Connecticut once again are 
limited to party members.   
 
Right-wingers got their wish by ousting me, but almost immediately, the 
law of unintended consequences came to play.  In Washington, President 
Bush nominated John Tower as secretary of defense.  As far as I am 
concerned, Tower was a person who always played by the same rules I 
did.  Our views were different, but he would have had my vote.  And with 
it, he would have been confirmed (pp. 180).      
 
It seems that for just one cycle – 1988 – the Republicans opened their primary to 
unaffiliated voters.  It does not appear the Democrats ever did.
69
 
 The issue about opening or closing the Republican Party primaries disappeared 
from the public debate, likely in part because Weicker ran for Governor in 1990 on a 
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had ever opened their primaries after 1986.     
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third-party platform.  Like in Colorado in 2010, the party control over pre-primary 
nominating procedures can be outflanked by a strong independent candidacy.  Weicker 
was a relatively popular figure in Connecticut.  The New York Times explained that the 
party split into factions for the 1990 Gubernatorial election:  
Battered by defections and internal bickering, Connecticut's Republican 
Party, which four months ago seemed confident in its ability to win its first 
gubernatorial election in 20 years, now appears on the brink of breaking 
apart. 
 
The main fissure has come from the independent candidacy of former 
Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., a liberal Republican who has attracted the 
support of several Republican leaders and this week selected a 
Republican, Eunice S. Groark, the Corporation Counsel of Hartford, to run 
for lieutenant governor on his Connecticut Party ticket. 
 
… 
 
''Remember the old expression, 'I'm not a member of any organized party, 
I'm a Republican?' '' asked State Senator George L. (Doc) Gunther, a 
Republican from Stratford. ''That's true now more than ever.'' 
 
… 
 
In the last two weeks, several Republicans have endorsed the Weicker 
campaign, which has maintained a wide lead in all polls over Mr. Rowland 
and the front-running Democratic candidate, Bruce A. Morrison of 
Hamden. 
 
… 
 
''I don't know if I've defected, or if the party has defected from me,'' Mr. 
Benvenuto said. ''I know there are many Republicans that don't like what's 
going on at the state level, and we see Weicker as the best candidate.'' 
 
The flurry of endorsements, along with the selection of Ms. Groark, is 
thought by some Republicans to be an attempt to shore up support in the 
party. In some private polls, Mr. Weicker's candidacy is attracting 40 
percent of the Democratic vote but only 20 percent of the Republican vote. 
  
… 
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The defections are also rooted in the long-running feud between the party's 
liberal and conservatives wings. Mr. Rowland is considered a Reagan 
conservative, and Reagan conservatives are currently ascending in the 
state party. Mr. Weicker's Republican support comes from liberals and 
moderates, who until recently had reigned over the party for decades. 
 
''There has been a schism in the Connecticut Republican Party as far back 
as the Taft-Dewey days in the 1940's,'' said Morton J. Tenzer, a professor 
of political science at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. 
 
The Republican Party's turmoil, however, has less to do with political 
philosophy or issues and more to do with Mr. Foley's personality and 
complaints about the gubernatorial nominating process. 
  
'Walter Mondale in Drag' 
 
Several Republicans, including Mr. Rowland, have reproached Mr. Foley 
for bullying party members backing or considering backing Mr. Weicker. 
Some have also criticized him as flippant. Last week, in a widely 
publicized remark, he called a Democratic congressional candidate, Rosa 
DeLauro of New Haven, ''Walter Mondale in drag.'' 
 
… 
 
Is a Primary Needed? ''The process is closed, and the party leaders have 
tried very hard to close the process,'' Mr. Cotter said. 
 
Mr. Foley has denied taking sides with any candidate but frequently 
emphasizes that most Republican town committee members do not want 
an expensive and potentially divisive gubernatorial primary this fall. He 
noted that the Stamford delegate-challenge primary last month involved 
many allegations of voter fraud and political dirty tricks. 
 
But Mr. Cotter disagreed. He said the party's gubernatorial candidate will 
need the exposure of a primary to combat Mr. Weicker's high name 
recognition. ''We honestly do not believe Rowland can win in November,'' 
he said. 
 
He said [Alternative Republican Candidate] Mr. Schiavone has 167 
delegates for the party's convention in Hartford next month. He needs 184 
delegates to force a primary against Mr. Rowland, a 33-year-old 
conservative who has the support of more than 70 percent of the state's 
914 delegates. 
 
His hopes were bolstered by a decision this week by the 29-member 
Republican town committee in Suffield to rescind its endorsement of Mr. 
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Rowland and send an uncommitted delegation to the convention. The 
decision came after a personal appeal by Mr. Schiavone to the town 
committee. 
 
''I don't think the Republican Party is in great shape,'' said Mr. Weicker's 
campaign co-chairman, Thomas J. D'Amore Jr., who served as the party's 
state chairman from 1983 to 1987. ''It's one of the reasons we are where 
we are today.'' 
 
Unlike in Colorado in 2010, Weicker’s outside bid in 1990 succeeded.  As a reward for 
his triumph, he would be burned in effigy on the capitol grounds in 1991 after passing the 
state’s first income tax.70 
 The extended discussion here about the adventures of Lowell Weicker illustrates 
both a technical problem with coding the database and a larger problem with the theory.  
It is not clear that party leaders after the early 1990s even knew about the Tashjian case, 
although it is now enshrined in Connecticut law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-431, 2013).
71
  
Since “party choice” is explicitly laid out in the law, I have coded Connecticut as “party 
choice” starting in 1988, although on coded the Republicans in ’88 as semi-closed rather 
than closed.
72
  Kanthak and Morton (2001, pp. 121), on the contrary, identify Connecticut 
as “fully closed” without noting the legal change.  Up until 1955, I have coded 
Connecticut as a ‘convention’ state, although the procedure may have involved more 
mass participation than the ‘smoke-filled back rooms’ of fame and legend would suggest.  
I have coded Connecticut as having the strongest pre-primary party control over the 
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 The section says: “No person shall be permitted to vote at a primary of a party unless (1) he is on the last-
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 Tashjian came out in December --- too late for the ’86 primaries.  Bryan Cafferelli of the Connecticut 
Republican party, in an email exchange with the author (March 21, 2013), wrote that the Republican Party 
repealed their semi-closed rule in 1989.     
78 
 
entire time period up to 2003, including the convention era, because the modern 
convention is just a weakened version of the earlier procedure.      
 The story of Lowell Weicker illustrates a larger challenge to the hypothesis that 
primary rules matter.  The story lays itself out for a different ending, an alternative 
history: challenged by conservatives in the 1988 primary, Weicker defeats them using his 
newfangled semi-closed primary and then wins the general election from the center.  
Instead, Republicans did not even bother to challenge him in the ’88 convention; he did 
not fight a primary at all.
73
  The Democrats, without changing the electoral institution, 
put forward a “moderate” – in their sense – candidate with Joseph Lieberman that 
Republicans were willing to accept over their own moderate candidate.  The Democrats 
found a way to respond to the situation without needing to change their institution.  
Similarly, Weicker – the most ‘moderate’ candidate in 1990 – by passed the primary and 
convention system to run as a third-party candidate.  Further, Lieberman himself would 
later run for Senate as an Independent.  All of these “moderate” campaigns took place 
without using the primary reform Weicker pioneered at all. 
 The state would ultimately adopt a less restrictive version of the “challenge 
primary,” allowing candidates to gain access to the ballot by petition.  Current law (Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 9-400) holds: 
A candidacy for nomination by a political party to a state office may be 
filed by or on behalf of any person whose name appears upon the last-
completed enrollment list of such party in any municipality within the 
state and who has either (1) received at least fifteen per cent of the votes 
of the convention delegates present and voting on any roll-call vote taken 
on the endorsement or proposed endorsement of a candidate for such state 
office, whether or not the party-endorsed candidate for such office 
                                                          
73
 Apparently, he nearly faced a primary challenge on the right in 1982 from Prescott Bush; Bush got 
enough votes in the convention to force a primary but then dropped out (Weicker 1995, pp. 172).   
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received a unanimous vote on the last ballot, or (2) circulated a petition 
and obtained the signatures of at least two per cent of the enrolled 
members of such party in the state, in accordance with the provisions of 
sections 9-404a to 9-404c, inclusive. 
 
The state changed this law (P.A. 03-241, July 2003) from the previous challenge primary 
in time to take effect January 1, 2004.  I have decided to code the new law – on a pre-
primary endorsement scale of 0, 1, or 2 – as a “1.”  I have ranked it as more severe than 
informal endorsements, like Colorado’s pre-primary caucus, as less severe than its 
previous challenge primary.  The existence of an alternative path – nomination by 
petition instead of by convention – distinguishes a “level 1” pre-primary hurdle from a 
“level 2.”     
Delaware 
 Typically, Delaware elections go on in obscurity.  Bott (1990) calls the elections 
closed and does not mention any kind of pre-primary hurdle for major parties; major 
party candidates go directly into the primary after filing to run (pp. 117).  Kanthak and 
Morton (2001) also list Delaware as “pure-closed.”  The strict closed primary rules 
persisted through 2012; Delaware held very late (September) closed primaries with a 
March deadline to change party affiliation.
74
  Candidates get on the ballot either by filing 
or by party nomination; filing is not difficult, however; candidates just have to fill out a 
form and pay a small fee.
 75
  
 While Delaware adopted the direct primary relatively early, the current closed 
system did not go into effect until 1980 for Governor and U.S. Senate.  Up to 1970 
statewide offices were all nominated by convention (see Jewell 1977, McNitt 1980) 
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although primaries took place for lower offices.  From 1972 to 1978 Delaware used a 
“challenge primary” like Connecticut’s, which it dropped for the 1980 election in favor of 
the closed primary.
76
  Parties still seem to do some kind of very weak pre-primary 
endorsement in Delaware but this does not seem to restrict candidate access to the ballot 
in a meaningful way; the most expensive fee for office is just a few thousand dollars, a 
trivial expense for a serious candidate.     
 I have coded Delaware as a ‘convention’ state through 1970, since I intend to use 
this database to study gubernatorial and senatorial elections.  Other researchers focused 
on state legislative races, for example, will need to recode Delaware appropriately.  From 
1972 to 1978 I have scored Delaware identically to Connecticut from 1955 to 1986: as a 
fully closed, challenge-primary state.  It does not appear that Delaware ever formally 
adopted “party choice,” so I have coded the state the same from 1980 through 2012.  
Delaware provides an excellent example about decisions researchers must make when 
categorizing state laws: even if the basics are the same, one set of state laws never wholly 
matches another.  For example, I have completely ignored this aspect of Delaware’s 
primary history: the state had a specific provision allowing the sale of alcohol on primary 
election day (which it at last repealed in 2008, allowing the sale of alcohol on general 
election day as well; see 15 Del. C. § 3112 and 76 Del. Laws 237).  ‘Drunken voting,’ 
though, may enter as an alternative explanation to ‘primary structure’ to help explain 
what happened in 2010. 
 Delaware’s 2010 Senatorial contest (to fill Joe Biden’s seat) is a textbook 
example of what can go wrong with fully closed primaries.  In 2010, Republican Mike 
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Castle – twice Governor, Republican Congressman, with $2.6 million dollars on hand, 
and a 60 percent approval rating – lost in the primary to fellow Republican Christine 
O’Donnell, who had the support of the growing Tea Party movement.  Time reported: 
In Delaware, for example, both campaigns expect only about 40,000 
voters in the Republican primary, a number that would nonetheless far 
exceed the norm in a state with little history of contested GOP races. That 
means O'Donnell could win by luring just 2% of the state's population, or 
about 1 in 9 of the state's registered Republicans, to the polls. The small 
turnout, says O'Donnell, "definitely works in our favor."
77
  
 
O’Donnell proved to be a disaster.   
 Among other bizarre features of the 2010 election, one moment stood out the 
most clearly: she ran an advertisement which began with her looking into the camera and 
announcing “I am not a witch.”  This advertisement responded to the emergence of a 
previous quotation from a 1999 television show (which never aired):  
“I dabbled into witchcraft -- I never joined a coven. But I did, I did. ... I 
dabbled into witchcraft. I hung around people who were doing these 
things. I'm not making this stuff up. I know what they told me they do…,” 
she said. “One of my first dates with a witch was on a Satanic altar, and I 
didn't know it. I mean, there's little blood there and stuff like that. ... We 
went to a movie and then had a midnight picnic on a Satanic altar.”78  
 
She failed to observe Professor J.J. Pitney’s basic rule of politics: “Never repeat the 
allegation.”79  Comments about witchcraft, though, merely reflected the larger problem 
reported in the Christian Science Monitor: “Mike Castle, the guy O’Donnell sent packing 
in the primary, appears to be the person the Delaware electorate as a whole actually 
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wants. He’s 15 points ahead of Coons in the Fox poll, at 48 percent to 33 percent.”80  
Someone with a large lead in the polls who represented the majority view in the state 
might well have been able to survive some weird comments; someone representing a 
small minority of the state’s voters would have to run a flawless campaign to win.  In the 
2010 primary, the closed format likely contributed to O’Donnell’s primary victory and 
Coon’s November win.   
Florida 
 Florida used the runoff primary for most of this period but combined it with a 
closed primary rule.  The state dropped the runoff in 2001
81
 but kept the pure-closed rule: 
“in a primary election a qualified elector is entitled to vote the official primary election 
ballot of the political party designated in the elector’s registration, and no other” (Fla. 
Stat. § 101.021, 2011).  McNitt (1980) just listed Florida as a “runoff primary” for 1954–
1974, without separating the closed Florida rule from the open Alabama one.  Kanthak 
and Morton (2001) identify the rule as “pure closed”; Bott (1990) identifies the state rule 
as “closed.”  Partisan registration certainly reached as far back as 1950 and very likely 
farther.
82
  I have coded Florida as a closed rule state from 1946 to 2012.  I have assigned 
it a runoff from 1946 to 2000.  The rules in the state seem relatively straightforward for 
state elections.           
Georgia 
                                                          
80
 Grier, Peter.  2010.  “Witchcraft?  Rent money?  Christine O’Donnell’s big problem: she’s behind.”  
Sept. 21.  Available online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/The-Vote/2010/0921/Witchcraft-
Rent-money-Christine-O-Donnell-s-big-problem-she-s-behind (last accessed 03/16/13).   
81
 The historical significance of southern primaries. (2005). Guide to U.S. elections (5th ed., Vol. I). 
Washington, DC: CQ Press. Retrieved from http://library.cqpress.com/elections/gus5e1-769-40250-
1938177.   
82
 Freedman, Morty.  1950.  “County Voters now number more than 50,000, Democrats 38,000.”  St. 
Petersburg Times, March 16.  Page 15.  Available online at: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=t1pIAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UE4DAAAAIBAJ&pg=4030,5085290&dq
=florida+register+voters+party&hl=en  (last accessed 03/16/13).   
83 
 
 Georgia uses a typical southern runoff system: an open primary combined with a 
runoff election.  See Bullock and Johnson (1985) for details of Georgia elections from 
1965 to 1982.  Kanthak and Morton (2001) listed Georgia as “semi-open,” reflecting the 
lack of private choice.  I have treated Georgia as “open” but without “private choice” and 
with “runoffs” from 1946 to 2012.  The interesting changes in Georgia primary history 
occurred outside the consideration of the variables I have included in the database.  
Georgia, through the early 1960s, used a mal-apportioned primary system called the 
“county unit system.”   
 The “county unit system” worked like the Electoral College but for Georgia 
counties in the primary.  The winner of each county got all the “unit” votes, apportioned 
to give rural Georgia a greater weight in state politics.  In gubernatorial elections, the 
winner failed to get a majority of the popular vote three times (1915, 1946 and 1948); in 
1946 the winner, Eugene Talmadge, gathered fewer votes than his main opponent.  In 
1963, the ‘one-person, one-vote’ standard imposed by the Supreme Court (in Georgia, 
this happened with Gray v. Sanders) forced Georgia to abandon this system.
83
  I did not 
code this as a ‘party control’ system (like some kind of pre-primary endorsement 
mechanism) because it pits different factions of the same party – urban and rural – 
against each other.   
Hawaii 
 Hawaii used an open primary system from statehood in 1960 to 1968.  From 1970 
to 1978 Hawaii in effect used a closed primary; voters had to vote in the primary of the 
party in which they last voted in a primary unless they registered another preference. 
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1978; in Hawaii’s second constitution, the state shifted to an open “private choice” 
system from 1980 to 2012.  Jewell (1977) claims Hawaii shifted from open to closed 
primaries before 1976 but McNitt (1980) lists Hawaii as having had closed primaries 
through the entire period.  Kanthak and Morton (2001) list Hawaii as pure-open (meaning 
“private choice”) and Bott (1990) lists Hawaii as ‘open.’  Since the open primary came 
about as part of the constitutional convention, it seems likely that the first primaries in 
Hawaii were closed, Jewell’s comment notwithstanding (Jewell does not mention when 
Hawaii was supposed to have changed).  I have coded Hawaii as closed from 1960 to 
1978 and open with private choice afterwards.   
 The interesting maneuvering in Hawaii took place recently.  Hawaii Democrats 
made an effort, starting in 2006, to sue (under the reasoning in Tashjian and Jones) that 
they should be able to close their primary; in 2008 the Senator Daniel Inouye (who had 
been a Senator since 1960) stamped out the movement.
84
  In 2009, Hawaii Republicans 
considered doing the same thing.
85
  While Hawaii’s system remains unchanged today, it 
seems likely that the system is vulnerable to a challenge along these lines if a party 
gathered itself to carry the process through.  Voters who want something like an open 
primary that rests on firmer legal grounds need to look to California’s top-two primary.   
Idaho 
 Idaho adopted the direct primary in 1909 (Galderisi and Ezra 2001) and, at the 
start of the period in this study, used an open and private choice primary (both Jewell 
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1977 and McNitt 1980 agree on this).  McNitt adds an important qualification: from 1964 
to 1971 Idaho had a weak pre-primary nominating procedure (not as strict as 
Connecticut).  Bott (1990) lists Idaho as “open.”  Lubecky (1987) and Kanthak and 
Morton (2001) indicate that Idaho had both the “open” and “private choice” 
characteristics through the rest of the period of this study.  Through 2010, Idaho fits 
neatly into the coding scheme used in the database.  I have defined Idaho’s system as 
“open,” “private choice,” and from 1964–1970 (I do not include odd years) I have listed 
it as having a moderate pre-primary party control (on a 0, 1, or 2 scale, this = 1).   
 Primary election law in Idaho gets interesting in 2011.  The Republican Party 
sued to close Idaho’s primaries after adopting a closed rule in 2007 for its own party rules 
(establishing harm, in the same way Connecticut’s Republican Party formally adopted a 
semi-closed rule before Tashjian).
86
  In 2011, the local District Court resolved the case 
Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa in favor of the Republicans, forcing Idaho to allow the 
Republicans to close their primary in 2012.  The state, following the ruling, implemented 
a closed primary with a party choice option for a semi-closed primary --- in line with both 
Idaho Rep. Party and Tashjian.  Furthermore, since the state had never required 
registration by party before, the 2012 primary would allow registration at the polls.
87
  So, 
in a sense, the 2012 primary remained “open” but lost its “private choice” characteristics.  
Starting in 2014, elections will be “party choice” as either closed or semi-closed.  In the 
semi-closed primary, “private choice” is lost for even the unaffiliated; furthermore, once 
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the unaffiliated voted in a party primary, they would remain affiliated with that party 
unless they changed their registration.
88
   
 Why did the Republican Party want to force a change in Idaho’s longstanding 
open primary?  The implied assertion in Idaho Rep. Party v. Ysursa is the party wanted to 
elect more ideologically pure candidates.  Republicans certainly did not need to worry 
about electing a candidate acceptable to the few Democrats.  In 2010 Republican Mike 
Crapo won the U.S. Senate contest against Democrat Tom Sullivan 71 percent to 25 
percent; in US Representative District 1 the Republican won by 10 percentage points and 
in District 2 by 44 points; and in the Governor’s race the Republican won by 27 points.89  
Republicans could afford to trade off a few points on their margin of victory for more 
ideological purity.  This is why it is not terribly surprising that Hawaii’s Democrats 
contemplated launching a similar action to close their primary; Democrats dominate 
Hawaii.  Minority parties (like Democrats in Idaho and Republicans in Hawaii) may also 
feel, if they are a weak enough minority, that voter registration by party would give them 
useful procedural capabilities (help locating their few supporters) even if it costs them the 
ability to run candidate with crossover appeal.  A party might reason that, at some point, 
it was hopeless that the party’s candidates would never reach a level at which crossover 
appeal would matter.   
 Idaho presents two key lessons.  First: generally, it seems parties try to close their 
primary (Idaho Rep. Party v. Ysursa) when they can trade off electoral strength for party 
purity and try to open it (Tashjian) when they want to be more competitive.  Who 
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precisely “the party” is matters as well: in California, moderate or “center-right”90 
Republicans were willing to trade ideological purity for electoral success by supporting 
the blanket and top-two primaries --- the more conservative wing of the party might not 
be so willing.  Nevertheless, the general idea is that rare is the day when a majority party 
will favor opening up its primary.  Second: due to court action, the two most common 
types of primaries in the 1950s are both on extremely unstable legal ground.  With Idaho 
Rep. Party the open primary looks vulnerable.  With Tashjian the closed primary states 
exist only with the agreement of both parties.  It would seem that in 2012 the choice 
really is between a “party choice” closed or semi-closed primary and a top-two type. 
Illinois 
 Illinois got off to a rocky start with direct primary laws.  The state, like others, 
began with a series of optional primary laws enacted in 1885, 1889, 1898, 1899, and 
1901.  Starting in 1905, the legislature attempted to make a mandatory primary law; in 
1905, 1906, and 1908 these attempts were all frustrated by the state courts which declared 
each successive law unconstitutional.  Apparently sometime between 1908 and 1910 the 
governor, in frustration, wrote to the chief justice of the state court demanding to know 
what kind of law they would find constitutional – a question the judge declined to answer.  
The courts would also invalidate three more primary laws, in 1910, 1919, and 1927.  The 
1927 law, though, would only be invalidated in part, and forms the basis of Illinois 
election law today.
91
  It is little wonder, then, that the state’s primary laws are confusing.   
 Kanthak and Morton (2001) list Illinois as “semi-open” and Bott (1990) calls it 
“open.”  Sorting through all the other sources, including available Illinois state laws, this 
                                                          
90
 Some of them prefer the term “center-right” or “pragmatic” rather than “moderate.”     
91
 This story comes from the first volume of the 1991 Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes, pp. 311.   
88 
 
seems to capture the general sense of how the laws work.  Voters just request one party 
ballot or the other and this choice is not private.  Commentators within Illinois would be 
quite surprised to find that political scientists define the Illinois primary as “open,” since 
many commentators have written editorials decrying the Illinois “closed” primary for 
years.  Two points in the original 1945 law help underscore this difference of opinion.   
 The legislators crafted the Illinois primary law, it seems, to make crossover voting 
difficult.  To vote in the primary, a voter must declare his or her party (1945 Ill. Rev. 
Stat. § 47-7-43).  After the voter gives her name and her party affiliation, the poll worker 
must “announce the same in a distinct tone of voice, sufficiently loud to be heard by all 
persons in the polling place” (1945 Ill. Rev. Stat. § 47-7-45).  Poll watchers can challenge 
your qualifications; one of which is not having voted in the primary of another party 
within 23 months.  The law about poll watchers is particularly interesting (1945 Ill. Rev. 
Stat. §46-7-34):  
The candidate or candidates of each party may appoint, in writing over his 
or their signature, two party agents or representatives who shall act as 
challengers of watchers for such respective candidate or candidates in each 
precinct.  Such challengers or watchers shall be protected in this discharge 
of their duties by the primary judges and peace officers and shall be 
permitted to remain within the polling place in such position as will enable 
them to see each person as he offers his vote, and said challengers or 
watchers may remain within the polling place throughout the canvass of 
the vote in such position as will enable them to see the said canvass and 
until the returns are signed.  All challengers or watchers shall be qualified 
primary electors residing within their respective precincts or wards and 
shall have the same powers as challengers at general elections. 
 
While technically an open primary, agents from the candidates can challenge your 
qualifications to vote if you have voted in another party primary within two years.  If 
those agents are sufficiently active, this would in many places make the primary 
equivalent to a closed primary.  These laws all remained in place at least through the 
89 
 
1991 Smith Hurd Ill. Ann. Stat., and seem to be in use today, with the exception of the 
23-month requirement (which remains on the books but is not enforced). 
 In 1971 Harriet G. Pontikes, a resident of Chicago, voted in the Republican 
primaries.  She wanted to vote in the Democratic primaries in 1972.  The 23 month 
requirement effectively barred her from doing so; she sued and, in Kusper et al. v. 
Pontikes (414 U.S. 51) the Supreme Court agreed.  Absent from Kusper v. Pontikes, 
unfortunately, is any kind of enumeration of how frequently party-switchers were found 
out and prohibited from participating.  The party control system was sufficiently serious, 
though, for McNitt (1980) to identify Illinois as a closed primary state (in his period of 
study: 1954-1974).  An editorial writer eloquently expressed the sense that the public 
declaration of partisanship acted as a real control, even after Kusper v. Pontikes, with a 
sarcastic remark in a 2010 editorial: “Voters not enjoying party leaders checking their 
voting status? That’s quite a revelation.”92  
McNitt (1980) also added that Illinois had informal pre-primary endorsements.  
Notes of these endorsement procedures are absent in both Galderisi and Ezra (2001) and 
Bott (1990).  There’s not much easily documentable evidence about Illinois informal 
procedures.  Nor did they, in some sense, work very well if they still existed in the 1980s, 
when followers of Lyndon LaRouche invaded Democratic Party primaries as candidates: 
When Gov. James R. Thompson, a Republican, went to cast his ballot 
Tuesday in the Illinois primary election, precinct workers in this heavily 
Democratic city could not immediately find a G.O.P. primary ballot for 
him. 
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''Only in Chicago,'' said the Governor. Within hours, politicians beyond 
this Midwestern state were saying, ''Only in Illinois.'' 
 
Mark J. Fairchild and Janice Hart, followers of the ultraconservative 
Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr., had captured the Democratic Party nominations 
for lieutenant governor and secretary of state. They defeated the 
Democratic candidates picked by the party's gubernatorial nominee, Adlai 
E. Stevenson 3d, a former Senator. 
The upsets, widely considered the result of regular party overconfidence 
and voter ignorance, threw Mr. Stevenson's campaign into confusion. 
There may, indeed, be no Democratic campaign for governor if Mr. 
Stevenson stands by his vow never to run with LaRouche candidates, 
whose platform is usually articulated from street-corner card tables. Planks 
include mandatory testing of all Americans for the disease AIDS, a larger 
nuclear weapons stockpile and ''Nuremberg-style'' trials for drug 
traffickers. 
Mr. Stevenson will try first to oust the LaRouche candidates through legal 
maneuvers. The last option, he said, is to launch a third-party bid, a very 
cumbersome procedure under Illinois law and one that aroused no 
enthusiasm among such other Democrats as Mayor Harold Washington of 
Chicago and Senator Alan J. Dixon.
93
 
Stevenson would honor his pledge not to run with LaRouche candidates; he temporarily 
left the Democratic Party and ran on a third-party platform.  He lost to the Republican.  
Since McNitt (1980) did not include Illinois with the strongest pre-primary categories, I 
have scored it as a “0” in that regard over the whole time frame.  Unlike in states like 
Colorado (that I coded as “1” for pre-primary coordination) whatever took place in 
Illinois did not restrict ballot access.         
 The 23-month party changing requirement before 1972 poses the largest coding 
challenge for Illinois.  I have decided to code the state as “closed” through 1972, 
following the reasoning of the court in Kuspar v. Pontikes: that if party switching 
requires skipping an election, it is more than just a public affiliation requirement aimed at 
                                                          
93
 Malcolm, Andrew H.  1986.  “Illinois Politics Produces Some Strange Results.”  The New York Times, 
March 23.  Section 4, Page 5.     
91 
 
reducing raiding.  Starting with 1972 (the Supreme Court in 1973 in the Pontikes case 
upheld a lower court order) I have treated Illinois as an open primary with public choice.  
The editorial writers’ complaints that the state still had a “closed system” after 1972 
highlight the importance of differentiating between public and private choice systems --- 
but do not reflect the true legal status of the ‘open’ primary. 
Indiana 
 While Indiana adopted the direct primary for some offices earlier, it actually used 
a convention to nominate candidates for governor and U.S. Senate through 1975.
94
  
Jewell (1977) and McNitt (1980) have the state listed as having a convention in the time 
periods they study.  Afterwards, the state implemented what would technically be a 
closed primary.  Nevertheless, the legislature wrote unverifiable requirements for 
participation, effectively making the law an open primary law with public choice. 
 The current Indiana law includes a very weak participation requirements.  In §3-
10-1-6, these are the rules: 
A voter may vote at a primary election: 
(1) If the voter, at the last general election, voted for a majority of the 
regular nominees of the political party holding the primary election; or 
(2) If the voter did not vote at the last general election, but intends to vote 
at the next general election for a majority of the regular nominees of the 
political party holding the primary election; as long as the voter was 
registered as a voter at the last general election or has registered since 
then. 
 
Due to the nature of secret ballots, all a potential crossover voter must do is swear to have 
voted for the majority of the nominees in the last election.  Scholars (Lubecky 1987, Bott 
1990) tend to treat this as an open rule; Kanthak and Morton (2001) add the important 
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“semi-open” qualification to signal the absence of private choice.  I have coded Indiana 
as ‘convention’ through 1974 and as ‘open’ with ‘public choice’ afterwards.   
Iowa 
 Iowa’s famous presidential caucus renders research into Iowa’s state-level 
primary elections nearly impossible.  The situation is further complicated by Iowa’s 
insistence on calling what is in effect an open primary a “closed primary.”  Bott (1990) 
called it open; Kanthak and Morton called it “semi-open,” and Lubecky (1987) explains 
why: while theoretically closed, voters affiliated with a party on election day.  The 
Secretary of State’s office confirmed this procedure for 2012.95  McNitt (1980) and 
Galderisi and Ezra (2001, pp. 19) also note that Iowa has a final post-primary convention 
option in the rare case in which no candidate receives 35 percent of the primary vote. 
 The post-primary convention is an interesting institution.  While periodically 
mentioned in news reports as a possibility, I have not located a prominent example of one 
such post-primary convention for a high-level office.  In 2010 in Iowa’s 3rd 
Congressional District, Republican Brad Zaun earned 42 percent of the vote in the 
primary – coming close to triggering a convention choice.96  If the state had a higher 
threshold, this rule would work much more like a runoff primary and would serve the 
same theoretical purpose as a runoff primary: to make sure that the victorious candidate 
represented a broad enough constituency in the district.  One of the concerns with 
California’s new top-two nonpartisan primary is that many candidates from many parties 
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could split the vote in so many ways as to send forward two candidates with narrow 
constituencies.  For example, in California’s Congressional District 8, the two 
Republicans who advanced each got no more than 16 percent of the vote in the primary, 
in a field of 13 candidates.
97
  
 I have coded Iowa as an open primary state with public affiliation for 1946 to 
2012.  I have not included a variable to take into account Iowa’s post-primary convention 
option, nor have I included this along with Connecticut’s challenge primary or 
Colorado’s pre-primary caucus system.  The system does have more in common with the 
runoff rules; however, since the threshold is so low – and I can find no examples of 
Senators or Governor’s winning by virtue of a convention – it seems inappropriate to 
include it with the runoffs that occur more frequently, at a higher threshold, and as votes 
rather than conventions.  I have left this part of the rules out of the database entirely.  As 
with all states, as specificity with the rules increases at some point any analysis is, in 
practice, running year-state fixed effects.   
Kansas 
  Kansas uses a variant of the closed primary that allows unaffiliated voters to 
choose on election day – once.  This type of law is closer to a semi-open primary than 
other closed primaries with durational requirements; and, indeed, voters could use it more 
like a semi-closed primary by filing the paperwork to return to unaffiliated status after the 
election.  Nevertheless, voters under stricter closed primary systems could also file 
paperwork to change parties after an election.  In my view, the status of the voter as she 
walks out of the polling place represents the key distinction between the “closed” and 
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“semi-closed” systems; if the voter comes in as unaffiliated and leaves as unaffiliated, it 
is “semi-closed.”  If the voter comes in as “unaffiliated” and leaves as “Republican,” then 
it is “closed.”  Note that this does allow a state some ‘wiggle-room’ to define selecting a 
party ballot as an act of affiliation (in an effort to establish the legal right of the voter to 
participate in the party primary, perhaps) and to provide the voter with a way to 
unaffiliated within the polling place.  It does not appear that Kansas law operates in the 
way; the voters leave affiliated with a party, so I define the system as closed (see K.S.A. 
§ 25-3301, 2011): 
(a) Each registered voter of this state who has declared a party affiliation 
as provided in this section or in K.S.A. 25-3304, and amendments thereto, 
shall be entitled to vote at every partisan primary election. 
(b) The county election officer shall prepare for each voting place at each 
partisan primary election a party affiliation list, duly certified by such 
officer, which clearly indicates the party affiliation of each registered 
voter in the voting area who has declared a party affiliation. The 
registration book prepared for a voting place pursuant to K.S.A. 25-2318, 
and amendments thereto, may be used as such list, but no registration book 
prepared for use at a voting place in an election other than a partisan 
primary election or an election held at the same time as a partisan primary 
election shall indicate in any manner the party affiliation of any voter. 
Such list shall be delivered by the supervising judge to the voting place 
before the opening of the polls. 
(c) The party affiliation list provided for by subsection (b) shall be used to 
determine the party affiliation of a voter offering to vote at a partisan 
primary election and of a voter applying for an advance voting ballot 
pursuant to K.S.A. 25-1122, and amendments thereto. If a voter's party 
affiliation is not indicated on the party affiliation list, such voter shall state 
the voter's party affiliation in writing on a form prescribed by the secretary 
of state. A judge at the precinct polling place, or the county election 
officer or such officer's designee, shall give such voter a primary ballot of 
the voter's party affiliation, and such person thereupon shall be entitled to 
vote. Such a statement of party affiliation shall constitute a declaration of 
party affiliation, and all such signed statements shall be returned to the 
county election officer, who shall cause them to be recorded on the party 
affiliation list. 
(d) No voter shall be allowed to receive the ballot of any political party 
except that with which such voter is affiliated. 
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(e) Party affiliation statements shall be preserved for five years. The 
county election officer may dispose of the statements in the manner 
approved for destruction of ballots as provided in K.S.A. 25-2708, and 
amendments thereto. 
(f) The county election officer shall update party affiliation lists as 
provided by rules and regulations of the secretary of state. 
 
The last provision is the key: the affiliation remains.   
 As with other closed primary states, the evolving legal environment challenged 
existing law.  In 2004 the Kansas Secretary of State, Ron Thornburgh, concluded that the 
closed primary law violated a party’s right to choose if the primary would be closed or 
semi-closed.  He “asked the state GOP and Democratic chairmen to give him directions.  
Both parties decided to open their primaries to unaffiliated voters.”98  Some Republicans 
did not like the decision; the chairwoman of the Republican 4
th
 Congressional District 
sued, arguing that the party chairman did not have the authority to unilaterally decide to 
open the primary.  The Kansas Republican Party’s congressional delegation supported 
keeping the primaries closed as well.
99
  Ultimately, the court agreed that the Chairman of 
the Republican Party, Jones, did not have the right to open the primary and the 
Republicans conducted the usual closed primary while the Democrats conducted a semi-
closed primary. 
 As with other controversies about primary rules, the dispute within the 
Republican Party had to do with conflict between moderates and conservatives.  
Chairman Jones came from the more liberal side of the party.  One newspaper report 
summarized the conservative view: 
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“I think an opening of the primary is a deliberate attempt by non-Republicans to open it 
up to other non-Republicans… we already have a situation where liberals area controlling 
the party.”100  Through 2012 a group of moderate Republicans worked together with 
Democrats in the Kansas State Senate.  In the 2012 primaries, a few of the more moderate 
Republicans would be defeated by more conservative Republicans; one party activist, 
upon hearing the news that his conservative candidate won, told an NPR reporter: “Oh, 
what a relief, because the other guy's a Democrat.”101  To the extent that primary rules do 
matter, keeping Kansas primaries closed may have helped the state’s conservatives. 
 Democrats have made the same trade-offs and calculations; just recently, Kansas 
Democrats voted to close their primary for 2014.
102
  For the Democrats, too, preferences 
for issue positions may play a role in the decision to close the primary; one editorial 
remarked: “Some speculation is that closing the primary was initiated by pro-gay rights 
interests and opponents of the socially conservative State Rep. Jan Pauls, a Democrat 
from Hutchinson. Prohibiting participation from unaffiliated moderate voters could leave 
her more vulnerable to primary election opposition.”103  This may help explain why the 
Tashjian case seemed to have so little immediate effect: for a party to challenge a state’s 
closed law, it has to adopt at least a semi-closed rule for its own party.  That means “the 
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state party” – a collection of political elite-level participants – has to want to win more 
than they want to stay ideologically distinct and believe that a semi-closed primary will 
provide them with winning candidates.  Party extremists are more likely to want to close 
the primary and party extremists are more likely to hold power in parties, it would 
appear.  The Democratic Party semi-closed primary from 2004–2012 is a rare case of a 
party choosing openness; now, they have joined the Republicans in choosing ideological 
purity.   
 I have coded Kansas as a closed primary state through 2002.  I do not consider a 
state “party choice” if state law does not reflect it and neither party has yet to issue some 
kind of challenge to the law or engage in actively “choosing.”  Starting in 2004, parties 
must be very clear on their ability to “choose.”  So from 2004–2012 I counted Kansas as 
a “party choice” state with the Republicans coded as “closed” and the Democrats as “not 
closed.”   
Kentucky 
 All of the main references I have used agreed that Kentucky had a closed primary 
over this period (Jewell 1977; McNitt 1980; Lubecky 1987; Bott 1990; Kanthak and 
Morton 2001).  With Kentucky the only uncertainty stems from the runoff rule the state 
used from 1992 to 2008.  Unlike a traditional southern runoff, the Kentucky version 
applied only to governors and included only a 40 percent threshold.  No election from 
1992 to 2008 triggered a runoff, although the state decided to eliminate the runoff after 
Governor Steve Beshear only got 41 percent of the vote in 2007.
104
  I have not counted 
this as a ‘runoff’ in the database for two reasons: I intend the database as best as possible 
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to apply to U.S. Senators as well and, with the low threshold, this is really quite a distinct 
institution from the 50 percent threshold.  If the database frames an argument about 
governors, Kentucky should be coded as a runoff from 1992 to 2008.  South Dakota has a 
similar requirement (with a 35 percent threshold) but this applies to both governors and 
U.S. Senators.     
Louisiana 
 Louisiana used a southern-style runoff through 1972 for all elections and through 
1976 for Congressional Elections.  In time for the 1975 gubernatorial election and 1978 
Congressional elections, the state adopted a nonpartisan runoff.  This system was quite 
similar to that employed by California, except that the second round did not always 
occur; if one candidate got more than 50 percent of the vote, the election ended with the 
primary.  The Supreme Court found in Foster v. Love  (522 U.S. 67, 1997) that this 
violated the Federal Government’s authority to set the date of Federal elections; 
Louisiana adjusted by setting the runoffs to occur later in the year.  In 2008 and 2010 
Louisiana used a closed primary system with runoffs for US Senate, reverting back to a 
nonpartisan primary for 2012. 
 A unique individual pushed forward this unique institution: Edwin Edwards.  
Governor Edwards certainly has lived up to Louisiana’s reputation for producing colorful 
political figures (he just recently was released from prison).  As best as I have been able 
to determine, he single-handedly engineered the development of the nonpartisan primary 
for the sole purpose of furthering his own political career.  As described in Time: 
Who would devise such a system? Edwin Edwards, the four-time governor 
of the state and a close second to Long in political charm who's also 
currently in federal prison on corruption charges. Edwards devised the 
open primary to help himself. When he won his first term in 1972, 
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Edwards slogged through a bruising Democratic primary and a tough 
runoff. By the time he got to the general election, he was beat up, while 
his Republican opponent, David Treen, faced no serious primary 
opposition (all the Republicans in Louisiana in 1972 could have fit on one 
Mardi Gras float). Once in office, Edwards instituted the open primary 
system under the assumption no Republican could survive the first round. 
Sure enough, Edwards got 62% of the vote in the 1975 primary and 
avoided a runoff entirely.
105
  
 
Notably, Edwards (supposed, although likely) motives differed considerably from the 
reformers in California.  Edwards came from the majority party and did not worry that 
the Republicans would use the rule to mount more competitive candidates.  Edwards 
designed the rule to squash competition, rather than produce it.    
Louisiana’s version of the top-two primary did result in one spectacular electoral 
failure in 1991.  Governor Buddy Roemer switched from the Democratic Party to 
Republican Party before the primary, leaving himself open to attacks from the left from 
former (corrupt) governor Edwin Edwards and attacks from the right by former Ku Klux 
Klan wizard David Duke.  The two more extreme candidates squeezed Roemer out; 
Edwards got 34 percent to Duke’s 32 to Roemer’s 27.  Edwards would defeat Duke 
(“who many think is still a racist anti-Semite”) in the general election; President Bush’s 
Chief of Staff, John Sununu, aptly summarized the situation: “I think you will see, 
unfortunately, a race in Louisiana that probably could be best served if they added a third 
line to the ballot, that line saying 'no.'”106  Notably, though, this very well could have 
happened under a more typical closed primary election rule.  A top-two nonpartisan 
system with one strong candidate of one party (Edwards) and two candidates of the other 
(Roemer and Duke), with a reasonable degree of sincere voting in line with the spatial 
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model, should produce outcomes very similar to a closed primary.  The single candidate 
from one party should likely make it into the top-two spots (as long as that party is 
sufficiently strong), leaving the two candidates of the same party to split their vote; a 
weak centrist candidate (Roemer, formerly of the other party) can easily lose to a more 
extreme candidate (Duke, of the KKK).   
 The rules for Congressional elections changed for 2008 and 2010.  The state 
implemented a ‘party-choice’ version of the partisan southern runoff primary.  The 
Louisiana Senate website summarized the bill that accomplished the change, SB 18 (Act 
560), as: 
Eliminates the state’s open primary election system for Congressional 
elections which has been in place for some 30 years and creates a closed 
"party" system for congressional seats. Republican and Democratic 
primaries will occur in September with any needed run-off occurring in 
October. The general election will occur in November as in other states. 
Independent voters will chose which party primary to vote in, if the party 
decides to allow independent voting. Effective Jan. 1, 2007, if the new 
primary process is approved by the U.S. Justice Department.
107
 
 
Note that this did not affect state elections.  Louisiana returned to its nonpartisan primary 
for 2012 for Congress.   
The exact details of the passage of the 2012 law seem a bit obscure, since this 
passed through the Louisiana legislature over the supposed opposition of both parties in 
2010.  The argument advanced by the supporters appears to have been cost saving by 
reducing Congressional elections to two stages (primary and general runoff) rather than 
three (primary, primary runoff, general election between parties): 
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For elections except Congress, Louisiana uses a two-stage open primary 
system in which all candidates for a race compete in a single election and, 
unless a winner emerges with more than half the vote, the top two 
competitors go to a runoff.  
 
The closed system, used in Louisiana only for U.S. House and Senate 
races since 2008, is a three-stage process that includes up to two party 
primaries and a general election.  
 
Greene's bill would save the state about $6.6 million in election costs 
every two years.  
 
The state Democratic party invites unaffiliated voters along with its own 
members to participate in its primaries for Congress. The state GOP, 
which allows only Republicans to vote in its primaries, prefers the current 
system.
108
  
 
The different election systems would have caused confusion in my database (intended for 
use with statewide offices), if it were not for the timing of the rules: current governor 
Bobby Jindal won his first term in 2007 and his second in 2011.  In 2008 and 2010, 
Louisiana elected Senators.  Similarly, in 1976 when the state had a split system, 
Louisiana did not have a U.S. Senate election.   
 I have coded Louisiana like a typical southern runoff through 1974.  From 1975 to 
2007, I have coded the state as a nonpartisan runoff.  Without the ensured second round, 
the Louisiana rule does differ from the one in California and Washington.  That 
difference might be important; in the first use of the top-two in California several 
candidates experienced a reversal of fortune.  Nevertheless, these systems have to be 
coded to some degree by similarity; I judge the two systems as ‘close enough.’  Since I 
want to measure ‘top of the ticket’ rules, I switch the database for 2008–2010 to ‘party 
choice’ and ‘runoff,’ with the Republicans as ‘closed’ and the Democrats as ‘open.’  I 
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have coded the state in 2012 as ‘nonpartisan.’  Note that nonpartisan primaries come with 
an assumption of ‘private choice.’  To use this database with other electoral data, it will 
be necessary to adjust the coding.    
Maine 
 Maine operates closed primaries.  Bott (1990) calls them closed, as does McNitt 
(1980) for 1954–1974.  For 1950–1976 Jewell (1977) also calls them closed, noting the 
long time required to change party registration (Bott 1990 does as well).  Lubecky (1987) 
and Kanthak and Morton (2001) both  mention that unaffiliated voters could affiliate on 
election day, but it seems that they remained affiliated afterwards.  For those reasons, I 
have just classified Maine as “closed” for the whole period; since neither party has yet to 
attempt to exercise “party choice,” I have not coded it as such; all “closed” primaries 
after Tashjian are vulnerable to party choice claims; analysis with this dataset should 
consider the effects (if any) of Tashjian.   
Maryland 
 Maryland  generally operates closed primaries, although the current law has 
“party choice” language built into it.  By § 8-202c  (2012)  parties can request 
unaffiliated voter participation if they do so within six months of the election.  Senate Bill 
313 in 2002, effective 2003, added this provision; the ‘purpose’ listed in the act makes 
clear that the state wanted to make sure it had a process to handle party demands for 
opening and closing the primary.
109
  I have found no evidence that either party ever 
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opened their primary, so I have coded Maryland as “closed” through 2002 and as “party 
choice” with both parties closed after 2003.   
 A mildly humorous incident occurred recently, illustrative of the challenges in 
meshing the legal requirements and terms (which vary quite a bit by state) with the 
knowledge of law held by regular citizens.  In 2010, The Hill produced a rather alarming 
sounding article titled: “Maryland invalidates independent voters.”  In this article, the 
author described how Maryland dispatched a letter to all of its registered voters 
mentioning that the “‘independent’ party is no longer recognized under Maryland’s state 
laws.”  Voters either had to pick a party or “automatically be reverted to ‘unaffiliated’ on 
their voter registration records.”110  The confusion stems from most Americans’ use of 
the word “independent” to mean “unaffiliated.”  Voters often unwittingly register with a 
political party which happens to call itself the “Independent Party” when they mean to 
register with no party at all.  California has a similar problem.  In 2012, between two and 
three percent of Californians registered with the “American Independent Party”; many of 
these voters may have not realized that instead of signaling their absence of committed 
partisanship that they instead signed up for a very right-wing political party.  In 
Maryland, whoever had previously filed the paperwork to keep the Independent Party 
viable failed to do so – revealing the difference between the Independent Party and 
“unaffiliated.”   
Massachusetts 
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 Massachusetts runs a semi-closed primary.  The language currently on the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts states “When you register to vote, you 
may choose to enroll in a political party or political designation or may choose to remain 
‘unenrolled,’ which is commonly referred to as independent. If you do not enroll in a 
party, you may still vote in state and presidential primaries by choosing a party ballot and 
will remain unenrolled.”111  In part because of the longstanding use of a semi-closed 
primary law, relatively few voters affiliate (“enroll” in Massachusetts-speak) in a political 
party; in 1958, about 49 percent of voters did not enroll with a party and about 53 percent 
did not enroll in 2012 (Figure 2-1, below).
112
 
Figure 2-1: Massachusetts Party Enrollment 
 
                                                          
111
 Located here: http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/elepar/paridx.htm (last accessed 03/21/13).   
112
 Massachusetts statistics available here: http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/eleenr/enridx.htm (last accessed 
03/21/13).  I used, when available, the “August” totals.   
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 If California retains a nonpartisan primary, the unaffiliated voters in California 
may grow in numbers and the state’s registration statistics might look more like those in 
Massachusetts.  Closed primaries seem to promote party affiliation, at least in the minds 
of many political elites.  One article discussing the Massachusetts unenrolled voters 
reported “Party leaders note that it’s easy for voters to stay unaligned in this state, which 
still allows them to vote in primary elections. But they acknowledge some voters today 
also seem to feel less bound by party loyalty.”113  The parties in Massachusetts could, if 
they wanted to, challenge the semi-closed law using earlier cases as precedent, especially 
after California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000) or Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa 
(2011).  Since it does not appear that they have done so, I have coded Massachusetts as 
semi-closed.  Note that Bott (1990) calls Massachusetts “closed” while Kanthak and 
Morton (2001) identify it, as I do, as semi-closed.          
 McNitt (1980) lists Massachusetts as having a “pre-primary endorsing 
convention” for 1948-1973.  McNitt suggests that the Massachusetts conventions are 
“fairly representative,” meaning the endorsed candidate should represent the will of the 
party (1980, pp. 266).  However, one news article from 1966 described the 
ineffectiveness of the Massachusetts routine for controlling nominations: “Massachusetts 
primary contests traditionally offer bitter, close races between party-endorsed and 
unendorsed candidates that often end in upsets.  This year’s primary this Tuesday is no 
exception… although [former Governor] Peabody is the convention-endorsed candidate, 
[Boston Mayor] Collins, a party maverick, had a slight lead in an Aug. 28 Boston Globe 
                                                          
113
 Riley, David.  2011.  “More Massachusetts voters enroll as Independents.”  GateHouse News Service.  
May 11.  Available online at: http://www.patriotledger.com/topstories/x767223046/More-Massachusetts-
voters-enroll-as-Independent#ixzz1iiMzCKoK (last accessed 03/21/13).   
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sampling of voters.”114  This type of article seems fairly typical of the era.  These types of 
nominating procedures that do not do much to limit candidate’s access to the ballot are a 
much lower barrier to entry than the institutions in place currently in Connecticut and 
Colorado.  I have decided to score Massachusetts as a “0,” for pre-primary party control.    
Michigan 
 Michigan conducts open primaries.  Bott (1990) classified the state as “open” 
while Kanthak and Morton (2001) identified it as “pure-open,” indicating ‘private 
choice.’  McNitt (1980) and Jewell (1977) both also call Michigan ‘open’ for the earlier 
period.  An unnamed author in the Hyde Park Herald lamented the difference between 
Michigan’s private choice open primary and the public choice open Illinois primary in 
1972; the author described Michigan’s process: “And in Michigan you do not declare 
your party.  You simply pull a lever inside the voting booth, and this lever shuts off from 
you the party in whose primary you do not wish to vote.”115  I have coded Michigan as 
open with private choice over the whole time period.           
 At some point, Michigan changed its voting technology.  In 2002, the Secretary of 
State’s office lamented the number of spoiled ballots: “Statewide, more than 1.8 million 
people voted in Tuesday's primary election, a record turnout representing 27 percent of 
Michigan's 6.8 million registered voters.  However, more than 224,000 ballots were 
invalidated primarily due to crossover voting.”116  It appears that by 2002 voters no 
longer pulled a lever to access only one side of the ballot and actually could, if they 
                                                          
114
 Byline ‘Congressional Quarterly.’  1966.  “Uncertain Massachusetts Primary.”  St. Petersburg Times, 
Sept. 10.  Available online at: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=EfZRAAAAIBAJ&sjid=CXQDAAAAIBAJ&pg=1930,5314710&
dq=massachusetts+endorsed+candidate+primary&hl=en (last accessed 03/22/13).   
115
 Unattributed.  1972.  “For Open Primaries.”  The Hyde Park Herald, Vol. 90, January 19.  Page 4.   
116
 August 8, 2002.  Press release from the Secretary of State, found here: 
http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1640_9150-46909--,00.html (last accessed 03/22/13).   
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misunderstood the directions, mark candidates from both parties.  With a considerable 
absence of creativity, and an ignorance of recent Supreme Court decisions, the Secretary 
of State Candice Miller, called for enacting a blanket primary (two years after California 
Democratic Party v. Jones).  It seems perhaps better voting technology or ballot design 
would have solved the problem instead.   
 Michigan’s 2010 gubernatorial race may help explain why some research has 
found little effect of primary rules on election outcomes.  In 2010 several Republicans 
fought to get the nomination for governor; one candidate, Rick Snyder, made an effort to 
run to the middle.  Politico reported:  “[Editor of News-source] Ballenger said Snyder’s 
attempt to attract Democrats and independents ‘may backfire because it’s going to certify 
for Republican primary voters — most of whom are conservative — what many of them 
have suspected all along: that he’s a RINO, a Republican in name only.’”117  Reaching 
across the aisle to court voters of the other party could potentially be punished within 
one’s own party.  In 2010, Snyder managed to pull it off; he not only won the primary but 
also won the general election.  Still, Snyder may have been the exception rather than the 
rule.   
Minnesota 
 Minnesota also conducts open primaries with private choice.  On this, Jewell 
(1977), McNitt (1980), Hedlund (1977), Lubecky (1987), Bott (1990), and Kanthak and 
Morton (2001) agree.  Minnesota also makes an explicit attempt to prevent voter 
confusion about the open primary (in the way the Michigan Secretary of State described 
in 2002, above): “If there are only two major political parties to be listed on the ballot, 
                                                          
117
 Alberta, Tim.  2010.  “Heat’s on in Michigan GOP primary.”  Politico.  July 28.  Available online: 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40309.html (last accessed 03/22/13).   
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one party must occupy the left-hand column, the other party must occupy the right-hand 
column, and the center column must contain the following statement:  ‘Do not vote for 
candidates of more than one party’” (Minn. Stat. § 204D.08, 2013).  Minnesota’s laws 
actually describe the primary ballots in great detail.  In any event, I have coded 
Minnesota as open primary, private choice for all years; the only caveat here is that as 
with all open primary states, it is certainly vulnerable to challenge after Idaho Rep. Party 
(2011).   
Mississippi 
 Mississippi, like other southern states, uses an open runoff primary.  The only 
caveat here is that theoretically “a voter who votes in the primary of one party may not 
‘crossover’ to vote in the run-off of another party.”118  I still count it as an “open” 
primary, though, since at least the first round is open.  I also count these elections as 
“private choice,” agreeing with the designation of “pure open” in Kanthak and Morton 
(2001).   
Missouri 
 Academic sources disagree slightly on how to treat Missouri’s primary law.  
McNitt (1980) called the state “closed” for 1954 to 1974.  Covering the same period, 
1950 to 1976, Jewell (1977) called it “open,” but noted that the voter had to declare a 
party on election day.  Lubecky (1987) observed that the primary was theoretically closed 
but voters could change parties on election day – a slight difference in emphasis from 
Jewell.  Bott (1990) just calls this open.  Kanthak and Morton (2001) strike the best 
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 Mississippi Secretary of State’s Office; information available here: 
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/elections/voterinfoguide.asp (last accessed 03/22/13).     
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categorization balance by calling this system “semi-open,” meaning an open primary 
without private choice.     
 The current version of the law has been in place since 1978.  The election code 
makes the “semi-open” primary very clear:  
Voter may receive only one party ballot--voters not wishing a party ballot 
may vote for independents and on all propositions and questions.  In each 
primary election, each voter shall be entitled to receive the ballot of one 
and only one political party, designated by the voter before receiving his 
ballot. Each voter who participates in a party primary shall be entitled to 
vote on all questions and for any nonpartisan candidates submitted by 
political subdivisions and special districts at the primary election. Each 
voter who does not wish to participate in a party primary may vote on all 
questions and for any nonpartisan candidates submitted by a political 
subdivision or special district at the primary election (§ 115.397 R.S.Mo., 
2013).  
 
This change (House Bill 101, 1977) appears to have been a modest alteration to the 
existing laws and seems to have generate almost no comment whatsoever in the media.  I 
have coded Missouri as “open, public choice.” 
Montana 
 Montana operates a system much like Hawaii’s: a classic open primary with 
private choice.  The FAQ on the Montana Secretary of State’s website is one of the few 
that describes this process well:  
Q. Which parties are qualified for primary access in Montana? Is there 
party registration in Montana? Can people in a primary election vote for 
more than one party's candidates?  
A. The list of Montana's qualified parties is available on our website at: 
http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/Parties.  
There is no party registration in Montana. Individuals who vote in a 
primary election are given all the parties' ballots, and can choose in private 
which party ballot they wish to vote. They return the voted ballots to an 
election judge in one sleeve, and the unvoted party ballots in a separate 
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sleeve. Voters in a primary election cannot vote more than one party's 
ballots.
119
  
 
Merriam and Overacker (1928, pp. 69–70) wrote about this rule for Montana, so this is a 
longstanding state tradition (without dispute in all the other usual sources).  I have coded 
Montana as an open primary, private choice state for all years.   
Nebraska 
 Due to its unique structure of government, Nebraska functionally uses two 
different primary election systems.  Nebraska only has a single house of its state 
legislature, which is officially nonpartisan; elections for that office take place under a 
top-two system.  Nebraska as a semi-closed state for congressional elections; it conducts 
semi-closed party primaries for U.S. House and U.S. Senate.
120
  Notably, though, it also 
still uses closed primary elections for Governor.  The explanation lies with an unintended 
consequence of Tashjian.  Before Tashjian (i.e., up to 1986) these elections both used 
closed primaries.         
 The New York Times reported that the legal counsel for the Nebraska 
Legislature’s “governing committee,” Cynthia Johnson, spotted a problem caused by the 
Tashjian decision.  The Supreme Court applied the “qualifications clause” of the 17th 
amendment to primary elections, meaning that “members of Congress will be chosen by 
state voters holding ‘the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch 
of the State Legislature.’”  Since Nebraska had a nonpartisan primary, those unaffiliated 
voters had to be able to participate in choosing members of Congress.  The State Attorney 
                                                          
119
 Available online here: http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/FAQ/index.asp (last accessed 03/22/13).   
120
 Conversation with the Secretary of State’s office, 2012.  Confirmed here: 
http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/voter_info.html (last accessed 03/22/13). 
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General agreed with this argument in 1987.
121
  Since this only applied to members of 
Congress, the gubernatorial elections could remain closed.  
Figure 2-2: Nebraska Nonpartisan Sample Ballot, 2010.   
 
 Note that the reasoning from Tashjian, Jones, and Idaho Rep. Party do not apply 
here: a party cannot close its election to nonpartisans since it cannot exclude voters 
eligible to vote for the nonpartisan legislature.  As indicated by Figure 2-2, nonpartisans 
who request a partisan ballot are allowed to vote in one of the House races in 2010 
(which one depends on which ballot).  On the same ballot, of course, only Republicans 
could vote for Republican gubernatorial candidates.  This does pose quite the coding 
conundrum.  I have coded Nebraska as semi-closed starting in 1988, since the New York 
Times article indicated that the Atty. Gen. expected his decision to affect the race in that 
year.  Note that this differs from the treatment given in Kanthak and Morton (2001); they 
identified the change to semi-closed congressional elections as occurring in 1996 instead 
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 Byline unattributed.  1987.  “Nebraska Independents to Vote in Primaries.”  The New York Times, May 
13.  Section A, pg. 18, Col 1.   
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of in 1988 as the Attorney General recommended (the whole recommendation is in 
Appendix 1 of this chapter).  To analyze the gubernatorial data, it is necessary to recode 
the election from semi-closed to closed.  Furthermore, any indicator variables 
representing the ‘party choice’ aspects of Tashjian cannot apply to Nebraska in the same 
way that such a variable would in other states.  Lastly, if there is a reliable way to 
compare ideological locations of Senators and Governors, what occurred in Nebraska 
(split methods for statewide elections) could serve as a very unusual natural experiment. 
Nevada 
 Nevada uses a closed primary election system; McNitt (1980), Jewell (1977), 
Lubecky (1987), Bott (1990), Kanthak and Mortion (2001), and the Secretary of State all 
agree.
122
  Primary administration in Nevada can apparently still excite; in 1996 the state 
had to try three times to run a simple closed primary for Nevada’s State Assembly.  The 
New York Times reported that in Clark County (which contains Las Vegas), the Registrar 
of Voters discovered that eight Democrats and Independents voted in the Republicans 
closed primary, and five voters cast ballots in the wrong precinct, in the first election.
123
  
Since the winner only won by six votes, the loser could demand another election.  The 
second election saw a reversal of fortune, with the loser of the first round winning by a 
single vote.  Despite this, election officials had allowed one voter who did not live in the 
district to cast a ballot.  So the election officials had to hold a third round.  In the third 
round, the original victor, Jeff Knight, won, although his triumph appears to have been 
                                                          
122
 See an explanation of the rules from Washoe County for 2012: 
http://www.washoecounty.us/voters/voterregfaq.htm (last accessed 03/22/13).   
123
 This story comes from: Holmes, Steven A.  1996.  “Politics: Political Briefings; The States and the 
Issues.”  The New York Times, October 3.  Section A, pg. 20, Col. 5. 
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short-lived; it seems he lost the general election to Democrat Tom Collins.
124
  It is 
certainly the case that nonpartisan primaries do not suffer from the crossover vote errors.   
New Hampshire 
 New Hampshire has a famous “open primary” – except that it does not have an 
open primary at all.  McNitt (1980) and Jewell (1977) both described the process as 
“closed.”  Lubecky (1987) also wrote that New Hampshire had a closed primary, with a 
very short (10 day) period before the election to change party registration; Bott (1990) 
reported much the same.  Kanthak and Morton (2001) list New Hampshire as fully closed 
through 1990 and as ‘semi-closed’ starting in 1992.  I agree with Kanthak and Morton’s 
analysis; the rules for 2012 were such that: “The law allows an undeclared voter to 
declare a party at the polls, vote the ballot of that party, and then change their party 
affiliation back to undeclared simply by completing the form available from the 
Supervisors of the Checklist at the polling place.”125  Even though there is an act of 
affiliation, I define it as a semi-closed primary because a nonpartisan voter can arrive 
unaffiliated and ultimately leave unaffiliated.  I have coded the state as “closed” to 1990 
and as “semi-closed” without private choice starting in 1992.   
New Jersey 
 New Jersey conducts closed primary elections.  The only exception are new 
voters or unaffiliated voters who had not voted in a primary before; the state law reads: 
“No voter, except a newly registered voter at the first primary at which he is eligible to 
                                                          
124
 McCall, Ken.  1996.  “Third time is a charm for Knight.”  Las Vegas Sun.  Oct. 9.  Available online at: 
http://138.210.151.139/news/1996/oct/09/third-time-is-a-charm-for-knight/ (last accessed 03/22/13).   
125
 This text came from the old Secretary of State’s website, which is no longer operable.  It used to be 
found at: http://www.sos.nh.gov/HOW%20TO%20REGISTER%20TO%20VOTE2012.pdf.  The new 
website says largely the same thing, available here: http://sos.nh.gov/VotePartyPrimFAQ.aspx (last 
accessed 03/22/13).   
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vote, or a voter who has not previously voted in a primary election, may vote in a primary 
election of a political party unless he was deemed to be a member of that party on the 
55th day next preceding such primary election” (N.J. Stat. § 19:23–45, 2013).  Kanthak 
and Morton (2001) call this semi-closed; I am inclined to call it a closed primary.  In my 
view, a true semi-closed primary allows unaffiliated voters to vote and walk out 
unaffiliated; here, only new (at least to the primary) voters can choose and they only have 
this privilege once.  The other standard sources (Bott 1990, McNitt 1980, Jewell 1977) all 
call the elections closed.   
New Mexico 
 All of the usual sources (Jewell 1977, McNitt 1980, Lubecky 1987, Bott 1990, 
Kanthak and Morton 2001) agree that New Mexico conducted a closed primary when a 
primary occurred.  There are two areas of concern with coding New Mexico.  First, the 
sources disagree about when New Mexico implemented a primary law.  The version of 
Michie's Annotated Statutes of New Mexico available through LexisNexis appears to 
date the primary from 1953; Galderisi and Ezra (2001) dated the direct primary to 1953 
as well.  McNitt included information about New Mexico primaries for 1949, though; 
news records exist for primaries for New Mexico from that time.
126
  It appears that New 
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 See: Associated Press.  1948.  “Democrats Hint at Compromise.”  The Day, June 5.  Page 10, Col. 8.  
“In New Mexico, former Secretary of Agriculture Clinton P. Anderson grabbed a commanding lead in his 
primary election bid for a senate seat.  Running with the president’s blessing, Anderson was well out in 
front over former Gov. John J. Dempsey.”  Available online: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=fR8iAAAAIBAJ&sjid=tnEFAAAAIBAJ&pg=950,6279990&dq=d
emocratic+primary+new+mexico+senate&hl=en (last accessed 03/23/13).   Or see the AP Story from 
March: “The secretary plans to enter the New Mexico Democratic primary in June.”  AP.  1948.  “South 
Chiefs Promise Truman Fight: Anderson to Run for Senate, Quitting Cabinet.”  Spartanburg Herald-
Journal., March 14.  Page 1, Col. 4.  Available online: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=MVcsAAAAIBAJ&sjid=HssEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6500,1493953&d
q=democratic+primary+new+mexico+senate&hl=en (last accessed 03/23/13).      
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Mexico implemented a closed (via McNitt) primary in 1940.
127
  So I have coded New 
Mexico as a closed primary state from 1940 to 2012. 
 McNitt (1980) provided a great deal of useful information about New Mexico, 
although not always in as much detail as I would like.  From McNitt comes the second 
puzzle: how to classify New Mexico’s pre-primary procedures.  The current procedures 
are simple enough; each party holds a nominating convention with only a single vote.  All 
candidates must file to make themselves available for this vote; any candidate with more 
than 20 percent of the convention vote automatically makes the ballot.  Candidates that 
do not reach that threshold may gain access to the primary ballot by petition; the New 
Mexico convention is more like the current Connecticut procedure than the old 
Connecticut challenge primary (see: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-8-21 and 1-8-21.1, 2012).  
Without a great deal of explanation, McNitt listed this institution as coming and going 
with some frequency in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 
 McNitt did not differentiate between an old Connecticut-style challenge primary 
(which I code as a “2” for pre-primary severity) and an endorsing procedure with a 
petition workaround (which I code as a “1” for pre-primary severity).  He listed them in 
the same category.  For New Mexico, he coded a closed primary through 1949, an 
endorsing procedure from 1949 to 1954, a closed primary from 1955 to 1962, and 
endorsing procedure from 1963 to 1967, a closed primary from 1968 to 1972, nothing 
from 1974 to 1976, and then as having an endorsement procedure in 1978.  Most of 
McNitt’s database only runs through 1974; I assume he intended the note about New 
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 Derived from this source: http://www.thegreenpapers.com/Hx/DirectPrimaryDates.phtml.  While not a 
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on this website is correct (last accessed 03/23/13).   
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Mexico’s laws in 1978 to signal that the laws had changed back.  I have accepted 
McNitt’s date ranges for the pre-primary procedure, with the exception that I include 
1974 and 1976 with the closed primary years; it seems that at least the most recent 
version of the nomination procedure dates largely from 1978.   
 That leaves only the nature of the pre-primary procedure as not yet determined.  
Fortunately, an article in the Western Political Quarterly from 1954 described it: “The 
New Mexico laws provide for a pre-primary nominating convention followed by a closed 
primary which technically and theoretically is open not only to the candidates endorsed 
by the convention but to others who may file for the primary by petition.”128  The author, 
Howard McMurray, went on to note that “since the number of signatures required is so 
large, and the time allotted for obtaining them is so short, it is doubtful that this provision 
has any practical meaning whatsoever.”  With that, I disagree; in the event that a 
candidate had widespread popular support but strong opposition with the party elite such 
a provision could very well matter very much.  In any event, this article mentions that the 
original pre-primary nomination procedure resembled the current one; this suggests that I 
should code the state as a “1” rather than a “2” on the pre-primary scale. 
 The article about the 1954 New Mexico election included one further detail about 
the nominating conventions.  McMurray wrote: “The platform conventions met soon after 
the primary, and both Democrats and Republicans adopted beautiful statements as 
innocuous as glittering generalities could make them.  Both parties were for God, Mother 
and the Flag, and for more water in New Mexico (who isn’t?), and more industry.  Both 
opposed sin and communism.  Neither spelled out its hopes or hates in great detail” (pp. 
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 McMurray, Howard J.  1954.  “The 1954 Election in New Mexico.”  The Western Political Quarterly, 
7(4): 616-620.  The quotations referenced in this chapter are all from pp. 616-617.    
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617).  While this remark describes a great deal of what political parties seem to do, it is 
worth noting the absence of major issue differences that could serve as tests for 
acceptability of particular candidates.  For example, Lowell Weicker in Connecticut took 
very different issue positions than his party; that he would choose to run as an 
independent rather than to risk a party primary makes some sense.  The absence of major 
policy disagreements in New Mexico may have reduced the likelihood of significant 
splits within a party that might cause a viable candidate to get less than twenty percent at 
the convention.        
New York 
 Like New Mexico and current Connecticut law, New York now uses a weakened 
challenge primary system matched with a closed primary (Bott 1990, Kanthak and 
Morton 2001, among others).  Candidates get on the ballot either by passing a certain 
threshold at a nominating convention or putting together an outside run via petition.  Like 
several other states as well, New York adopted primaries in phases, with lower-level 
offices typically using the primary first.  For Senate and Governor, New York used just a 
convention through 1967 (McNitt, 1980).  The state appears to have adopted the current 
procedure, more or less, in 1968.
129
 
 New York’s petition requirements are more burdensome than those in New 
Mexico or Connecticut in part because New York has a much larger population.  New 
York instituted large (described below) petition requirements; apparently in some years 
in which the parties desired competition they arranged to get all the candidates on the 
ballot with their convention.  In other years, the parties tried to avoid competition.  Since 
                                                          
129
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the signature requirement is steep enough, it may serve to make New York much closer 
to an old-style Connecticut challenge primary: 
Candidates get on the party primary ballot by winning 25 percent of the 
convention delegates' votes. That balloting is scheduled to take place at 
Wednesday's session in suburban Rye Brook. In the past, thoughtful party 
leaders have held several ballots with different candidates on each in order 
to let more contestants into the primary. They should do that again this 
year. 
 
If candidates are not given a line on the ballot through the party, they must 
collect signatures from Democratic voters around the state -- a process that 
is costly and time-consuming and a way of excluding candidates who can't 
afford $200,000 or more in staff work and legal fees.
130
 
 
For an uncertain prospect, $200,000 is a lot of money, even in 2010 in New York.  
Furthermore, the parties seemed to have developed a habit of challenging the signatures 
on petitions; one article noted “court challenges to petition signatures are a way of 
political life.”131  Nevertheless, because a workaround exists, I have still coded New 
York from 1968 to the present as a “1” for pre-primary hurdles.   
 New York’s election system has another peculiarity as well: cross-filing.  Like in 
California until the 1960s, candidates in New York can attempt to win the nomination of 
multiple parties.  Gaines and Cho (2002, pp. 33) mention that Charles Rangel, a 
Democrat from Harlem, was the last house candidate to win both the nomination of the 
Republican and Democratic parties.  Typically, candidates file to win the nomination of 
important minor parties, like the Conservative Party.  I have coded New York for cross-
filing over this entire period, including the time of the convention; in theory, little 
prevented someone from winning by convention the nomination of two parties as well.   
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North Carolina 
 North Carolina explicitly allows “party choice,” one of the few states to 
implement laws to provide an orderly process of implementing the Tashjian decision.  
State law provides a procedure for a party to both extend and withdraw permission for 
unaffiliated voters to participate (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-119, 2013).  North Carolina 
passed this law in 1987; the Republicans opened their primary to the unaffiliated in 
1988.
132
  Democrats followed in 1995.
133
  The newspaper accounts appear to contradict 
the report in Kanthak and Morton (2001) that the state was “pure-closed” through 1994.  
Bott (1990) does not distinguish between semi-closed and closed for most states (with 
only a very brief discussion of Tashjian), so Bott calls the law closed.   
 North Carolina also uses a runoff rule.  This causes some confusion with 
classification; for example, McNitt (1980) put North Carolina under “runoff” rather than 
“closed” when, in fact, it should have been “both.”  North Carolina also uses a slightly 
lower threshold for victory; 40 percent (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-111, 2013).  I will not 
attempt to distinguish between North Carolina’s 40 percent rule and Alabama’s 50 
percent rule; in the types of races (Governor, U.S. Senate) I will use in the database there 
will not be enough information to meaningfully assess the differences.   
North Dakota 
                                                          
132
 Associated Press.  1988.  “Unaffiliated voters may vote during presidential primaries.”  The Robesonian.  
March 3.  Page A5, Col. 1.  Available online: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=gixVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=kz0NAAAAIBAJ&pg=3477,716143&dq=
north+carolina+republican+primary+unaffiliated&hl=en (last accessed 03/23/13).  The story indicates that 
the Republican Party decided to open its primary in November (of 1987).    
133
 Stevenson, Alabama.  1995.  “Across the USA: News from Every State.”  USA Today.  Sept. 18, pg. 
11A.  See also: Unattributed Staff/Wire Reports, 1995.  “Democrats may open up primaries to 
unaffiliated.”  Wilmington Morning Star.  Sept. 15, pg. 3B, Col. 1.  Available online at: 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=IbEsAAAAIBAJ&sjid=FxUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6557,6002253&dq
=republicans+open+primary+north+carolina+unaffiliated&hl=en (last accessed 03/23/13).     
120 
 
 North Dakota has an open primary; the state does not even have voter registration, 
a prerequisite for a closed or semi-closed system.  McNitt (1980) observed that the state 
had an open primary with informal pre-primary endorsements up to 1967; after that point, 
Democrats and Republicans had a formal pre-primary convention nominating process.  
As in some other states with pre-primary conventions, candidates can also get on the 
primary ballot by petition.  Unlike in other states (such as New York) with very high 
petition requirements, North Dakota’s requirement is relatively small; Bott reported that a 
candidate only needed three percent of the party’s vote in the last election or 300 
signatures, whichever is less (1990, pp. 131).   
 North Dakota Candidates can circumvent the convention procedure.  In 2012, one 
Republican candidate, Kevin Cramer, decided to forgo participation in the convention 
entirely.  From an AP report: 
Republican U.S. House hopeful Kevin Cramer said Thursday he would 
skip the North Dakota GOP convention's traditional candidate selection 
process and run instead in the June primary, an unorthodox decision that 
immediately drew criticism from rivals. 
 
One opponent, Brian Kalk, who serves with Cramer on the state Public 
Service Commission, suggested the move was prompted by Cramer's 
belief that he would be beaten in a GOP state convention fight. 
 
“Our opponent did the math, and realized that he simply could not win the 
endorsement,” Kalk said in a statement posted on his campaign website. 
“Now he has made the decision to bypass the convention, marginalizing 
the very people who have built the North Dakota Republican Party.” 
 
Cramer denied that, and said he believed a primary campaign would be the 
best way to draw attention to Republican candidates. 
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“I'm doing this to bring a lot more people into the party, and my main 
rationale for this is to open up the party process and invite all Republicans 
from around the state into this decision,” Cramer said.134   
 
I have scored this pre-primary process starting in 1968 as a “1,” because candidates do 
get automatic ballot access from a convention victory.  I do not count informal 
endorsements as a serious enough hurdle, so before 1968 I have coded ND as a “0” in the 
pre-primary category.  It is debatable, though, whether the 300 signature requirement 
after 1968 counts enough to deserve equality with what in New York may be a $200,000 
signature gathering effort.   
Ohio 
 Ohio has an open primary with public choice.  The Ohio rules have caused some 
confusion; McNitt (1980) called the rule closed while Jewell (1977), for the same time 
period, called it open.  Voters have to declare a party affiliation at the polls.  The rule 
seems to have always been some variant of what stands now.  A poll worker can 
challenge the right of a voter to participate in a party primary on the grounds that the 
voter is not a partisan of the appropriate type.  The voter’s previous affiliation decisions 
can serve as evidence that the voter is indeed from the right party.  Nevertheless, even 
without that, a voter may obtain access to the ballot by declaration.  The modern law 
reads: 
Membership in or political affiliation with a political party shall be 
determined by the person's statement, made under penalty of election 
falsification, that the person desires to be affiliated with and supports the 
principles of the political party whose primary ballot the person desires to 
vote (ORC Ann. § 3513.19, 2011). 
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That is, a determined voter will always manage to cast a ballot in whichever primary she 
prefers.  Kanthak and Morton appropriately classified Ohio as “semi-open,” in their 
context translating to “open, public choice.”  Bott (1990) also held the view that the 
affiliation requirements were not very restrictive; Bott called Ohio open.   
Oklahoma 
 Oklahoma primaries can be pretty exciting.  In 1978, one news report commented, 
in what one can only presume to be an increasing order of alarm: “Oklahoma voters 
finish picking Democratic nominees for Senate and governor Tuesday in a bizarre 
campaign that has been punctuated by gunfire, denials of homosexuality and charges of 
party disloyalty.”  To the apparent great relief of Oklahoma voters, one of the Senatorial 
candidates, then-Governor David Boren, opened his campaign for the second stage of the 
runoff with a statement: “I David Boren, being of lawful age and upon my oath do swear 
and state that I know what homosexuals and bisexuals are.  I further swear that I have 
never been a homosexual or bisexual.”  His opponent, Representative Ed Edmondson, did 
not directly pick up the charge – but referred to him as a “closet Republican.”135  With a 
runoff primary, candidates get plenty of opportunities for mudslinging.        
 While the primaries may be fairly exciting, the rules are hardly easily 
discoverable in the political science literature.  Jewell (1977) does not include Oklahoma 
(or any southern states); McNitt (1980) of course categorizes the state as having a runoff 
primary without disclosing if access to that primary was open or closed.  The 1978 
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primary, described above, did use a closed primary system.
136
  Current state law requires 
political parties to let the State Election Board know if they would like to use a closed or 
semi-closed primary for the next two years in every odd-numbered year (26 Okl. St. § 1-
104, 2012).  The Election Board’s website indicated that the primaries were closed from 
2008 to 2013.
137
  Kanthak and Morton (2001), citing Bott (1990), indicate that 
independents could participate.  Bott cites 26 Okl. St. § 1-104 --- which only allows a 
semi-closed primary but does not mandate it.   
 The Libertarian Party challenged the restriction in 26 Okl. St. §1-104 to a semi-
closed (rather than open) primary.  In Clingman v. Beaver (544 U.S. 581, 2005), the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the restrict to a semi-closed primary, limiting the effect of 
Tashjian and Jones.  In this case, the court suggested the situation was not quite the same 
as in Tashjian: 
Nevertheless, Tashjian is distinguishable. Oklahoma's semiclosed primary 
imposes an even less substantial burden than did the Connecticut closed 
primary at issue in Tashjian. In Tashjian, this Court identified two ways in 
which Connecticut's closed primary limited citizens' freedom of political 
association. The first and most important was that it required Independent 
voters to affiliate publicly with a party to vote in its primary… That is not 
true in this case. At issue here are voters who have already affiliated 
publicly with one of Oklahoma's political parties…  These voters need not 
register as Libertarians to vote in the LPO's primary; they need only 
declare themselves Independents, which would leave them free to 
participate in any party primary that is open to registered Independents. 
See Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 1-104(B)(1) (West 1997). 
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There is an important distinction for my purposes (since I am not terribly concerned with 
minor parties in my coding) not made explicit here.  They key in Clingman is that the 
Libertarians could have a semi-closed primary if they wanted it, not that other parties 
actually did conduct semi-closed primaries. 
 Oklahoma adopted the ‘party choice’ rule in time for the 1974 elections.  This 
information proved very difficult to find from a standard LexisNexis search; fortunately, 
the State Election Board provided a response:  
…in Oklahoma, the political parties are required to notify the State 
Election Board whether or not they will permit registered Independents to 
vote in their primaries and runoff primaries.  26 O.S. § 1-104 also provides 
that if a political party does not notify the State Election Board of its 
choice, registered Independents will be prohibited from voting in that 
party’s primaries and runoff primaries.  In Oklahoma, voters who are not 
affiliated with a political party are designated as Independents.  26 O.S. § 
1-104 has been in effect since 1974.  Since that time, our records do not 
show that the Democratic or Republican Parties have ever filed notices 
with the State Election Board under this section of law, thus prohibiting 
Independents from voting in their primaries and runoff primaries.  From 
time to time, other political parties have gained recognition in Oklahoma 
under the provisions of 26 O.S. § 1-108.  In some cases, those parties have 
notified the State Election Board that they would permit Independents to 
vote in their primaries and runoff primaries as provided in paragraph 4 of 
26 O.S. § 1-104.
138
 
 
I have coded Oklahoma as “party choice” since 1974, with neither party ever opting for 
“open.”   
Oregon 
 Oregon ran a closed primary through the 1980s (Jewell 1977, McNitt 1980, 
Lubecky 1987).  After Tashjian, the state implemented a procedure for a party to choose 
(see ORS § 254.365, 2011; from the documentation in LexisNexis, it appears this 
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occurred in 1987).  In 1990 the Republican Party opened their primary to unaffiliated 
voters; this lasted only through the 1992 election.  The Republicans only attracted 11 
percent of nonpartisans in 1990 and 9 percent in 1992, so “faced with scant interest… the 
Republicans realized that a larger voter base in the primary would increase the cost of 
complaining.  They also feared that independents might push the party leftward.  For all 
those reasons, the Republicans dropped the experiment and retreated to a closed primary 
system.”139  In 1998, the Oregon Democrats decided to give opening their primary a try; 
this lasted only through the 2000 election.
140
  Both party primaries remain closed.  
Notably, since Oregon conducts elections entirely by mail, voters have to be much more 
proactive about making a party choice in a semi-closed Oregon primary; this task with 
mail balloting is somewhat more technically difficult.  In any event, I have coded Oregon 
as closed through 1986.  I have coded it as party choice starting in 1988, with the correct 
choices filled in for the two periods in which each party experimented with a semi-closed 
primary. 
Pennsylvania 
 Pennsylvania conducts now, and conducted historically, closed primary elections.  
Jewell (1977), McNitt (1980), Lubecky (1987), Bott (1990), and Kanthak and Morton 
(2001) all list the state as closed, as does the official state source: “Pennsylvania holds 
closed Primary Elections, meaning you must be a member of the party to vote for that 
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party’s candidate (for example, you could not vote in the Republican primary unless you 
are a registered member of the Republican Party).   The candidates that receive the 
highest number of votes in the Primary Election will be the nominee representing their 
party on the General Election ballot.”141  I have coded Pennsylvania as closed over the 
whole period in the database; neither party seems to exercise a ‘private choice’ option. 
Rhode Island 
 Like Connecticut, Rhode Island adopted the direct primary relatively late: 1947 
(Galderisi and Ezra, 2001).  It still maintains the tradition of an endorsing convention that 
provides an advantage by being listed first on the ballot (Galderisi and Ezra 2001, R.I. 
Gen. Laws §17-15-8, 2012), although R.I. Gen. Laws §17-14-7 (2012) and Bott (1990) 
appear to contradict Galderisi and Ezra’s contention that a party endorsement led to 
automatic ballot placement.  The disagreement is trivial, though, since R.I. Gen. Laws 
§17-14-7  (2012) – last altered in 1988 – includes very low signature requirements; to run 
for U.S. Senate, a candidate only has to acquire one thousand signatures.  As far as I can 
tell, Rhode Island has used something close to this pre-primary nominating convention 
since 1948; McNitt (1980) includes it in that category for 1954-1974, the whole span of 
his study.  The relevant provisions of state law all date to 1947.   
 In Rhode Island, voting in a party primary counts as an act of affiliation (R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 17-9.1-23, 2012; last modified 1994).  Voters on their way out of a polling place 
after a primary can change their designation for the next election (back to unaffiliated, for 
example); voters have until 90 days before the next primary to change their affiliation (§ 
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17-9.1-24; first modified in 1994 as well).  Members of another party (either by 
registration or by voting in a primary) who have not changed their party status are barred 
from participating in another party’s primary; everyone else is eligible (§17-15-24; a 
provision that dates to 1978).  Rhode Island used to have a much stronger (26 month) 
affiliation requirement; in Yale v. Curvin (345 F. Supp. 447, 1972) the local district court 
found that requirement too extreme.  Citing the contemporary Illinois case Pontikes v. 
Kusper (414 U.S. 51), the court noted that Rhode Island’s law forced voters who wanted 
to switch parties to skip an election.  Rhode Island had to adjust its law.  Bott (1990) 
listed Rhode Island as one of the states in which the unaffiliated can participate in a 
closed primary and noted the election day affiliation.  Lubecky (1987) indicated that the 
current rules were largely in place by 1986.  
 I have coded Rhode Island as a convention state for 1946.  Starting in 1948, I 
have coded it as a closed primary with a pre-primary endorsement of level “1” (not “2,” 
like Connecticut’s challenge primary).  After Yale v. Curvin, starting in 1974, I have 
coded the state as “semi-closed.”  I judge, by analogy, that the state is somewhat like 
Massachusetts with its affiliation requirements; Kanthak and Morton (2001) also coded 
Rhode Island as semi-closed.   
South Carolina 
 South Carolina operates a traditional open southern runoff primary and has used 
this system over the entire period in question.  South Carolina is one of three states 
(Alabama and Virginia are the other two) that allow parties to choose between using a 
primary and a convention to nominate candidates (Bott 1990).  The Republican Party did 
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not opt-in to the primary until at least 1970.
142
  Nevertheless, I concern myself here only 
with major-party primary rules – and the Republican Party hardly meets the definition of 
a major party in South Carolina in the 1960s.  I have coded the state as an open runoff 
primary over the whole period.  The first Republican to win statewide office did so in 
1974 because a court declared his Democratic opponent for Governor ineligible; 
Democrat Charles Ravenel failed to meet the state’s residency requirement and his 
defeated primary opponent took his place at the last minute.
143
  The first Republican to 
defeat a Democrat for statewide office, Carroll Campbell, did so in 1986 --- but faced no 
opposition that year, so no primary occurred.
144
  Campbell won even though the 
Democrats did not have to go through a runoff on their side; the second place finisher 
voluntarily gave up, sparing the frontrunner an expensive second round.   
 The 1986 election provides a lesson in differentiating formal rules from common 
practice.  Although by 1986 the Republican Party held primaries, only one candidate ran 
for Governor – and Campbell would likely have been nominated by a convention 
anyway.  Furthermore, even though the Democrats formally had a runoff procedure, and 
the candidates met the conditions for a runoff, they coordinated to prevent it (the second 
place candidate indicated that he had run out of money and knew that he would lose).  
For researchers looking for reasons why primary rules might not matter very much in 
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every election, the 1986 election serves as a case in which the voters would likely have 
reached the same final result under a variety of institutions.       
South Dakota 
 South Dakota used a closed primary until recently.  Jewell (1977) identifies this as 
a closed primary in the early period (1950–1976); this lasted through 2008.  In 2008, 
national politics intervened:  
Meanwhile, in South Dakota, where there are 23 delegates, the Clinton 
camp is complaining about the fact that Obama's henchmen are trying to 
change it from a closed primary -- one for registered Democrats only -- to 
an open primary, where independents could have a say. According to the 
Rapid City Journal, 47% of South Dakota's registered voters are 
Republicans, 37% Democrats and 15% independents. Obama does better 
than Clinton among independent voters.
145
 
 
The Democrats ultimately did not open their primary in 2008; nevertheless, someone in 
the party thought it was a good idea, so they voted to do so in 2009 for the 2010 
elections.  Echoing comments made by Lowell Weicker about why he wanted 
independents to participate in Republican primaries in Connecticut, the director of the 
McGovern Center said: “I've seen studies showing that if you vote for somebody in a 
primary, you're more likely to vote for them in the general election… I don't know of any 
studies just on independents voting in primaries, but there's a definite correlation 
there.”146  The Democratic primaries remained semi-closed for 2012 while the 
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Republicans remained fully closed.
147
  The party-choice component (S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 12-6-26, 2013) appears to have been in place since at least 1996.   
South Dakota also has a runoff option for extraordinary elections.  McNitt (1980) 
adds that the state did have some kind of “final convention option” in the early years.  
Now, for Governor and U.S. Senate, if no candidate gets 35 percent of the vote a runoff 
of the top-two candidates occurs (S.D. Codified Laws § 12-6-51.1, 2013).
148
  South 
Dakota opted to change the final convention option to a runoff in 1985; it appears no 
runoff has ever actually taken place.
149
  Much like Kentucky, it is debatable if a low-
threshold runoff serves at all the same purpose as a majority vote requirement.  The 50 
percent threshold seems to have a different philosophical view – that no candidate should 
be elected without the vote of a majority.  The low-threshold runoff does not oppose 
plurality rule; it just prevents extreme cases of electoral fragmentation.   
I have coded South Dakota as a standard closed primary through 1985.  Starting 
in 1986 I have included the runoff option.  In 1996, I have switched the state to “party 
choice.”  The parties have chosen “closed” through 2008.  For 2010 and 2012, I have the 
Democrats as “semi-closed” and the Republicans as “closed.”  To use this database for 
state legislative offices, the runoff option should be recoded back since that only applies 
to selected offices.   
Tennessee 
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 Tennessee used previously, and still uses, an open primary.  McNitt (1980) 
classified Tennessee as a closed primary but Lubecky (1987), Bott (1990), and Kanthak 
and Morton (2001) all treat it as open.  This does not reflect a change in law but instead 
reflects classification choices; Lubecky explains that the state technically conducted 
closed primaries but that voters could affiliate on election day.  I have followed the 
majority view and classified Tennessee as an “open” primary state with public affiliation.  
It also is one of the few states of the Confederacy not to use a runoff system. 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that voters in Tennessee routinely cast crossover 
ballots.  One recent report from 2010 described an election in Knox County: 
Let’s say you’re at a polling place this Thursday. Up drives a young 
woman in an old blue Volvo sedan, with bumper stickers on the back that 
say “Health care for all” and “Homophobia is not a moral value.” When 
she gets out of the car and starts walking toward the voting location, you 
see she has a pierced lip and an Obama T-shirt. But then, when she 
approaches the check-in table and is asked in which primary she plans to 
vote, she nonchalantly says, “Republican.” 
 
That scenario, or some less cartoonish version of it, has no doubt played 
itself out many times already over the past three weeks. By the end of 
early voting last Saturday, of 36,339 early and mail-in ballots cast in Knox 
County, 33,382 were in the Republican primary. It’s no secret that the 
county leans Republican, but it doesn’t lean 92 percent Republican. (It 
went 61–38 for John McCain over Barack Obama in 2008.) What’s going 
on is, of course, a familiar feature of the primary election landscape in 
Tennessee: crossover voting.
150
 
 
Only very rarely do election workers challenge voters that they are not members of their 
selected party.  In 2010, one avowed Democrat had her desire to cast a Republican ballot 
challenged, which caused a considerable media controversy; ultimately, she was allowed 
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to vote.
151
  In news reports, voters frequently call Tennessee’s law “open,” suggesting 
that the law has become by custom if not by rule more or less indistinguishable from a 
true open primary.   
Texas 
 Like many of the other southern states, Texas has long had an open runoff 
primary.  The usual sources (McNitt 1980,Bott 1990, Kanthak and Morton 2001, 
Galderisi and Ezra 2001) document the Texas law.  The Republican Party, like in 
Alabama and South Carolina, did not immediately switch to primaries from conventions; 
the Texas Republicans converted before 1968.
152
  As in the other states, I have ignored 
this in the coding as there were so few Republicans in Texas to much distinguish between 
a convention and a primary before 1968. 
Utah 
 Utah is the last state to use only a challenge primary, without a petition 
workaround.
153
  Utah had a more traditional primary from 1937 to 1946.  Starting in 
1947, to trigger a primary, a candidate had to get 30 percent at the party convention.  In 
1996 the Democrats changed the threshold to 40 percent; Republicans adopted the 40 
percent threshold in 1999.  This system gives the party elite at the convention a great deal 
of power.  In 2004, Utah Republicans did not even allow incumbent Governor Olene 
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Walker the opportunity to run in the primary.
154
  In 2010, Utah Republicans knocked a 
three-times-elected incumbent U.S. Senator, Bob Bennett, out of the primary at the 
convention.
155
  So, from 1948 to the present, I have coded Utah as the 2
nd
 level of pre-
primary control, like Connecticut’s challenge primary. 
 Surprisingly, Utah also conducts open primaries with, as categorized by Kanthak 
and Morton (2001), private choice.  Jewell (1977), Lubecky (1987), and Bott (1990) all 
agree that Utah used open primaries spanning this entire period of time.  So while 
Connecticut operated the restrictive nomination procedure with a closed primary, Utah 
used a similarly restrictive pre-primary control with an open primary.  Coding separate 
categories for primary type and for pre-primary hurdles allows me to use the observations 
from McNitt (1980) – that this is a restrictive system – and then also include the open 
rule noted by the other authors.   
Vermont 
 Voters in Vermont participate in private choice open primaries for Governor and 
U.S. Senate.  The instructions are very specific: “The names of all candidates of a party 
shall be printed upon one ballot. Each section shall bear in print larger than any other 
print on the ballot the words VOTE IN ONE PARTY ONLY OR YOUR BALLOT 
WILL BE VOID in a prominent place on the ballot. The voter shall vote for the 
candidates of one party only. A person voting at the primary shall not be required to 
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indicate his party choice to any election official” (17 V.S.A. §2363, 2012).  I have coded 
Vermont as “open” and “private choice” for the entire time-span of my database.     
This “private choice” scheme does not extend to presidential primaries, as of 
1995.  Voters participate under a “public choice” scheme for those elections: “A person 
voting at the primary shall be required to ask for the ballot of the party in which the voter 
wishes to vote and an election official shall record the voter's choice of ballot by marking 
the entrance checklist with a letter code, as designated by the secretary of state, to 
indicate the voter's party choice. The names of all candidates on the ballot shall be listed 
in alphabetical order. Each voter may vote for one candidate for the presidential 
nomination of one party, either by placing a mark opposite the printed name of a 
candidate as in other primaries, or by writing in the name of the candidate of the voter's 
choice” (17 V.S.A. § 2704, 2012).  An election official reported to me that the national 
parties had asked Vermont to track this information.
156
  Vermont is one of many states 
that conducts presidential primaries on a different date from state primaries, so one law 
does not conflict with the other (Galderisi and Ezra 2001, pp. 22).   
Virginia 
 Bott (1990) cites Virginia as one of three states that theoretically allows parties to 
choose between a convention and the primary.  As in other states of the old Confederacy, 
the Republican Party opted for the convention for quite some time – likely due to lack of 
Republicans.
157
  Unlike some of the other southern states, Virginia did not use a runoff 
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primary except from 1969 to 1971.
158
  Otherwise, Virginia uses a public choice open 
primary (Kanthak and Morton 2001, Bott 1990); the state still uses that system: “Virginia 
is an open primary state which means that any qualified voter can vote in either party's 
primary election. Virginia does not have party registration in its voter registration 
process.”159  I have coded Virginia as an open primary state with public choice and a 
runoff in 1970.  For use with gubernatorial data, a runoff must be added for 1969 as well.      
 The 1969 runoff primary for governor did feature a runoff.  William Battle 
defeated Henry Howell in a very close second round (within 25,000 votes of 430,000); 
the Republican in the race, Linwood Holton, seemed to be an afterthought to the 
process.
160
  Holton would not prove to be an afterthought at all; instead, he proved to be 
the first Republican governor in a century.
161
  In 1970 two liberal Democrats, George 
Rawlings Jr. and Clive DuVal, should have advanced out of the Democratic primary to 
have a runoff; one articled reported “a runoff election is possible but DuVal aides said he 
was not likely to seek one.”162  DuVal may have declined to seek the runoff because 
winning the Democratic primary mattered somewhat less than usual in 1970; Senator 
Harry Byrd had left the party to run as an independent.  In a three-way race, Byrd won 
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relatively easily.  Given the consecutive disasters, it should be no surprise that the runoff 
disappeared in 1971.      
Washington 
 Washington’s blanket primary turned out to be a casualty of California politics.  
When California’s parties sued in Jones, they undermined Washington’s blanket primary 
as well.  Washington managed to hold on through 2002 but had to resort to an open 
primary with private choice for 2004.  While voters in Washington did pass a “top-two” 
primary in 2004, further court action delayed its implementation past the 2006 primary – 
which also used the open primary with private choice.  In 2008, the Supreme Court gave 
Washington the go-ahead on the top-two.  Washington has used the top-two now in three 
elections: 2008, 2010, and 2012.
163
  As McGhee et al. (2012) noted, Washington’s forced 
conversion provides an opportunity to study an exogenously imposed change of primary 
system.      
West Virginia 
West Virginia’s primaries remain technically closed (W. Va. Code §3-1-35, 
2012).  Nevertheless, the Democratic and Republican parties both allow the unaffiliated 
to participate, making the state a de facto “party choice” primary state.164  The 
Republicans decided to open their primary in 1992 (Kanthak and Morton, 2001).  The 
Democrats did not follow the Republicans until 2008.
165
  When the Democrats opened up 
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their primary, they did it in some style: “The party has begun sending out full-color 
invitations — in red, white and blue, naturally — to thousands of households where 
unaffiliated voters live, urging them to participate for the first time in a West Virginia 
Democratic primary.  About 100,000 invitations will be in the mail before the May 13 
primary, according to Tom Vogel, executive director of the state Democratic Party.”166   I 
have coded West Virginia as closed until 1990.  Since the Republicans successfully 
opened their primary in 1992, I have coded the state as “party choice” from 1992 to the 
present.  I have coded the Republicans as having opened up their primary in 1992 and the 
Democrats as 2008.   
Wisconsin 
 Wisconsin has famous open and private choice primaries – and has for more than 
a century.  The extent that La Follette of Wisconsin deserves credit for the broad spread 
of primaries may be debatable (a debate pitting Ware 2002, pp. 114, against Merriam and 
Overacker 1928); nevertheless, his institution remains alive and well today.  All of the 
usual sources classify Wisconsin as having open primaries (Jewell 1977, McNitt 1980, 
Bott 1990, Kanthak and Morton 2001).  Wisconsin’s tradition of open primaries, as well 
as its recall provisions, generated perhaps an unexpected outcome in 2011.  Democrats 
attempted to recall several state senators as part of a political dispute over union rights; 
only Democrats had to hold primaries to select alternative candidates.  As a consequence, 
several Republicans entered the primary as “Democrats.”  One nearly won with the 
support of crossover voters; the Democrat only carried the Democratic primary with 54 
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percent of the vote.
167
  These were very unusual circumstances.  In any event, I have 
categorized Wisconsin as open and private choice over the entire time period in question.   
Wyoming 
 Wyoming is in effect an open primary state.  Lubecky (1987), Bott (1990) and 
Kanthak and Morton (2001) all caught on to the effect of the same-day affiliation rule.  
Jewell (1977) and McNitt (1980) both call Wyoming “closed”; they seem to have focused 
on the technical party affiliation requirement rather than the timing of that affiliation.  
Wyoming has allowed same-day affiliation since 1951.
168
  I have coded Wyoming as 
closed through 1950 and then as open with public choice afterwards.        
Conclusion 
 States have used a variety of different rules; political scientists have used a variety 
of schemes to categorize them.  The main difference between the scheme I propose here 
and the ones used in, say, Kanthak and Morton, is that I have created “base categories,” 
with modifiers.  Instead of distinguishing between “pure open” and “semiopen” 
primaries, I code them all as open primaries and then create a separate variable for 
“private choice.”  This allows the measurement of the effects of the “openness” part of 
the rule in traditional open primaries, open primaries with private choice, and southern 
runoff primaries (using another indicator variable to set off the partisan runoff).  The 
earlier schemes used terminology originally designed to array the laws on a linear scale 
of closedness to openness --- with the belief that this would also correspond with an array 
from most extreme candidates to most moderate.  By Gerber and Morton (1998) political 
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scientists had abandoned (to some extent) those expectations – but not the terminology.  
Getting away from the spectrum of open, semi-open, semi-closed, and closed also helps 
to fit in the ‘oddballs:’ blanket primaries, top-two primaries, southern runoff primaries, 
challenge primaries, and so on.  The next chapter makes use of this categorization 
scheme.    
Appendix for Chapter 2 
Appendix 2-1 
Nebraska’s response to Tashjian: 
Nebraska, AGO Opinion 07070
169
 
May 12, 1987 
Opinion 87070  
 
SUBJECT:  
The Legality of Closed Primary Elections in Light of Recent Decisions by 
the United States Supreme Court  
 
REQUESTED BY:  
Senator Lee Rupp  
Nebraska State Legislature  
 
WRITTEN BY:  
Robert M. Spire, Attorney General  
 
SUMMARY OF OPINION  
 
Must independent voters in Nebraska, who are qualified and allowed to 
vote in our nonpartisan legislative primaries, also be allowed to vote in our 
partisan congressional and senatorial primaries? Yes. Qualified 
independent voters in Nebraska must be allowed to vote in partisan 
congressional primary elections. This conclusion is based primarily upon 
the 1986 United States Supreme Court Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Connecticut decision, which holds:  
 
(a) The United States Constitution Qualifications Clause requires that all 
of those allowed to vote for the more numerous branch of the state 
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legislature (in Nebraska, our unique nonpartisan unicameral) must also be 
allowed to vote in congressional elections.  
 
(b) This requirement applies to primary as well as general elections. 
Therefore, it requires that qualified  
independent voters who vote in the Nebraska primary nonpartisan 
unicameral elections must also be allowed to  
vote in the Nebraska primary partisan congressional elections.  
 
DETAILED OPINION  
 
You have asked whether a recent United States Supreme Court decision 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 93 L.Ed.2d 514, 107 S.Ct. 
544 (1986)] requires that independent voters in Nebraska, who are 
qualified and permitted to vote in our nonpartisan legislative primaries, 
must be allowed to vote in our partisan congressional and senatorial 
primaries.  
 
We have reviewed the Tashjian decision together with other applicable 
law, and have concluded that the answer to your question must be yes. 
Tashjian does require that independent voters allowed to cast ballots in our 
nonpartisan legislative primaries also must be allowed to vote in our 
partisan  
congressional primaries.  
 
I. Our legal reasoning.  
 
(I) The Tashjian case involved a Connecticut statute which allowed only 
party members to vote in a primary election for a nomination to public 
office by a major political party. Contrary to that statute, the state's 
Republican .Party adopted a rule which attempted to permit independent 
voters to vote in the party's primaries for federal and statewide public 
offices but which remained silent as to the party's primaries for 
nominations for the state legislature.  
 
(a) The Republican Party then challenged the state statute in federal 
district court, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Party.  
 
(b) On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
the district court which struck down the state statute.  
 
(c) Among other things, the Supreme Court held that the Qualifications 
Clause contained in Article I, § 2 and the Seventeenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution are applicable to primary elections in precisely 
the same fashion that they apply to general congressional elections.  
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(d) The court also held that those constitutional provisions require that all 
those qualified to participate in the selection of members of the more 
numerous branch of the state Legislature must also be qualified to 
participate in the election of Senators and Members of the House of 
Representatives.  
 
(2) Under our unique nonpartisan, unicameral legislative system, our state 
statutes provide that independent voters may participate in primaries for 
the selection of state senators. However, those same statutes do not allow 
independent voters to cast ballots in the partisan primary elections for the 
Senate and for the House of Representatives. Therefore, our current 
primary system conflicts with the holding of the Tashjian case.  
 
Numerous branch of the state legislature are also:  
 
(3) In Tashjian, the Supreme Court began its analysis of the qualifications 
issue by discussing the purpose in enacting the first Qualifications Clause. 
The court determined that the purpose of the Qualifications Clause was 
actually increased federal suffrage, and the Court stated, "Far from being a 
device to limit the federal suffrage, the Qualifications Clause was intended 
by the Framers to prevent the mischief which would arise if state voters 
found themselves disqualified from participation in federal elections." 93 
L.Ed.2d at 532. The Court went on to state,  
 
The fundamental purpose of the Qualifications Clauses contained in 
Article I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment is satisfied if all those 
qualified to participate in the selection of members of the more  
qualified to participate in the election of Senators and Members of the 
House of Representatives.  
 
Our conclusion that these provisions do not require a perfect symmetry of 
voter qualifications in state and federal legislative elections takes  
additional support from the fact that we have not previously required such 
absolute symmetry when the  
federal franchise has been expanded.  
 
We hold that the implementation of the Party rule does not violate the 
Qualifications Clause or the Seventeenth Amendment because it does not 
disenfranchise any voter in a federal election who is qualified to vote in a 
primary or general election for the more numerous house of the state 
legislature.  
 
93 L.Ed.2d at 532, 533 (Emphasis added).  
 
(4) It therefore appears clear that the Qualification Clause and the 
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Seventeenth Amendment of the United States Constitution do not require 
that voter qualifications for the state Legislature and for the United States 
Congress be identical if voter qualifications for the congressional elections 
are expanded. However, it appears clear that a statute which would reduce 
the persons qualified to vote in the congressional elections in comparison 
to those qualified to vote in the elections for the state Legislature would be 
questionable under the Tashjian analysis. The latter situation is exactly 
that which we face under our current Nebraska statutes. Independent 
voters in Nebraska can participate in the primary elections for our state 
Legislature. They cannot, however, participate in the partisan primaries for 
selection of candidates for the House of Representatives and for the 
United States Senate.  
 
(5) Our research has disclosed very little additional law about this issue. 
Our own Nebraska Supreme Court has not dealt with this specific 
question, although it has indicated that in the exercise of the right of 
suffrage, statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the voter. Shaw 
v. Stewart, 115 Neb. 315, 212 N.W. 760 (1927). This holding would 
support the notion that statutes which unduly restrict those who shall be 
allowed to vote are suspect.  
 
(6) In addition, there are a number of cases which deal with the legitimacy 
of state regulation of the voting process. For example, in Rosario v. 
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), the United States Supreme Court upheld 
primary election registration requirements designed to prevent party 
fragmentation and interparty raiding. In these various cases, it is clear that 
the right of suffrage is a fundamental right, and that the state must 
demonstrate a compelling interest which is addressed by the regulatory 
statute in question in order for that statute to have legitimacy. Libertarian 
Party of Nebraska v. Beermann, 598 F.Supp. 57 (D.Neb. 1984).  
 
(7) In any event, the real question in the present instance is not whether 
the state has unduly burdened the primary election process in Nebraska, 
but rather whether our statutory framework complies with the 
Qualifications Clauses of the United States  
Constitution as they are explained in the Tashjian decision. As  
the Supreme Court has said on at least one earlier occasion,  
 
The States in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most 
numerous branch of their own Legislatures, do not do this with reference 
to the election for members of Congress. . . They define who are to vote 
for the popular branch of their own Legislature, and the Constitution of the 
United States says the same  
persons shall vote for members of Congress in that State. It adopts the 
qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for 
members of Congress.  
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In the matter of Jasper Yarbrough, I U.S. 651, 663 (Emphasis added).  
 
(8) On the basis of the Tashjian decision and on the general law 
supporting expanded suffrage, it is therefore our view that our current 
statutory framework which does not allow independent voters to vote in 
the partisan primary elections for Congress conflicts with the 
Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution. It is further our 
view that those portions of the federal Constitution require that 
independent voters who vote in the nonpartisan primary for the Legislature 
should be  
 
 
 
 
given whichever partisan ballot they desire for the partisan congressional 
elections.  
 
Where does this leave us?  
 
You have asked whether or not current Nebraska election laws conflict 
with the recent United States Supreme Court Tashjian ruling. We have 
answered you by stating and explaining our conclusion that our laws do 
conflict with this ruling. Perhaps we should stop there. However, because 
of the significance and urgency of this issue, it may be helpful if we 
comment upon related legal concerns and share with you our thoughts 
about precisely what legal options the Legislature, political parties and 
people of Nebraska have as a result of this significant United States 
Supreme Court decision:  
 
(i) Humility and experience both teach us that our legal opinion here may 
be wrong. Others may reach different conclusions. However, we do not 
consider this a close case. In our judgment the Tashjian Case is clear in 
what it says and thus it is clear how it affects our unique Nebraska 
situation.  
 
(2) Tashjian was a 5-4 Supreme Court decision. And so it is always 
possible that a future Court (with different members) might rule otherwise. 
But, irrespective of this possibility, we must respect and adhere to the law 
as it now is, not as it might be at some future undefined time. To proceed 
in any other fashion would result in legal anarchy.  
 
(3) Timing is important here. We have primary elections next year and so 
compliance in some form with the requirements of this decision should be 
addressed promptly. A failure to comply could cast some legal shadows on 
the 1988 Nebraska primary congressional elections.  
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(4) What are the actual legal options for the Legislature, the political 
parties and the people of Nebraska?  
 
(a) The Legislature could amend our state election laws so as to allow 
independents to vote in partisan congressional primaries. Legislation 
which merely gives the parties the option to let independents so vote 
would not meet the Tashjian case requirements. The case requires that the 
independents must be allowed to so vote. It is important to remember that 
the Tashjian Case relates to federal congressional elections only. It does 
not affect the partisan elections of state officeholders, such as the 
Governor and Secretary of State.  
 
 
(b) Nebraska could change to a partisan legislature. Doing this would 
require a state constitutional amendment.  
 
(c) Nebraska could do away with direct partisan primary Congressional 
elections. The parties themselves, through procedures they would 
establish, would then designate nominees for the general election. This 
would replace the present direct vote of the people nomination system. 
Doing this would require statutory changes.  
 
III. Concluding thoughts.  
 
(I) This Tashjian Case decision raises truly significant public policy and 
political science issues. For example, its effect upon an established and 
effective two-party governmental system is of concern to many. It also 
raises questions about nonpartisanship in the legislature, the policies and 
procedures of the major political parties, and other related concerns. On all 
of these questions we quite properly express no opinion. Our task here has 
been to interpret the meaning and effects of the law ~nd nothing else. How 
to react to the requirements of the law is the province of the people and 
their elected representatives.  
 
(2) Special recognition should be given to Ms. Cynthia Johnson, Legal 
Counsel for the Legislature's Government, Military and Veterans Affairs 
Committee. Ms. Johnson, a wise and constructive attorney, studied, 
analyzed and effectively brought this important issue to the attention of all 
of us.  
 
(3) As a personal matter, I particularly appreciate the substantial assistance 
on this issue provided by Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General and 
Chief of our Department of Justice General Legal Services Section, and 
Chief Deputy Attorney General A. Eugene Crump.  
 
145 
 
Perhaps because of the difficult policy decisions the law confronts us with 
here, we find ourselves a fronte praecipitium a tere lupi (literally "a 
precipice in front, wolves behind; i.e. between a rock and a hard place).  
 
Sincerely,  
 
ROBERT M. SPIRE  
Attorney General 
 
Appendix 2-2 
Variable coding: 
Variable Name:  btype 
 “Basic Type” 
 Open, Partisan = 1 
 Open, Blanket = 2 
  Semi-Closed (Mandated) = 3 
 Closed (Mandated) = 4 
 Party Choice = 5 
 Nonpartisan = 6 
 Convention = 7 
 
Variable Name: privatechoice 
 “Private Choice” 
 Party Selection Made Privately = 1 
 Otherwise = 0 
 
Variable Name: preprimary 
 “Party Pre-Primary Control” 
 None = 0 
 Weak Coordinating Mechanisms = 1 
 Challenge Primary = 2 
 
Variable Name: runoff 
 “Southern-Style Runoff Primary” [i.e., partisan runoff]  
 No = 0 
 Southern Runoff Primary = 1 
 
Variable Name: rpartychoice 
 “Republican Party Primary Choice” [if applicable] 
Open/Semi-closed = 1 
 Otherwise = 0   [assumed unless found evidence otherwise] 
 Not an option = -99 [must be ‘party choice’ primary type] 
 
Variable Name: dpartychoice  
146 
 
 “Democratic Party Primary Choice” [if applicable] 
 Open/semi-closed = 1 
 Otherwise = 0 [assumed unless found evidence otherwise] 
 Not an option = -99 [must be ‘party choice’ primary type] 
 
Variable Name: xfile 
 “Crossfiling” 
 No = 0 
 Yes = 1 
 
A few notes about the coding: 
 “Open:”  Open primaries are partisan primaries with easy affiliation 
requirements.  This includes the public choice partisan open primary, the private 
choice partisan open primary, and the blanket partisan primary – as well as most 
but not all Southern runoff primaries. 
 “Closed:”  Closed primaries have hard affiliation requirements that block 
opposite partisans from participating.  These must have a durational registration 
requirement for partisans.  If anyone can re-register on election day, that would 
be an open primary with public choice even if it is called a ‘closed primary.’  In 
effect, it is not.  However, broadly speaking, semi-closed primaries fall under this 
category, as do ‘party choice’ primaries after Tashjian. 
 “Nonpartisan:”  Republicans and Democrats run against each other in the first 
stage. 
 “Convention:”  I coded states as having conventions if and only if there was no 
direct primary at all.  So, while primaries were very rare under Connecticut’s 
early challenge primary system, I have coded that as a closed primary with strong 
pre-primary hurdles rather than as a convention because a primary could occur.   
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 Pre-primary hurdle coding:  0 = otherwise; 1 = there is an endorsement procedure 
or convention that puts candidates on the ballot automatically, but some other 
procedure by which they can reach the ballot (like a petition); 2 = the only way to 
the ballot is through a party operated procedure like a convention or a very severe 
requirement.   
 Separating “closed” from “semi-closed:” To be semi-closed, a voter must be able 
to go in and come out unaffiliated.  This differs from the way Gerber and Morton 
(1998) thought about semi-closed primaries; they included as semi-closed states 
in which new voters could affiliate at the polls but would leave affiliated.  I use a 
much narrower definition of a semi-closed primary.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: LAWS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND REPRESENTATION 
 While later chapters deal with a close up look at primary reform in one state, 
California, this chapter leverages a long time frame and the diversity of laws across states 
to examine how different primary laws affect political outcomes.  This chapter builds on 
the database of laws described in the previous chapter.  In particular, I focus on two main 
outcomes.  First, do different primary laws produce more competitive elections?  Second, 
do different primary laws produce more moderate candidates than others?   
Data 
 I have supplemented the database of primary election laws with three kinds of 
data: demographic and economic information, the outcomes of primary and general 
election campaigns, and estimates of the ideal points of United States Senators.  Pulled 
together, with some data-processing, I can then merge those data-sources with my 
database of laws.  Each “observation” in my laws database reflects a state-even-year, e.g. 
“Alabama 1968.”  To the fullest extent reasonable, I have adjusted the other data to fit 
that format. 
 For non-political information about each state, I relied on the United State 
Decennial Census of 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.  The database 
includes: state population, per capita income, percent of the population above age 65, 
percent of the population that graduated from high school, percent of the population with 
four years of college, percent of the population that is black, percent of the population 
identified as white, and the percent of the state that qualifies as urban.  These variables 
seemed to have relatively stable definitions over time.  Some of the other categories that 
might be nice to include, like percent Latino, have emerged comparatively recently as 
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official census categories.  To fill in the intervening years, I just used a linear 
interpolation by state: Alabama’s 1984 percent white in the database reflects two fifths of 
the difference between its 1980 and 1990 census reports.  A linear interpolation seems 
fairly safe here; these variables do not change dramatically year-by-year.  For 2012, I just 
projected based on the data from 2000 and 2010.     
 Election data came from Congressional Quarterly’s “Voting and Elections 
Collection.”  This database includes the number of votes and vote share of each candidate 
in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial elections back to 1968.  The CQ also identified 
candidates as incumbents.  I have collected the data for both general and primary 
elections.  Not every state-election-year included an election for Senate or governor; 
those entries are listed as “missing.”  I did interpolate U.S. Presidential election vote 
totals for non-presidential years as a measure of state partisanship – but I intend to use 
that as an independent variable in the analysis.  Some states elect governors in odd-
numbered years; to keep the structure of the data consistent I assigned odd-numbered 
year gubernatorial elections to the year before them and then included an indicator 
variable for odd-numbered year elections to remove them later if this seemed like a 
problem.          
 For a measure of each state’s representation, I made use of the DW-Nominate 
scores.
170
  For each Congress, I computed a distance (using both dimensions) from each 
Senator to the point that represented that Congress’ mean (in both dimensions).  Then I 
averaged across all Senators in each state-Congress to get a measure of the extremity of 
that state’s representation relative to the current Congress.  The DW-Nominate database 
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03/30/13).   
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organizes data by Senator-State-Congress; by this transformation, I have a variable that is 
just by State-Congress, which I can then easily map to election years.  Even in years in 
which Senators are not up for election, they should contemplate the election laws of their 
state – in case those laws remain in place for the future.  Conceivably, a law enacted after 
a Senator faced an election and repealed before the Senator faced reelection could still 
impact the Senator’s choices during their time in office.  For example, if a state used a 
nonpartisan primary for a year, a Senator might consider positioning herself to appeal to a 
broader segment of the electorate.    
Competitiveness 
 The type of primary election law a state uses may affect how competitive 
elections are in that state.  Most states tend to lean towards one party or another.  If we 
assume that elections tend to have a centralizing spatial effect, even without making very 
specific claims about achieving precisely the median voter, it is not a large intellectual 
leap to assume that a state with a closed primary rule and a dominant party should have 
large margins of victory.  If the weaker party picks someone close to their median 
registered voter, and the dominant party picks someone close to their median registered 
voter, the candidate of the dominant party will end up much closer to the general election 
median voter.   
 Of course, if the two parties are evenly balanced and they each pick an extremist, 
measuring general election competitiveness does not measure proximity to the median at 
all.  Two extremists might very well split the vote evenly between them, as most voters 
try to pick the lesser of two evils.  Even so, competitiveness can be a desirable outcome: 
it may engage citizens in the democratic process, compel politicians to take clearer issue 
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positions, encourage scrutiny of public officials for corruption, and so on.  While political 
scientists can argue about the precise goods delivered by competitive elections, it at least 
stands to reason that the nomination process has failed to produce viable candidates for at 
least one party if general election margins of victory are large.   
 As a general rule, with many primary reform attempts, “moderate” and “viable” 
are synonymous.  Typically, parties attempt to open their primary process to produce 
more moderate (and therefore viable) candidates.  Arguably this is what happened in 
Connecticut in the 1980s; at least there the Republicans considered a desire to win more 
elections.
171
  Moderate California Republicans also pushed for the blanket and top-two 
primaries in that state.  There’s a back-of-the-envelope application of the median voter 
theorem that underlies all of this: letting unaffiliated moderate voters into the minority 
party primary “should” allow more moderate candidates to win the primary and then run 
more competitively in the general election. 
 The problem with all back-of-the-envelope political theory rears its ugly head in 
this case: the formal predictions are nowhere unambiguous and depend to a great deal on 
the assumptions of the strategic choices of both candidates and voters.  As noted in the 
chapter reviewing the literature, several political scientists have commented that 
moderation may not vary along a linear “openness” dimension.  Gerber and Morton 
(1998) specifically suggested that semi-closed primaries might produce the most 
moderate candidates because they would prevent partisan “raiding” while allowing 
unaffiliated moderate participation.  Gerber and Morton hypothesized, and found, that 
semi-closed primaries produced more moderate candidates than open primaries. 
                                                          
171
 Although, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Lowell Weicker emphasized the habitual voting aspect 
over the spatial modeling notions in Connecticut; nevertheless: ‘so he said.’    
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 Overall, elections for “top of the ticket” statewide offices tend not to be very 
competitive in any case.  Figure 3-1, below, plots the mean and median difference 
between the first and second place candidates for U.S Senate – or, if a Senate election did 
not occur, state governor – by election year across all the states.  Notably, both the means 
and the medians increase over time; on average, elections for U.S. Senate and governor 
become less competitive.  In 2012, both the mean and the median differences were more 
than fifteen percentage points.  Most Senators and governors win big; one interpretation 
overall is that the nomination process fails to provide the winners with credible 
competition more often than not.     
Figure 3-1:  Margin of Victory (Percent Difference Between 1
st
 & 2
nd
 Place); Means and 
Medians for “top of the ticket” U.S. Elections, 1968–2012.    
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Figure 3-2: Percent Margin of Victory, “Top of Ticket” Elections, 1968–2012 (N=968) 
 
 Of the 968 elections included in this study, the victor won by less than five 
percent in less than 200 of them.  Figure 3-2 provides additional context for Figure 3-1; 
while the high means are driven in part by a few very high outliers (uncontested 
elections), most of the explanation lies with a broader lack of competition affecting most 
elections.  There are two ways to contemplate “competitiveness.”  As discussed in Born 
(1981) and Atkeson (1998) in the context of primary competitiveness, early studies in 
that area tended to come up with an arbitrary cutoff of what constituted “competitive.”  
Using the whole continuous variable does have some advantages; the continuous version 
of the difference does capture much more information about the election.  On the other 
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yards generated at the end of a lopsided football game; they are not very predictive of 
future values because the backups are in the game.  I created a variable which indicates if 
the winner triumphed by less than ten percentage points (342 elections, or 35 percent of 
the elections in the study); I will use both measures in the analysis.  These cutoffs are 
arbitrary; to capture the sense of the competitive election I had hoped to use the five 
percent cutoff but needed to adopt the ten percent to ensure that all states had at least one 
“competitive” election.   
Figure 3-3: Types of Primary Laws Used 1946–2012 
 
 Some policymakers may view the lack of competition as a problem to solve; this 
section addresses whether or not different primary laws might help solve it.  Figure 3-3 
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2012.  Over this period of time, the number of true closed primaries diminishes and states 
(and parties) use more semi-closed primaries.  The Tashjian case accelerated this trend as 
parties periodically opted for semi-closed rules.  Figure 3-3 shows the results of what 
parties decided; in some cases, both major parties made different rules (the “asymmetric” 
category).  Most states over this period used either an open, closed, or semi-closed 
primary.  Typically states that used an open primary stuck with it, although there are 
periodic changes.  I have included the open runoff primaries in with the other open 
primaries in Figure 3-3 as well.  States rarely used the alternative nomination procedure 
types: conventions, blanket primaries, nonpartisan primaries.   
 I have tried conducting the analysis in several different ways, including 
combining some of these primary categories.  Open primaries, broadly defined, could 
include the (now unconstitutional) blanket primary.  Especially since I have drawn 
competitiveness data from the top of the statewide ticket, the multiple crossover effect in 
the blanket primary is a lot more likely to take place farther down the ballot.  For 
example, if a Republican voter wants to vote for a Democratic U.S. Senate primary 
candidate, that voter is likely to vote in the Democratic race in both the open and the 
blanket primary.  If a voter wants to vote in their own Senate primary, the desire to vote 
in the other party’s primary for other races – lower house of the state legislature, perhaps 
– seems unlikely to draw the voter to cross over.  I suspect that the blanket primary would 
have a larger effect against an open primary farther down the ballot; both because a voter 
drawn across for the top of the ticket might change back and because a voter might jump 
across the aisle farther down the ticket.  This is a hypothesis rather than a fact, of course; 
nevertheless, it is sufficiently credible to deserve testing in the models.  In the broad-open 
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category I have excluded challenge primaries (like Utah); instead, I have grouped the 
“challenge primary” states with the conventions for these broader and simplified 
categories.   
 I have also generated a category for closed primaries, broadly defined.  The semi-
closed primary has much more in common with the closed primary than with the open 
primary.  For most of the electorate (in most cases, anyway) semi-closed primaries and 
closed primaries operate identically; registered partisans cannot cast crossover ballots 
without changing their registration status.  In most semi-closed primaries, commentators 
across many states lamented low participation levels by unaffiliated or independent 
voters.  Campaigns may not have had the microtargeting infrastructure (at least, until 
very recently) to figure out which unaffiliated voters to try to mobilize.  In this category I 
have excluded challenge primary states (like Connecticut, until recently) since they may 
be more properly grouped with the conventions. 
 I have grouped the challenge primaries and the conventions together under the 
heading of “party control.”  As with the broadly defined open and closed categories, I 
will use this as a variable for alternative specifications to my original classification 
scheme.  I have not included here the states with weak pre-primary institutions (like 
Colorado); I have only included the challenge primaries that have no petition “work-
around” for alternative candidates to use to get on the ballot.  Starting in 1968, there are 
very few elections that use conventions in the database – only six.  The “party control” 
category has 43 observations over that span (from Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Utah).  
Since meaningful primaries rarely occurred with challenge primaries, considering these 
together also makes sense. 
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 In some of the regressions, I have also grouped together the “nonpartisan” and 
“blanket” primaries under an “anti-party” heading.  In Washington, California, and 
Alaska one can make plausible inferences about the intentions of the authors of the laws: 
to prevent strong party control over the nomination process.  Louisiana seems to have 
acquired the nonpartisan primary for other reasons (to cut out the Republicans entirely; 
see previous chapter).  Nevertheless, these types of laws have constituted popular 
reforms.  It may make sense to consider them together.  It is, though, not possible to use 
both the “anti-party” grouping and the “broad open” heading simultaneously as blanket 
primaries appear in both.   
 In the analysis of these laws, the party-choice laws could be coded two different 
ways.  I have tested both.  The first alternative, leaving them all coded as “party choice,” 
reflects the notion that whatever choice the parties make is an equilibrium outcome in a 
strategic contest; that type of coding tests whether letting the parties choose increases or 
reduces competition.  The second alternative, coding their choice, sets up a test on the 
more specific rule.  A “party” is not a rational actor; it is instead made up of many 
individuals with their own agendas.  Parties may not always make sensible choices (or 
their leadership may consider different dimensions of the problem).  Periodically parties 
do not make symmetric choices.  There are 21 cases in which an election occurred for 
one of these top offices with asymmetric rule choices.  Those are interesting opportunities 
for analysis that would be missed by just coding each primary as “party choice.”       
 Do primary laws seem to correlate with margins of victory?  Table 3-1, below, 
displays the mean and median margin of victory for the “top of the ticket” race by 
primary type for 1968 to 2012.  Some of these categories obviously have more entries 
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than others; there are just 15 nonpartisan elections that meet the requirements while there 
are 439 open primaries.  The figures in Table 3-1 should be surprising; contrary to 
expectations, closed primaries (either broadly or narrowly defined) have smaller margins 
of victory than the alternatives.  The six general elections generated by conventions had 
the smallest margins of all (about three times smaller), although with only six 
observations that should be taken with a grain of salt.  
Table 3-1: Margin of Victory, Primary Type 
Category Type Mean Median N 
Broad Broad Open 21.3 16.6 450 
 
Nonpartisan 23.2 21.7 15 
 
Broad Closed 18.4 14.3 460 
 
Party Control 21.2 16.9 43 
Narrow Open 21.6 16.9 439 
 
Blanket 22.7 13.7 30 
 
Semi-Closed (Choice) 20.6 14.6 97 
 
Closed (Choice) 17.5 14.1 360 
 
Asymmetric (Choice) 23.4 23.0 21 
 
Nonpartisan 23.2 21.7 15 
 
Convention 7.0 3.9 6 
 
 Of course, many considerations besides primary type determine general election 
margin of victory.  This section presents several approaches to estimating the effect of 
primary type on general election victory margins.  Closed primaries do seem to produce 
closer elections than some of the other alternatives, even when controlling for other 
possible sources of variation.  The different models vary by how primary types are 
categorized or what types of elections are included.  The main result remains robust to all 
of the different models presented below. 
 In Table 3-2, I display the results for two models using narrowly defined primary 
election type categories.  Both of these linear models include time series and cross-
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section (state) fixed effects.
172
  The only difference between them is that the left model 
codes states by their laws and the right model codes states by their laws and, if allowed, 
the choices of the parties.  Both models have the same number of observations (968), 
cross sections (50), and observations per cross section (ranging from 14 to 23).  Both 
models use the winning percentage of the ‘top of the ticket’ candidate – either a Senator 
or, lacking a Senator, a governor.  A positive coefficient implies an increase in the 
winning percentage, a less competitive election.  In each model, I have specified all the 
types of primaries but one; the coefficients on the other primaries should be interpreted 
relative to the variable I excluded. 
 Open primaries produce much less competitive elections than closed primaries.  
In the “laws” model reported in Table 3-2, both open and blanket primaries had notably 
larger margins of victory, statistically significant at the .05 level.  The semi-closed and 
nonpartisan primaries had positive coefficients that did not reach the .05 level.  The 
“party choice” and convention nomination procedures had negative and insignificant 
coefficients.  Many parties decided to continue with the closed primary and there are very 
few convention observations, making neither of those results wholly unsurprising.  In the 
version of the model that replaces the “party choice” variable with the actual choice made 
(now excluding both primaries closed by law and closed by both parties by choice), the 
general results are the same.  Both open and blanket primaries produced greater margins 
of victory than closed primaries; the model estimated not only significant coefficients but 
also large ones.  Once again semi-closed primaries are not significantly different than 
                                                          
172
 Estimated using STATA’s xtset and xtreg commands.   
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closed primaries and the results for nonpartisan primaries and conventions are much the 
same.  Interestingly, the “asymmetric” primaries do not produce different margins of  
Table 3-2: “Top of Ticket” Margin of Victory, Narrow Categories; TSCS Fixed Effects 
. 
Model: 
Laws 
Model: 
Laws & Choice 
Variable Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. 
Open 13.08* 2.35 13.54* 2.44 
Blanket 15.63* 2.77 17.15* 3.04 
Semi-Closed (Law) 3.76 1.04 
  Semi-Closed (Law & Choice) 
  
1.82 0.60 
Party Choice -0.58 -0.20 
  Asymmetric Choice 
  
-0.16 -0.04 
Nonpartisan 6.10 0.81 7.05 0.93 
Convention -0.55 -0.05 -0.32 -0.03 
Incumbent in Race 7.90* 6.88 7.88* 6.85 
Pre-Primary Hurdle -1.04 -0.28 -0.96 -0.26 
Runoff -8.26 -1.65 -8.41 -1.70 
Presidential MofV 0.03 0.41 0.02 0.27 
Population (100,000) -0.09 -1.90 -0.10* -2.05 
Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.53* 2.56 0.55* 2.71 
Percent Over Age 65 -0.81 -1.34 -0.84 -1.39 
Percent High School Grad -0.06 -0.55 -0.06 -0.58 
Percent Black -0.39 -0.55 -0.37 -0.51 
Percent Urban -0.04 -0.18 -0.06 -0.30 
Gubernatorial Odd Year Elections 0.42 0.05 0.40 0.05 
Presidential Election Year -0.26 -0.25 -0.24 -0.24 
Constant 26.31 1.50 28.29 1.63 
Excluded  
   Variable 
Closed 
(Law) 
Closed 
(Law & Choice) 
Overall R-Sq. 0.0392 0.0387 
N 968 
50 
14 
23 
Groups 
Obs. Min 
Obs. Max 
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victory than closed primaries either; in those elections, one party used a closed primary 
while the other party allowed some participation from outsiders.   
 Of the three variables included in both of these models intended to capture other 
aspects of the primary process, only one matters – but it matters a lot.  I find no effect for 
having pre-primary hurdles or for using a partisan runoff.  On the other hand, incumbents 
generate larger margins of victory.  This should come hardly as a surprise, although the 
relative magnitude of the effect for incumbents and for open primaries might.  In both of 
these models, a race would likely have a larger margin of victory due to a switch from a 
closed to an open rule rather than from a switch from an open seat to including an 
incumbent.   
 With regard to the other variables in the model, most are not significant.  The 
state fixed effects pick up some of the information these variables attempt to capture.
173
  
A larger state population may generate slightly closer elections, possibly just because the 
“bench” of each party might be a bit larger in bigger states.  Wealthier states seem to 
produce slightly larger margins of victory; this may be capturing some artifacts of 
American geography, as in recent years some of the states with the largest per capita 
income have featured particularly lopsided elections (California and New York come to 
mind).  I have plotted the weak relationship between these variables in Figure 4, below. 
 Table 3-3 repeats the analysis of Table 3-2 using slightly different primary type 
categories.  Table 3-3 uses the two different “broad” categorizations; in the end, the 
difference is moving around which category into which “blanket” primaries fall.  The 
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 Without the time series cross section fixed effects, the coefficients for population and per capita income 
are much larger and statistically significant; the presidential margin of victory also becomes large and 
significant (model not shown).   
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model presented on the left side of Table 3-3 combines the blanket primary with the 
nonpartisan primary to create an “anti-party” category.  The right-most model combines 
the blanket primary with the open primary.  These two models make clear that the blanket 
primary drives the “anti-party” result.  There’s little evidence to distinguish nonpartisan 
primaries from closed primaries from both models presented in Table 3-3 as well as the 
two models presented in Table 3-2.  The other results in Table 3-3 are consistent with 
those in Table 3-2.  Open primaries have larger margins of victory than closed primaries. 
Figure 3-4: Top of the Ticket Margin of Victory and Per Capita Income 
 
 The decision to supplement the Senate races with gubernatorial elections may bias 
the results.  The two offices are, after all, quite different; one has a legislative function 
while another has an executive function.  One has to participate in national politics while 
the other participates in state politics.  I have therefore reproduced one of the regressions 
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Table 3-3: “Top of the Ticket” Margin of Victory, Broad Categories; TSCS Fixed Effects 
 
Model: 
“Anti-Party” 
Model: 
“Broad Open” 
Variable Coef. T-Stat Coef. T-Stat. 
Open 13.48* 2.58 
  Broad Open 
  
14.64* 3.58 
Anti-Party 13.38* 2.68 
  Nonpartisan 
  
5.91 0.82 
Party Control -4.07 -0.38 -3.76 -0.35 
Incumbent in Race 7.81* 6.83 7.84* 6.86 
Pre-Primary Hurdle 0.83 0.15 0.90 0.16 
Runoff -7.12 -1.48 -8.61 -1.76 
Presidential MofV 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.17 
Population (100,000) -0.09 -1.95 -0.09 -1.95 
Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.54* 2.70 0.56* 2.82 
Percent Over Age 65 -0.88 -1.46 -0.90 -1.50 
Percent High School Grad -0.05 -0.45 -0.06 -0.54 
Percent Black -0.36 -0.51 -0.41 -0.59 
Percent Urban -0.07 -0.34 -0.06 -0.27 
Gubernatorial Odd Year Elections -0.94 -0.11 0.79 0.10 
Presidential Election Year -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 
Constant 28.28 1.63 28.29 1.64 
Excluded  
     Variable 
Broad 
Closed 
Broad 
Closed 
Overall R-Sq 0.0408 
 
0.0321 
 N =  968 
50 
14 
23 
Groups 
Obs. Min 
Obs. Max 
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Table 3-4: U.S. Senate Only, Margin of Victory; TSCS, Fixed Effects 
 
 
  
Variable Coef. T-Stat. 
Open 14.18* 2.28 
Blanket 17.96* 2.83 
Semi-closed (Law & Choice) 0.12 0.03 
Asymmetric -0.30 -0.06 
Nonpartisan 7.30 0.86 
Convention -2.38 -0.19 
Incumbent in Race 7.79* 5.46 
Pre-Primary Hurdle -1.23 -0.30 
Runoff -8.44 -1.51 
Presidential MofV 0.05 0.79 
Population (100,000) -0.07 -1.35 
Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.49* 2.09 
Percent Over Age 65 -0.51 -0.72 
Percent High School Grad -0.08 -0.62 
Percent Black -0.32 -0.40 
Percent Urban -0.02 -0.10 
Gubernatorial Odd Year Elections 0.19 0.02 
Presidential Election Year -1.68 -1.45 
Constant 23.05 1.15 
Excluded  
     Variable 
Closed 
(Law & Choice) 
Overall R-Sq 0.0493 
N =  755 
Groups 50 
Obs. Min 11 
Obs. Max 16 
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the same: open and blanket primaries are associated with larger margins of victory than 
do closed primaries.  The magnitudes of the effects remain large.   
 How credible are these results?  At first glance, they seem to be surprisingly large 
and, generally, in the opposite direction of what I expected.  As a further robustness 
check, I dropped all the elections that included an incumbent.  It could be the case that 
primaries had different effects in contests for open seats.  Since open-seat elections 
comprised only about a quarter of the data, running the full time-series cross-section 
models proved difficult; some states had only a single open-seat election.  Table 3-5 
displays a very simple model, including only presidential margin of victory, state 
population, state per capita income, the existence of a presidential election in the same 
year, and a linear variable for time as controls.  As the treatments I specified just the 
closed (by law or by choice) and semi-closed (by law or by choice) types of primaries; 
these are then compared against all the other types (dominated mostly by open primaries).  
Closed and semi-closed primaries once again have significantly smaller margins of 
victory. 
 As another robustness check, I also used a binary definition of a “close” election.  
Table 3-6 presents the results of a time-series cross-section fixed effects logit model; the 
dependent variable equals 1 if the winning candidate had less than a 10 percent margin of 
victory.  The broadly defined open primary did reduce the probability of getting within 
that margin relative to a broadly defined closed primary (closed and semi-closed 
combined).  From this I conclude that the effects found in the earlier models did not rely 
entirely on a few spectacular blowout elections.  Nevertheless, these results do not carry 
over into all possible specifications of the logit model. 
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Table 3-5: “Top of the Ticket,” Open Seats Only174 
Variable Coef. T-Stat. 
Closed (Law & Choice) -4.46* -2.22 
Semi-Closed (Law & Choice) -8.25* -2.43 
Presidential MofV -0.04 -0.43 
Population (100,000) -0.05* -2.31 
Per Capita Income (1000s) 0.16 0.38 
Presidential Election Year -2.14 -1.15 
Year (1968–2012) 0.00 0.01 
Constant 16.09 0.03 
N = 259 
  F(7, 251) = 2.57 
  Prob. > F = 0.01 
  R-Sq. =  0.0669 
    
                                                          
174
 Note: I made Table 5 without fixed effects by state or time, since some states had as few as 2 
observations and none had more than 9; the states averaged 5.2 open seats from 1968 to 2012 at the “top of 
the ticket” races.  The same regression with fixed effects by year and state wipes out all of these results in 
Table 5.  I specified this regression with as few variables as possible to see if the unexpected result for 
closed primaries appeared to hold even for open seats.    
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Table 3-6: “Top of the Ticket” Margin of Victory; TSCS Logit for Under 10% 
Variable Coef. T-Stat. 
Broad Open -1.27* -2.08 
Nonpartisan -0.39 -0.40 
Party Control 2.29 1.21 
Incumbent in Race -0.83* -5.22 
Pre-Primary Hurdle -0.75 -0.85 
Runoff 0.56 0.81 
Presidential MofV 0.01 0.99 
Population (100,000) 0.00 -0.72 
Per Capita Income -0.01 -0.38 
Percent Over Age 65 0.06 0.71 
Percent High School Grad -0.02 -1.04 
Percent Black -0.13 -1.15 
Percent Urban 0.02 0.52 
Gubernatorial Odd Year Elections 0.71 0.56 
Presidential Election Year 0.00 0.03 
N =  968 
 Groups 50 
 Obs. Min 14 
 Obs. Max 23 
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 The simple ‘back-of-the-envelope theory’ would not likely produce these results: 
closed primaries are associated with more competitive elections.  There are two possible 
explanations.  First, of course, states did not adopt primary rules randomly.  Selection 
bias could explain the counter-intuitive results; it may be the case that states which 
adopted open primaries are systematically more likely to produce larger margins of 
victory and could even be the case that the open primaries reduced that effect.  
Nevertheless, this seems an unlikely explanation for all of this effect.  This dataset 
measures competitiveness starting in 1968; many of these states adopted open primary 
rules over a half-century earlier in very different political contexts.  Furthermore, rule 
changes to increase competitiveness were rare: Connecticut in the 1980s, California’s 
experiments with the blanket and the nonpartisan primary, the Democratic Party opening 
up their primary in Kansas.  Even in those cases, “victory” motivated reformers more 
often than an abstract notion of “competitiveness”; competitiveness just happened to be a 
by-product of aiming for victory as a losing party.  Louisiana adopted the nonpartisan 
primary for precisely the opposite reason: Edwin Edwards wanted to avoid competitive 
general elections.   
 The second possible explanation: the behavior of elites in the “invisible primary” 
might differ between the types of primaries.  It may be the case that elites exercise more 
control in a closed primary setting.  For example, minor party elites could do a better job 
in closed primaries of signaling to their supporters who should run and win; they could 
strategically select competitive candidates.  The alternative story works as well: majority 
party elites are more likely to do a worse job of picking a competitive candidate in a 
closed primary.  A spatial model explanation for the observed outcome is: in closed 
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primaries either the weaker party picks more centrist candidates or the stronger party 
picks more extreme candidates.  To investigate that angle, I have to resort to a different 
dependent variable and examine primary type and ideology. 
Ideology 
 The unexpected results for open primaries hold not just for competitiveness but 
also for ideology.  I use the DW-NOMINATE scores back to 1946 (they are available 
back to the first Congress) and capture a great number of state-year pairs.  As mentioned 
above, I have averaged the ideological distances of each state’s U.S. Senators from each 
Congress’s mean in both dimensions to capture that state’s representation in congress for 
that year.  Figure 3-5, below, plots those results over time (with the y-axis as arbitrary 
DW-NOMINATE units of distance); slowly, Congress becomes more polarized.  Due to 
the evident time trend (which does, in fact, correspond with decreasing numbers of closed 
primaries), I will include a variable to account for time in the regressions. 
 The main result holds in the simplest model, defining primary types broadly.  
Open primaries produce more extreme representation than closed primaries (Table 3-7).  
While the nonpartisan primaries do not produce a significant effect, the “party control” 
systems (conventions, challenge primaries) also produce more extreme representation.  
While the coefficients may seem small, the large number of observations provides the 
computational power to capture a relatively small effect.  A movement of size .036, the 
effect of the “broad open” category, is enough to move half of the distance from the 
median to the 1
st
 or 3
rd
 quarter of the data.  The median is .43, with the boundary between 
the first and second quantiles at .35 and the boundary of the third and fourth quantile at 
.50.  Some of the other variables also produce significant effects in the model: income 
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Figure 3-5: Average Ideological Distances of State U.S. Senators, 1946–2012 
 
Figure 3-6: Distribution of State Mean Ideological Distances (by State & Congress) 
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 has a very small negative effect and high school education and age have very small 
positive effects.   
 The T-statistic for the broad open primary category in Table 3-7 is close enough 
to 1.96 to make further robustness checks worthwhile.  Table 3-8, below, presents the 
alternative “broad” categorization; in this version, blanket primaries and nonpartisan 
primaries group together to form an “anti-party” category.  In this scheme, open 
primaries are defined much more narrowly.  From the results, it would appear that the 
blanket primaries tamped down the overall effect of the open primary; the coefficient is 
larger and still significant in the model presented in Table 3-8.  
 Since the DW-NOMINATE database extends back all the way to 1946, in 
contrast with my competitiveness data which only extends to 1968, it makes more sense 
to also look at the narrowly defined primary categories.  There are more conventions and 
more blanket primary observations. Once again, the open primaries are significantly 
associated with more ideologically extreme representation than closed primaries (Table 
3-9).  Asymmetric primary rules – one party has a closed primary and the other has an 
open primary – are also associated with more extreme representation, as are conventions.  
There is no observable effect for blanket primaries, nonpartisan primaries, or semi-closed 
primaries.    
 At least with this measurement strategy, closed primaries appear to produce less 
extreme candidates than the alternatives.  These results differ from what Gerber and 
Morton (1998) found; I did not find a significant difference between semi-closed and 
closed primaries (in the model in Table 3-9).  Contrary to the expectations framed by 
Kaufman et al. (2003) and their moderate open primary electorate, open primaries appear 
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Table 3-7: TSCS Model on Avg. Ideological Distance by State & Year, “Broad Open” 
Category 
Variable Coef. T-Stat. 
Broad Open 0.036* 1.98 
Nonpartisan 0.034 0.82 
Party Control 0.095* 2.52 
Pre-Primary Hurdle 0.010 0.49 
Runoff 0.028 1.09 
Presidential MofV 0.000 0.78 
Population (100,000) 0.000 0.03 
Per Capita Income -0.003* -3.64 
Percent Over Age 65 0.007* 2.94 
Percent High School Grad 0.001* 2.93 
Percent Black 0.001 0.80 
Percent Urban 0.002* 3.95 
Presidential Election Year 0.003 0.61 
Constant 0.128* 2.86 
Excluded Variable Broad Closed 
Overall R-Sq 0.0363 
 N =  1636 
 Groups 50 
 Obs. Min 26 
 Obs. Max 33 
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Table 3-8: TSCS Model on Avg. Ideological Distance by State & Year, “Anti-Party” 
Category 
Variable Coef. T-Stat. 
Open 0.051 2.69 
Anti-Party -0.012 -0.43 
Party Control 0.095 2.54 
Pre-Primary Hurdle 0.011 0.57 
Runoff 0.005 0.22 
Presidential MofV 0.000 0.74 
Population (100,000) 0.000 -0.03 
Per Capita Income -0.003 -3.78 
Percent Over Age 65 0.007 2.80 
Percent High School Grad 0.001 3.16 
Percent Black 0.001 0.73 
Percent Urban 0.002 4.00 
Presidential Election Year 0.003 0.59 
Constant 0.127 2.86 
Excluded Variable Broad Closed 
Overall R-Sq 0.0295 
 N =  1636 
 Groups 50 
 Obs. Min 26 
 Obs. Max 33 
  
  
174 
 
Table 3-9:  TSCS Model on Avg. Ideological Distance by State & Year, Narrow 
Categories 
Variable Coef. T-Stat. 
Open 0.068 3.50 
Blanket -0.020 -0.65 
Semi-closed 0.019 1.30 
Asymmetric 0.057 2.58 
Nonpartisan 0.046 1.13 
Convention 0.126 4.69 
Pre-Primary Hurdle 0.011 0.75 
Runoff 0.018 0.68 
Presidential MofV 0.000 0.88 
Population (100,000) 0.000 0.25 
Per Capita Income -0.003 -4.68 
Percent Over Age 65 0.007 2.85 
Percent High School Grad 0.001 3.78 
Percent Black 0.002 1.43 
Percent Urban 0.002 3.84 
Presidential Election Year 0.003 0.59 
Constant 0.109 2.47 
Excluded Variable Closed 
 Overall R-Sq 0.066 
 N =  1636 
 Groups 50 
 Obs. Min 26 
 Obs. Max 33 
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associated with more extreme representation.  Unlike in McGhee et al. (2012), I do find 
significant results for representation – although notably using both a different time frame 
(back to 1946) and a different dependent variable.   
Conclusion 
 Combining these two pieces of analysis produces a very unexpected conclusion: 
closed primaries are associated with more competitive elections and more moderate 
representation than open primaries.  How strong is a causal claim?  There are plausible 
stories to tell for both.  Primary type connects more directly to general election 
competitiveness than to Senatorial representation; many more variables intervene 
between the primary and the decisions of Senators.  Additionally, my ideology variable 
underwent a number of transformations, including averaging across two (or more) 
Senators for each Congress.  Elections do not select averages, they pick individuals.  
Furthermore, since most incumbents win their primaries, it may be the case that sitting 
Senators more or less stop worrying about the upcoming primaries.  I do not happen to 
think so; still, some caution with these results would be appropriate given the diversity of 
answers in the literature to the same question.    
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
 This appendix addresses how frequently state laws change, an important 
consideration in understanding the value of the statistical models presented in this 
chapter.  The answer: in nineteen of the thirty-three election years, at least one state law 
changes in its basic type (open, open (blanket), semi-closed (mandated), closed 
(mandated), party choice, nonpartisan, convention).  In no year did more than four states 
change their basic type, with most of the major changes occurring around the time of 
Tashjian (for the 1988 and 1992 elections).  Figure A3-1, below, plots the number of 
states that changed their basic type of primary law in each election year.   
Table A3-1: Number of States with a New Election Law in Each Year     
  
States also make changes to the other parts of their laws without changing the 
basic type (such as allowing private choice or lowering pre-primary hurdles).  Those 
changes are not reflected in Figure A3-1.  Nevertheless, they do not change the overall 
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picture: some change occurs frequently, although not a great deal of change occurs at any 
one time.  Although I have a data set over many years, much larger than any used in the 
existing literature, the decisions to focus at the state level (U.S. Senate), to use state fixed 
effects, and to use detailed primary law descriptions make it surprising that I find any 
statistically significant effects at all.  Further research will include more emphasis on 
congressional elections and state elections, increasing the number of observations in each 
state-year.    
 
 
“Politics is a team sport... If you work well with others, you can be 
successful. If you can't, you won't.” – Betsy Butler, Candidate, AD50175 
 
“Democratic Party leaders are warning their members that if the measure 
passes, they might have to choose between two Republicans; GOP leaders 
are offering similar warnings about the peril of having to pick between 
two Democrats. What they leave out is that under the top two primary, 
candidates would have to appeal from the beginning to a broad swath of 
the electorate instead of just their parties' hardliners. It's a route to more 
pragmatic officeholders and elections controlled more by voters than by 
political parties — which is why the Democratic and Republican parties 
both oppose it so adamantly, and why it would be a positive move for 
California.”–The Los Angeles Times, 8 June 2010.176    
 
CHAPTER 4: A PEEK INTO THE FUTURE: 2012 CALIFORNIA SURVEY 
 When fifty-four percent of the few Californians who voted in the June 2010 
primary election passed Proposition 14, they upended the state’s election system.177  
From the demise of the “blanket primary” at the hands of the Supreme Court after the 
2000 primary (in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567) through the 2010 
primary election, California used a “semi-closed” party primary, as described in Chapter 
2.  Proponents of the California law pushed it forward with a specific purpose in mind.  
While the Times defined the objective as “pragmatic” officeholders, a Public Policy 
Institute of California study more transparently identified the goal: elect “moderate” 
legislators (McGhee 2010, pp. 5).
178
  Before June 2012, though, political scientists could 
do little more than conjecture about the law’s potential effects; as detailed in Chapter 1, 
there is little consensus in the field about the effects of even more commonly used 
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primary types.  Californians ventured into nearly uncharted electoral waters with the top-
two. 
 The top-two came about largely through the efforts of then State Senator Abel 
Maldonado, a “center-right” Republican.179  In 2009, as part of negotiations over the 
passage of the state budget, he insisted that the Democratic Party leadership (who then – 
as now – held the majority) pass the top-two through the legislature and place it on the 
2010 ballot.  The Los Angeles Times described what happened: 
In exchange for his reluctant yes to the state's controversial new budget, 
the 41-year-old Santa Maria grower demanded a ballot measure allowing 
open primaries, in which people can vote for candidates regardless of 
party affiliation.  He also was able to fend off a 12-cent-a-gallon tax 
increase and keep legislators from getting pay raises until they balance the 
state's budget.
180
 
 
Indeed, the pivotal voter in the legislature can demand quite a bit!  To view his vote on 
the budget as an explicit quid pro quo might be a bit simplistic; he explained that 
California had to be “governable,” which required having a budget, even if it was not the 
budget he wanted.
181
   
 Maldonado made the effort to pass the top-two in part because of his own 
electoral experience.  He first won office under a previous electoral reform, the “blanket” 
primary, in 1998.  Furthermore, Maldonado got his start in politics with city government, 
which in California operates under a similar system to the top-two.
182
  Both systems give 
candidates a reason to try to attract votes from the whole spectrum of Californians.  With 
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the blanket primary declared unconstitutional, he wanted to push for a top-two system.  
He framed his argument for the top-two similarly to the Times endorsement: overall, it 
would be a good thing for Californians if politicians felt every voter important.
183
  The 
leadership of neither party wanted the law; opposing the blanket primary represented one 
of the few things the California Republican and Democratic Parties had agreed on in 
recent memory.  Nevertheless, the intransigence of both Republicans and Democrats on 
the 2009 state budget suddenly endowed the more flexible Senator Maldonado with the 
political capital to spend on his reform project – so over the objections of both parties he 
got the top-two on the ballot.  State voters in the June 2010 primary passed Proposition 
14.
184
    
The Survey 
 Survey data provides key insights into voter attitudes and behavior in the June 
2012 California “top-two” primary.  This chapter provides many of the details about the 
original survey I conducted in five California State Assembly Districts in the two weeks 
prior to the first “top-two” election in the state’s history.  Each of these five districts has 
its own political character.  A look “in depth” into the particulars of the survey instrument 
and the data helps provide clarity for the main results, adding nuance to the interpretation 
of the major findings. 
 The James Irvine Foundation and California Forward provided the funding for 
this project through a grant to the California Institute of Technology.  YouGov (formerly 
“Polimetrix”) earned the contract to oversee the telephone survey; Sam Luks served as 
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the project manager.  The survey was in the field from May 24 to June 4; the primary 
took place June 5.  The bulk of the successfully completed interviews occurred over the 
weekend before the election, starting Thursday May 31 and continuing through Sunday 
June 3 (see Figure 4-1).  The survey house had to shift resources to continue calling in 
Assembly District 50 for the last day, June 4, to make the target per-district quotas.
185
    
Figure 4-1: Percent of Interviews Conducted by Date 
 
 This survey includes over a thousand respondents from each of the five Assembly 
districts for a total of 5615 registered voters.  Since YouGov conducted interviews using 
both landline and cellular phones, Table 4-1 (below) reports the percentage of each 
district reached by cell phone and the number of respondents in each district.  As there is 
always some concern that there is some sampling bias, YouGov provided a set of survey 
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weights for the data as well.  Using known characteristics of the population (as reported 
by a political consulting firm, Political Data Inc., and listed in the California Target 
Book) the weights allow for better district-level estimates by ‘weighting up’ individuals 
who are more rare in the sample than they are in the population.  Table 4-1 reports the 
weighted percent of each district that took the survey by cellular phone; the cell 
proportion increases across all the districts because the voters underrepresented in the 
survey as a whole were better represented in the cell phone component.
186
  As an 
additional note, voters in AD47 (a majority Latino district) could also take the survey in 
Spanish; 24% chose to do so.  Respondents in other districts did not have this alternative.        
Table 4-1: Number of Total Respondents, Percent Reached by Cellphone 
  % Cell Phone 
 
Total N 
Without 
Weights 
Using 
Weights 
AD5 1080 15 19 
AD8 1094 15 22 
AD41 1099 15 20 
AD47 1208 15 21 
AD50 1134 14 22 
Total 5615 15 21 
 
The core of the survey instrument uses just five questions about the June Primary 
in the local Assembly race.  First, respondents reported if they had already voted (i.e., by 
mail) or intended to vote; those voters in Table 4-2 are listed as likely voters.  Second, the 
voters answered a question about which candidate they preferred.  Then the voters scored 
on a 0-10 scale the candidates on approval ('10' indicated high approval), a Liberal-to-
Conservative scale ('10' meant most Conservative), and an electoral chances ('10' 
represented a likely election winner).  Table 4-2, below, lists the percent of the 
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respondents from each district who met the minimal qualifications for answering those 
three rating questions: rating at least one of the candidates.  For the 'Ideological Distance' 
score, the respondent must have also placed themselves on the same ideology scale 
(nearly all voters did). 
Table 4-2: Data Quality for Core Survey Questions 
   
Listed At Least One Candidate 
District 
Likely 
Voter 
Has Assembly  
Candidate Preference 
Approval 
Rating 
Ideological 
Distance 
Electoral 
Chances 
AD5 96 69 86 75 81 
AD8 94 68 80 68 74 
AD41 93 62 76 66 71 
AD47 89 68 82 78 81 
AD50 90 64 73 62 67 
Total 93 66 80 70 75 
 
As is relatively commonplace with surveys, most of the respondents said that they 
had either voted or planned to vote.  Overall, 93% of the 5615 registered voters qualified 
as "likely voters."  Generally speaking, approximately two-thirds of the respondents 
across all districts intended to vote for a specific Assembly candidate.  There is much 
more variation across districts with the three main measures of the voters' opinion of the 
candidates.  Generally, respondents could give an approval rating for at least one of the 
candidates in their district; overall, 80% could do so.  AD5 and AD47 have the lowest 
rates of non-response, with 86% and 82% able to give a rating for at least one candidate.  
There are fewer responses available to use to construct measures of ideological distance.  
Notably, this is constrained by design to be no greater than the approval ratings; if a voter 
replied that they had never heard of a candidate on the approval ratings, that candidate 
was excluded from later questions.  Overall, only 70% of the respondents gave enough 
information to construct an ideological distance measure to at least one candidate.  This 
ranged from a high of 78% in AD47 to a low of 62% in AD50.  More voters, 75%, were 
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able to assess the electoral chances of at least one candidate.  Once again, AD50 lags 
behind the others.   
These core questions require some nuance to analyze.  Nevertheless, the simple 
combination of the three core questions with voting preferences gives an important sense 
of the data.  Table 4-3, below, shows those results.  Voting for a 'highest score' candidate 
in the approval rating column means that the respondent intends to vote or a candidate 
which they gave at least weakly the highest rating of all candidates.  For example, if a 
voter gave candidates A, B, and C scores of 9, 9, and 5 then that would be listed in Table 
4-3 as voting for a 'highest score' candidate.  A 'closest distance' candidate choice means 
that the voter picks a candidate that they have placed on the ideological scale as close or 
closer than any other candidate to the voter's own self-placement.  A 'highest score' vote 
choice in the electoral chance column implies the voter intends to vote for a candidate to 
whom they gave the best likelihood of winning the election.  The notable conclusion 
from Table 4-3 is, among respondents who intend to vote and have a candidate 
preference, most voters will vote for a candidate of whom they approve, who they list as 
ideologically closest to them, and who they give the best chance to win the election.   
Table 4-3: Core Questions and Voting Preferences 
Voting Preferences 
Approval 
Rating 
Ideological 
Distance 
Electoral 
Chance 
Not Voting/No Preference 34 34 34 
Highest Score/Closest Distance 54 40 47 
2nd Highest Score/Distance 4 10 7 
Other Score/Distance 5 7 6 
Candidate Preference but No Ratings 4 8 6 
 
In Table 4-3, the 2nd place row shows the percent of each column which intended 
to vote for a candidate that the respondent explicitly listed as in 2nd place for that 
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measure.
187
  For example, with the ideological distance variable, this means ten percent 
of the respondents intended to vote for a candidate listed as farther away from the voter 
than another candidate.  While 1-to-4 actually seems like a high ratio for second-to-first 
place voting, further analysis will temper this effect somewhat.  The 'other score/distance' 
row picks up behavior that could be strategic or could reflect a lack of information.  This 
row includes voters who select explicit third or later choices as well as voters who intend 
to vote for a candidate who they left unranked (while ranking some other candidates).  
The last row includes all the voters who did not rate in that column but who yet still had a 
candidate preference.  If all of the non-closest ideological voters are counted as 'strategic,' 
this sets a ceiling of strategic behavior at 25% of the respondents.   
Much of the work with these core questions will refine the notions of strategic 
behavior and more precisely identify which voters do it and why they do it.  The voters 
who have not ranked their preferred candidate may be engaged in strategic behavior–but 
they also could just be uninformed, disinclined to answer the questions, selecting a 
candidate based on other characteristics, or they could be confused.  Despite the 
interpretive challenges for some of the respondents, regardless of the interpretation there 
are more voters are picking the candidate they most approve of or the candidate 
ideologically closest to them than there are voters doing anything else. 
Aside from the core voter behavior questions, the survey also contained another 
series of questions about what voters thought of the top-two primary.  These statements 
are designed to find out specifically what voters expected on some of the key arguments 
used both for and against Proposition 14.  The survey contained four positively framed 
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statements and four negatively framed statements; respondents could disagree, agree, or 
say they were not sure.  Table 4-4, below, shows the responses to these questions, 
displayed as percentages along each row of the table.  While more detailed analysis of 
these statements is to follow later, I want to mention the general trends across all five 
districts now.  First, respondents had a great degree of uncertainty ex ante about how the 
top-two would work.  On each question, the percent of respondents who were not sure 
ranged between 25% and 46%.  In addition, between 11% and 21% of the respondents 
gave no response at all to each of these questions.  Only 43% of respondents, for 
example, gave a firm statement (agree or disagree) about whether or not they thought the 
ballots would be too confusing.   
Table 4-4: Opinions on the Top-Two Primary (Percentages Sum to 100% Across Rows) 
 
Disagree 
Not 
Sure Agree Missing 
Will provide better choices on the 
November ballot. 
15 32 28 14 
Will help candidates I support. 
 
21 25 33 21 
Will help more moderate candidates 
win. 
18 31 32 19 
Will help fix problems in 
California.  
19 44 22 16 
Will prevent my party from 
controlling its nomination process. 
18 31 33 19 
Will put third parties at an unfair 
disadvantage. 
14 36 34 16 
Ballot is too confusing. 
 
12 46 31 11 
Might not leave me with anyone to 
vote for in November. 
12 40 36 12 
 
The rest of this chapter will focus on a district-by-district look at the rest of the 
survey questions, providing context for the more sophisticated analysis that follows.  The 
responses reported in Table 4-4 show that the respondents generally are participating in a 
grand political experiment with, from their perspective, very uncertain outcomes.  This 
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may change as time goes by; after more rounds of the top-two primary, voters (and 
political scientists) may have a much better idea of what to expect from the process.  
Nevertheless, elite-level strategic actors will respond in the next round to what happened 
in 2012.  Capturing a snapshot of the top-two in its first year in California preserves our 
understanding of the initial conditions of a long game and allows us to contemplate what 
will happen in the future.    
Demographic and Economic Characteristics 
I selected the five districts in this study because they displayed a range of the 
strategic possibilities open with the top-two primary.  The California State Assembly is 
an eighty-member body and the lower house of the California legislature, with two year 
terms.  The districts are roughly half the size of a Congressional District, providing a lot 
of variation at the local level in terms of district characteristics and the key political 
variables of 2012.  AD5 is a very Republican district in mid-to-northern California, near 
Yosemite National Park.  AD8 looked to be a one of the few districts in which both 
Republicans and Democrats would be competitive; the district is out to the east of 
Sacramento.  AD5 and AD8 both had candidates run who did not use a Republican or 
Democratic label and had many candidates, which made them politically interesting as 
well.  AD41 runs along the foothills outside of Los Angeles, including cities like 
Pasadena.  AD47 is also outside of Los Angeles but farther out into what is known as the 
"Inland Empire."  AD50 is a coastal district on the Westside of Los Angeles, including 
Santa Monica, Malibu, and then reaching inland to West Hollywood.   
Each of the districts included in this study has very distinctive characteristics.  
This section explores the demographic and economic variables included in the study that 
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describe the population of registered voters.  The data presented here is weighted (per the 
earlier discussion on weights) to present as accurate of a picture of the registered voters 
in the district as possible.  Note that the population generally and the population of 
registered voters may differ on some of these characteristics; in particular, this data has 
little to say about what eligible but unregistered voters may look like.  Nevertheless, the 
focus of this study on how campaigns and voters interacted makes registered voters the 
key population of interest. 
Table 4-5: Basic Demographic Information for Registered Voters (Weighted, Col. %) 
  
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Age Under 35 17 22 23 33 23 24 
 
Ages 35-64 53 55 55 53 55 54 
 
Above 65 31 24 22 14 21 22 
Race White 80 76 63 31 76 64 
 
Black 1 4 6 11 4 5 
 
Latino 9 5 15 48 5 17 
 
Other Answer 10 15 16 10 15 13 
Nativity Otherwise 5 9 13 23 14 13 
 
Born in U.S. 95 91 87 77 86 87 
Gender Male 48 46 46 45 49 47 
 
Female 52 54 54 55 51 53 
 
The districts vary by much more than political characteristics.  Table 4-5, above, 
shows the percentage of each district that falls under certain basic demographic 
categories: age, race, nativity, and gender.  AD5, a Republican stronghold, is older, is 
generally whiter, and has fewer naturalized citizens than all the other districts.  While 
only 17 percent of registered voters in AD5 are under the age of 35, AD47 has more than 
30 percent of voters in this younger category.  AD8, AD41, and AD50 have very similar 
distributions with 22 or 23 percent under age 35.  The general population in AD50 likely 
has a lot of unregistered younger voters, or younger voters that still have yet to move 
their official residence to the district.        
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With respect to race and ethnicity, AD47 stands out.  In AD47, 48 percent of the 
district identifies as Hispanic or Latino.  Whites make up only 31 percent of the 
respondents; AD47 truly is a majority-minority district.  Four candidates, two 
Republicans and two Democrats, ran for this seat; among the Democrats, voters could 
choose between a Latino endorsed by the Democratic Party and an African-American 
woman with strong ties to the party as well.  This district is well-suited as a laboratory to 
study race and politics in California.  To the extent that this survey is missing a 
component of California politics, none of these districts are majority Asian (included 
with “other answer” in Table 4-5).188  The most racially diverse district is actually AD41; 
only 63% white, the district also includes politically relevant African-American, Latino, 
and Asian populations.  AD41 would ultimately elect an African-American Democrat, 
demonstrating that African-American candidates do not need to come only from 
majority-minority districts. 
Beyond the basic demographics, this survey asked a variety of other questions 
about personal characteristics that tend to relate to politics.  The results presented in 
Table 4-6, below, spotlight the religious differences.  One question asked voters about 
their religious affiliation.  Another asked about the frequency of church (or religious 
service) attendance; for that question, Table 4-6 reports only the top-frequency categories 
and then sums them into one measure of what percent of each district regularly goes to 
church.  The “other response” category for the religious affiliation question is quite large; 
34% of all survey respondents gave another answer.  Those respondents then had a free 
                                                          
188
 There is a technical reason for this: in a district with a large minority population where some of that 
population would be more comfortable answering questions in a language other than English, a good 
survey would have to be translated and provided in the appropriate languages.  While it is not prohibitively 
expensive to conduct a survey in Spanish (as this study did in AD47), finding a survey company to conduct 
a survey in Vietnamese on this scale and time schedule was not possible.   
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response question to use to identify themselves; a great number are from various 
Protestant subdivisions (who did not, apparently, consider themselves generically 
protestants) or generally thought of themselves as “Christians.” 
Table 4-6: Religious Affiliation and Church Attendance (Weighted Col. %) 
  
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
R
el
ig
io
u
s 
A
ff
il
ia
ti
o
n
 Protestant 28 26 24 15 12 21 
Catholic 20 21 26 42 15 25 
Atheist or Agnostic 13 13 18 5 22 14 
Jewish 1 2 2 0 27 6 
Other Response 39 37 31 38 24 34 
C
h
u
rc
h
 
A
tt
en
d
an
ce
 
More than Once/Week 8 9 9 15 6 9 
Once Per Week 22 22 26 27 9 21 
Once or Twice /Month 9 9 10 17 10 11 
Sum: At Least Once a Month 40 40 45 58 25 42 
 
The questions on religion highlight two key points to understand the survey 
results.  First, these results show one of the fundamental tensions of partisan politics 
today: while Republicans tend to favor more socially conservative policies, they have 
generally failed to reach the very religious Latino population.  AD47, the heavily Latino 
district, is 42 percent Catholic and has the highest regular church attendance at an 
astonishingly high 58 percent.  Only 40 percent of the voters in AD5, a Republican 
district, attend church at least once a month.  Despite this, AD47 remains a very 
Democratic district and, in fact, featured a same-party runoff between two Democratic 
candidates in November. 
The second point is that AD50 is a religious outlier.  While the age and race basic 
demographic information (in Table 4-5) would not suggest that this is a heavily 
Democratic district, the religious data helps to explain why.  More than a quarter of the 
respondents are Jewish.  One candidate from AD50 told me that going from temple to 
temple on a Saturday and talking to Rabbis was a much better use of campaigning time 
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than walking precincts.  Furthermore, only a quarter of the respondents regularly attend 
church or temple services.  In AD50, 22 percent of the respondents identify either as 
Atheists or Agnostics.  There are just very few Protestants here, of whom a subset would 
be the evangelical Christians most likely to support Republicans.         
Voters' economic perspective also likely influences their local politics.  These five 
districts capture a variety of education and economic backgrounds.  It is somewhat 
difficult to believe, for example, that AD5 and AD50 come from the same state; the 
details are presented in Table 4-7, below.  In AD5, the Republican district, 25 percent of 
the population has at best a high school diploma; unemployment in the district, though, is 
fairly low at 6 percent among registered voters and 80 percent of the survey respondents 
lived in their own home.  In AD50, a very Democratic district, only 7 percent of the 
registered voters had no better than a high school diploma while 33 percent held some 
kind of postgraduate degree.  In contrast with AD5, only 53 percent of the respondents in 
AD50 lived in their own home.  Furthermore, reported incomes in AD50 tend to be quite 
high; 45 percent of the registered voters reported making above $80,000 a year.   
AD47 has the worst economic situation.  The workforce in AD47 has the lowest 
levels of education of the five districts included in the study: 36 percent of the registered 
voters have at most a high school education and only 31 percent have either a four-year 
college (21%) or postgraduate degree (10%).  Ten percent of the registered voters in the 
district were unemployed and looking for work at the time of the survey; true 
unemployment levels (taking into account people in the district who had not registered to 
vote) were likely worse.  Respondents from AD47 had the lower incomes that would 
correspond with relatively high unemployment and worse educational attainment relative 
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to the other districts: 39 percent made under $40,000 while only 21% made over $80,000.  
To compare more directly with AD50 (not reported in Table 4-7): 15.5 percent of the 
respondents in AD50 reported making more than $200,000 while only 1.6 percent of the 
respondents in AD47 made that much.  At the low end, 16.6 percent of the voters in 
AD47 made under $20,000 while only 8.2% of the voters in AD50 made under that 
amount.  Nevertheless, both AD47 and AD50 are safe Democratic districts; they just 
draw that support from different parts of the Democratic Party coalition.   
Table 4-7: Economic and Education Information (Weighted Col. %) 
  
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Education High School 25 16 12 36 7 19 
 
Some College 38 35 27 33 18 30 
 
College 23 30 33 21 42 30 
 
Postgraduate 14 18 28 10 33 21 
Income Under $40,000 25 27 20 39 17 26 
 
$40-80,000 33 28 24 28 22 27 
 
Above $80,000 27 31 39 21 45 32 
 
Not Stated 15 14 17 12 17 15 
Employment Seeking Work 6 9 7 10 7 8 
Residence Own 80 73 68 63 53 67 
 
Rent 15 20 25 29 44 27 
 
Other 5 7 7 8 4 6 
 
AD8, the district most competitive between the parties, reports mixed economic 
and education results.  On one hand, only 16 percent of the respondents had no better 
than a high school diploma, 73 percent lived in a home they owned, and 31 percent 
reported incomes over $80,000.  On the other hand, 27 percent reported incomes under 
$40,000 (12% under $20,000) and nine percent of the respondents were unemployed and 
seeking work.  With work like Fiorina's (1981) on retrospective economic voting, the 
high unemployment would appear to give Republicans a good chance since Democrats 
held both the state government and the White House.   
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While each of these districts is unique, each of these communities represents a 
distinct brand of California politics.  AD5 has the dynamics of the Republican eastern 
fringes of the state: a rural district with a white, older, Christian, economically stable, but 
not terribly well educated electorate.  AD50, in contrast, represents the stereotype of the 
urban California liberal district: wealthy, well educated, and religiously diverse if not 
particularly religiously inclined.  AD47 picks up another angle on the Democratic base; a 
majority-minority district that is young, generally poorly educated, and economically 
suffering in a bad economy.  AD41 is suburban California, with a population diverse 
racially, religiously, and economically.  AD8 draws together aspects of all of these 
traditions in the competitive interior of the state.   
Partisan Politics 
 The survey contains two measures of partisanship.  First, since voters were 
sampled from the pool of registered voters, the data contains each voter’s partisan 
registration status.  Not all states keep voter registration by party but California, along 
with about half of the other states, does; furthermore, in California, a voter’s status is 
generally public information.  Second, voters responded to questions on the survey about 
their partisan affiliation.  Most of the respondents to the survey were Republicans, 
Democrats, or in some sense unaffiliated with a political party (Table 4-8).  The survey 
did not interview enough Green or Libertarian Party voters to say very much about 
opinion on the top-two in any detail within those parties. 
 In California, researchers face a dilemma about the “American Independent 
Party.”  Many of the Independent registered voters likely believed that they were 
registering as a nonpartisan, rather than with a real political party.  The American 
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Independent Party in California is, though, a real political party: it has a website 
(http://www.aipca.org/), a headquarters (currently in Vacaville, located between San 
Francisco and Sacramento), a regular central and executive committee, and even a 
preferred candidate for President (Thomas Hoefling).  The party’s platform focuses on 
opposing gay marriage, opposing abortion, and favoring limited government.  
Nevertheless, the distribution of self-professed party identification (on the 7-point 
American National Election Studies type scale) for the voters registered with the 
Independent Party looks very much like that of those who successfully selected 
unaffiliated (nonpartisan, or “Decline to State” – DTS).  This includes individuals who 
self-identify as strong Democrats – who would likely be quite surprised to learn that they 
are registered with a party that has a very conservative party platform.   
Table 4-8: Total Party Registration in Sample 
 
Number Percent 
Democratic Party 2,667 47.5 
Green Party 30 0.5 
American Independent Party 111 2.0 
Libertarian Party 24 0.4 
Other Party 41 0.7 
Republican Party 1,938 34.5 
Unaffiliated (DTS) 804 14.3 
Total 5,615 100% 
 
 Generally in this study the voters registered as “American Independent” will be 
treated as if they registered as unaffiliated.  Both registration choices have many of the 
same practical implications: under the old semi-closed primary system, neither would 
have automatically received a Republican or Democratic ballot.  Nevertheless, those 
registered with the “American Independent Party” would technically have been unable to 
request to vote on a party primary ballot of the Republican Party or Democratic Party.  
The voters successfully registered as unaffiliated would have been able to do so, although 
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not all unaffiliated voters who even bothered to vote in the primary under the semi-closed 
primary system did.  Under the ‘top-two,’ though, the main point remains that these 
voters are now automatically able to vote on Republican and Democratic candidates and 
that they may be more central in determining who advances to the general election.       
 Given the demographic and economic profiles, and what we generally know about 
how those correlate with partisanship, the party registration figures by district contain 
few surprises.  Table 4-9, below, shows the weighted percentage of each party 
registration group in each district, combining the unaffiliated (DTS) and Independent 
voters into a single category.  (The unweighted numbers are actually not very different.)  
The overall story here is that Republicans have a clear edge in AD5.  AD8 is competitive 
in part because Republican and Democratic registration percentages are very close.  
Democrats could certainly feel confident in AD41.  In AD47 and AD50, Democrats had 
almost a two to one edge on the Republicans. 
Table 4-9: Registration by Party by District (Weighted Col. %) 
 
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Democratic 35 42 46 54 58 47 
DTS/Ind. 15 14 14 15 17 15 
Republican 47 41 36 29 21 35 
Third Party 4 3 3 2 4 3 
 
In terms of explaining the district dynamics, perhaps self-reported party 
identification is of greater importance.  The branching party ID questions are based on 
the Campbell et al. (1960) American Voter type party ID questions, still used by the 
American National Election Studies (ANES).  Voters are first sorted into Republicans, 
Democrats, and Independents.  Depending on how the respondent answers the first 
question, the respondent then answers a second more detailed question.  Democrats and 
Republicans are asked if they are a “strong” or “not strong” member of their party.  
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Independents and other voters are asked if they are closer to one party or another (called 
“leaners”) or not (“true Independents”).  The results for these questions are displayed in 
Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10: Party Identification (Weighted Col. %, Don’t Know / No Response Dropped) 
 
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Strong Dem. 14 21 24 23 36 24 
Weak Dem. 12 14 18 22 18 17 
Lean Dem. 13 12 13 17 17 14 
True Ind. 6 6 7 7 6 6 
Lean Rep. 16 17 11 12 7 13 
Weak Rep. 15 14 10 7 7 11 
Strong Rep. 24 17 17 11 9 16 
Total N= 1053 1070 1068 1169 1100 5459 
 
The middle of these scales is poorly populated in all of the districts.  In AD5, 24 
percent identify as strong Republicans and 14 percent identify as strong Democrats while 
only six percent are true Independents.  Even in very liberal districts, strong Republicans 
outnumber not strong (“weak”) Republicans.  Across all the districts, the trend towards 
the poles is evident: in the whole sample, 24 percent identify as strong Democrats and 16 
percent as strong Republicans.  Only six percent identify as true Independents. 
Party registration and party identification do not always match up very well.  
There are a number of possible reasons for this.  A voter may have changed their party 
preference over time but not bothered to register again with their new party.  A voter may 
have incorrectly registered originally.  The voter's registration may have been incorrectly 
recorded by election officials.  The voter may have deliberately registered with the other 
party to vote for that party's candidates under the old primary or because registering with 
the other party was more socially acceptable (since it is public information).  There may 
be other reasons.  The key point here is that under a semi-closed primary format, 
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registered Republicans could not vote for Democratic candidates and registered 
Democrats could not vote for Republican candidates. 
Table 4-11: Party Registration and Party Identification (Weighted Numbers) 
  Party Registration  
 
 
Dem. 
Party DTS/Ind. 
Rep. 
Party 
Third 
Party. Total 
P
ar
ty
 Id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 Strong Dem. 1202 43 33 12 1289 
Weak Dem. 732 100 70 16 918 
Lean Dem. 349 283 94 58 784 
True Ind. 112 110 107 23 352 
Lean Rep. 124 188 329 50 691 
Weak Rep. 35 44 491 7 576 
Strong Rep. 36 33 773 6 849 
 Total 2590 801 1897 171 5459 
 
Table 4-11, above, shows how many voters in the entire sample have registered 
with each party with each of the seven party identification categories.  Most registered 
Democrats identify as some kind of Democrat–strong, weak, or leaning.  Nevertheless, 71 
registered Democrats of 2590 explicitly identify as either weak or strong Republicans 
(2.7%).  Of the 1897 registered Republicans, 103 identify as either weak or strong 
Democrats (5.4%).  While these percentages are small, they are politically relevant.  
Under the old semi-closed primary system, these voters had to vote for candidates of a 
party with which they did not identify–in effect, crossing over to potentially “raid” the 
other party.  So when contemplating “crossover” voting, it is important to keep in mind 
that under the old rules 2.7% of “Democrats” were pre-crossed-over Republicans and 
5.4% of “Republicans” were truly pre-crossed-over Democrats.    
Issues and Policy Preferences 
The survey also contains four questions about voters' policy preferences.  These 
issues–How should California deal with a budget shortfall? Do you approve of gay 
marriage?  Should abortions be easier or more difficult to obtain?  What should our 
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immigration policy priority be?–represent major policy issues not just in California but in 
the United States.  These questions measure attitudes on both economic and social policy, 
describing generally how people think in each of the five districts in this study. 
Table 4-12: Policy Preferences by District (Weighted Col. %) 
  
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
S
ta
te
 B
u
d
g
et
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
Don't Know/No Response 6 4 5 9 3 5 
Cut Spending Only 45 35 33 35 24 34 
Increase Taxes Only 7 10 13 13 18 12 
Mix of Cuts and Taxes 
 
42 51 49 44 55 48 
G
ay
 
M
ar
ri
ag
e Don't Know/No Response 10 9 9 10 6 9 
Approve 43 54 61 46 78 56 
Disapprove 
 
47 37 30 44 16 35 
A
b
o
rt
io
n
s 
S
h
o
u
ld
 B
e…
 Don't Know/No Response 6 5 6 6 5 6 
More Difficult to Obtain 28 21 18 29 7 21 
Easier to Obtain 22 22 29 16 45 27 
No Change 
 
44 52 47 49 44 47 
Im
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
 
P
ri
o
ri
ty
 
Don't Know/No Response 4 4 4 3 3 4 
Enforce Current Laws 36 30 23 21 19 26 
Path to Citizenship 22 24 32 37 37 31 
Both 
 
39 42 40 39 41 40 
 
The question about the state budget asks the voters to choose between cutting 
spending and taxing.  Not surprisingly, many voters prefer a mixture of tax increases and 
spending cuts; 48 percent across all five districts, ranging from a low of 42 percent in 
AD5 to a high of 55 percent in AD50 (see Table 4-12, above).  Solving the state budget 
shortfall by only increasing taxes remains an unpopular choice; even in AD50, only 18 
percent of voters supported only increasing taxes.  IN AD5 and AD8 only 7 and 10 
percent of voters wanted to just increase taxes.  Solving the problem with only spending 
cuts remained a relatively popular option even in AD47, a district most likely to benefit 
from government spending and with few voters in the highest tax brackets.  Overall, 
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voters generally had an answer for this question: only five percent of voters in all the 
districts did not give one of those three answers. 
The gay marriage question did not give voters an option to hedge their bets.  Gay 
marriage had been an ongoing political issue in California; in 2008 voters passed 
Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment to the state constitution banning gay marriage.  
More voters approved of gay marriage than disapproved of it in this 2012 survey in all 
but one of the districts: AD5, the Republican district.  Even in AD5, the margin is small, 
only 4 percent.  Notably, voters in AD47 only weakly favor gay marriage, with 46 
percent approving and 44 percent disapproving.  In contrast, AD50–a district containing 
West Hollywood, an area known for welcoming and celebrating homosexuality–had 78 
percent of the respondents approving gay of gay marriage (which is, actually, surprisingly 
low).  Additionally, many voters in AD41 support gay marriage (61%), even though it is 
not the most solidly Democratic district of the five. 
The question about abortion also had some surprising results.  As it was 
somewhat surprising that only 78 percent of the respondents in AD50 approved of gay 
marriage, it is also surprising that only 28 percent of the respondents in AD5 thought 
abortions should be more difficult to obtain.  Even though AD5 is a solidly Republican 
district, the most popular response to the abortion question remained “no change.”  The 
missed opportunities with Republicans and socially conservative Latinos are also evident 
in the responses in AD47: 29 percent, a higher proportion than even in the AD5 
Republican district, think abortions should be more difficult to obtain.  Combined with 
the responses to the gay marriage question and the relatively tepid support for “increasing 
taxes only,” AD47 would look like a promising district for Republicans. 
200 
 
 
Immigration Priorities help explain that Republican failure.  Here AD47 looks 
very much like AD50; slightly less than twice as many prefer a path to citizenship as a 
priority over enforcing existing laws.  In AD5 and AD8, enforcement has a higher share.  
In all districts, though, hedging and selecting “both” is the most popular choice.  As with 
many of the other questions, when given an alternative, voters would like to have their 
cake and eat it too. 
These survey questions do a fairly good job of measuring a person's political 
orientation.  As a test of how well these four issue questions cover the whole issue space, 
I have used them to predict respondents' party identification.  To do so, I dropped the few 
true Independents–only about six to seven percent of the sample–and then used a binary 
probit model to analyze who identified as a Republican and who identified as a 
Democrat.  Note that this is a relatively weak classification system; I am adopting the 
most extreme interpretation of Keith et al.'s Myth of the Independent Voter (1992) and 
made no effort to distinguish between partisan leaners and partisans in my dependent 
variable.  Then I ran the model three times: first using just the responses to the four issue 
questions, second adding in race, and third using a ‘kitchen sink’ approach.  The results 
are presented in Table 4-13, below. 
The binary probit framework makes assessing the predictive success of these 
variables easy.  The first specification–using only the issue questions–correctly classified 
78.5 percent of the 5101 Republican and Democratic identifiers.  Since only 57.9 percent 
of the two-party (unweighted) sample identified as Democrats, this is a considerable 
improvement over the naive guess (“all Californians are Democrats”).  Using a likelihood 
ratio test it is possible to demonstrate that the fuller models do 
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Table 4-13: Simple Probit for Republican or Democratic Party ID (True Independents 
Dropped).
189
 
 
Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. Coef. T-Stat. 
Budget: Cut Only 1.36 16.90 1.37 16.77 1.34 15.97 
Budget: Mix Tax/Cut 0.46 5.95 0.47 5.90 0.42 5.17 
Budget: Missing/Other 0.42 3.71 0.52 4.47 0.55 4.62 
Gay Marriage: Disapprove 0.80 15.99 0.91 17.39 0.90 16.26 
Gay Marriage: Missing/Other 0.50 6.55 0.58 7.32 0.55 6.82 
Abortion: More Difficult 0.59 8.48 0.76 10.31 0.73 9.58 
Abortion: No Change 0.31 5.66 0.38 6.75 0.32 5.61 
Abortion: Missing/Other 0.47 4.60 0.54 5.12 0.54 5.02 
Immigration: Enforcement 0.95 16.14 0.78 12.55 0.77 12.07 
Imm.: Pathway & Enforce 0.52 9.91 0.43 7.93 0.42 7.57 
Immigration: Missing/Other 0.40 3.23 0.27 2.07 0.26 1.98 
Race/Ethnicity: Latino 
  
-0.85 -13.76 -0.79 -11.01 
Race/Ethnicity: Black 
  
-1.57 -12.02 -1.64 -12.43 
Race/Ethnicity: Missing/Other 
  
-0.35 -4.91 -0.38 -5.24 
Religion: Catholic 
    
-0.24 -3.68 
Religion: Atheist or Agnostic 
    
-0.51 -6.05 
Religion: Jewish 
    
-0.65 -6.20 
Religion: Missing/Other 
    
-0.14 -2.34 
Age: 35 to 64 
    
-0.23 -3.12 
Age: 65 and Older 
    
-0.29 -3.71 
Female 
    
-0.16 -3.54 
Education: HS Only 
    
-0.17 -2.58 
Education: Some College 
    
0.03 0.43 
Education: Postgraduate  
    
-0.10 -1.46 
Education: Missing/Other 
    
-0.31 -1.44 
Income: $40-$80,000 
    
0.04 0.61 
Income: Above $80,000 
    
0.34 5.25 
Income: Missing/Other 
    
0.26 3.48 
Percent (Both Parties)  
Correctly Predicted 
78.53 81.93 82.18 
True % Democratic:  57.89 57.89 57.89 
N=5101 
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 This binary variable = 1 if Republican and 0 if Democrat; positive coefficient means more likely to be 
Republican and negative coefficient means more likely to be Democrat.   
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statistically significantly improve the fit; relatedly, the percent correctly predicted also 
increases to 81.9 percent with race added and 82.2 percent with many more variables 
added.  While statistically significant, the added information is hardly politically 
significant.  Adding race, religion, age, gender, education, and income to the model only 
buys a little more than three and a half percentage points of better predictive value.    
These four issue questions then do explain quite a bit about the political 
orientation of the voters in these five Assembly districts.  Computing first differences for 
the more “Republican” answers to the four questions – cutting spending only, opposing 
gay marriage, believing abortion should be more difficult, and preferring to focus on 
enforcing existing immigration laws – also provides an insight into which of these 
variables has a larger effect.  Setting all the indicator variables in the third and fullest 
model to their median value (0 in every case except for “female,” which is 1) and using 
Clarify in STATA produces estimates of the effect of changing the response to each 
question.  Changing the budget question response to “cut spending only” produces the 
largest effect, a 35 percentage point increase in the probability of identifying as a 
Republican.  Disapproving of gay marriage increased the probability of identifying as a 
Republican by 19 percentage points; favoring making abortions more difficult only 
increased that probability by 14 percentage points.  Preferring prioritizing enforcing 
current immigration laws had a positive 15.5 percentage point effect. 
This section is not an argument about which is the correct causal model for 
determining partisanship (and, indeed, it is always possible that partisanship causes 
responses to issue questions rather than the other way around).  The evidence presented 
here merely demonstrates that these issue questions are measuring important attitudes 
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about politics fairly efficiently.  Without even including questions about foreign policy, 
health care, the federal government deficit, the national debt, and so on, these four issue 
questions can predict the party of four out of five partisans.   
Comparing Ideology, Partisanship, and Positions on Issues 
 How effectively the top-two primary promotes the candidacies of “pragmatic” or 
“moderate” candidates depends, to an extent, on whether the California “moderate 
voters” are mythical creatures or real human beings.  That is: does California have a 
‘missing middle?’  The answer changes somewhat with the specific question; Figures 2-4 
(below) help to illustrate the measurement quandary.  Generally, voters like to say that 
they are strong partisans but also like to report that they occupy the middle of the 
ideological space.   
 The party ID scale in Figure 4-2 is just a graphical representation of what has 
already been presented in Table 4-10.  While there are more Democrats than Republicans 
in the sample, both tend towards identifying as “strong” partisans.  There are very few 
“true Independents.”  The ideological self-placement scale appears to suggest an opposite 
conclusion; as shown in Figure 4-3, more than 30 percent of the respondents located 
themselves at “5” – explicitly given in the question as “middle of the road.”  Locations 1, 
4, 6, and 9 are not particularly popular.  There is a small uptick at the ends of the 
spectrum, particularly on the conservative side; it seems some conservatives prefer to 
think of themselves as “very conservative” – or “severely conservative,” as Governor 
Mitt Romney put it during his 2012 Presidential campaign.
190
  Nevertheless, the apparent 
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 See: Memoli, Michael A.  2012.  “CPAC: Mitt Romney tells conservatives he is one of them.”  Los 
Angeles Times, 10 February.  Available online: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/10/news/la-pn-mitt-
romney-cpac-20120210 (last accessed 12/12/12).   
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Figure 4-2:  7-Point Party Identification Scale (Weighted, All Districts) 
 
Figure 4-3: 10-Point Self-Placement Ideological Scale (Weighted, All Districts) 
 
Figure 4-4: “Issue Scale” (Weighted, All Districts) 
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conclusion from the party identification figure is that there are few moderates; the 
conclusion from the ideological figure is that there may be many.  
 Figures 2 and 3 do not necessarily conflict as much as it may initially appear.  A 
voter could, for example, consider themselves very committed to the cause of their party 
but also prefer moderate policies or hope for compromise.  The opposite interpretation is 
also possible, that voters think of themselves as committed to their party but that they 
view their party’s positions as centrist and reasonable.  Figure 4-4 helps to shed 
additional light on this problem by using the issue questions to create another alternative 
scale.   
 The four issue questions together make up the “issue score” in Figure 4-4.  Each 
of those questions has a clear “more Republican” and “more Democratic” response (as is 
apparent from the results presented in Table 4-13, using these answers to predict party 
ID).  The “more Republican” response for each question got a score of “1,” while the 
“more Democratic” response got a score of “-1.”  If respondents either did not give an 
answer for that specific question or selected one of the hedging alternatives (like 
preferring a mixture of tax increases and spending cuts) they were assigned a “0” for that 
question.  The issue score then sums the individual question scores so that a total of “4” 
means the respondent adopted the “most Republican” answer to all four questions --- 
spending cuts only, opposing gay marriage, preferring abortions to be more difficult to 
obtain, and prioritizing enforcement in immigration law.  A total of “-4” means precisely 
the opposite; the respondent adopted the “most Democratic” answer to all four questions.  
Note that there are several ways to reach all the interior scores; to get a zero, for example, 
a respondent could either agree with two Republican and two Democratic positions or 
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have taken no positions at all (or have scores of 1, -1, 0, and 0).   The issue scale 
actually produces what looks to be the most well-behaved distribution, centered slightly 
to the left of zero but with very few voters in either extreme.  While not a complete 
measure of the entire issue space – it is missing questions about foreign policy, for 
example – the four questions used to construct it do a good job of predicting partisanship.  
It also removes the normative implications imposed on the other two questions – where it 
is possible to imagine being a ‘strong partisan’ (that is, a good team member) but ‘middle 
of the road’ (that is, a reasonable person) could be seen as desirable.        
Figure 4-5: The Issue Scale By Party ID (Weighted, All Districts; not missing PID) 
 
The issue scale is also very well behaved by party ID.  Figure 4-5, above, shows 
the distributions (while assigning the leaners to their respective parties).  The Democrats 
peak around -2, the Republicans around 2 or 3.  The true Independents tend to be around 
the middle between -2 and 2.  There are still outliers in the parties, though, who disagree 
with their own party on many issues.  There are self-identified Democrats who have 
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scores of 2 or more and self-identified Republicans with scores under -1.  These 
individuals must be identifying with their political party for reasons other than the four 
issues listed here–not entirely surprising that there would be some who would do so. 
Figure 4-6: The Issue Scale for Self-Identifying Democratic or “Leans Democratic” 
(Weighted) 
 
Partisanship does not always mean the same thing in all places.  Figure 4-6, 
above, shows the same issue scale as in Figures 2 to 5 but with only Democrats and 
broken down by district.  The mean in AD50 is both shifted left and the distribution 
shrunk when compared to the other districts; Democrats in AD50 hold more consistently 
solid Democratic positions on issues when compared to Democrats elsewhere.  The 
distribution in AD47 looks very different and, in fact, resembles more closely that of the 
true Independents (shown in Figure 4-5 for all districts).  From Figure 4-6, it is 
reasonable to conclude that there is more going on between districts than just moving the 
median voter by changing the proportion of Democrats and Republicans in each district.  
A Democrat from one area is not the same as a Democrat from another; the issue 
preferences of the median Democrat move around by district as well.    
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Resolving this broader issue – is there a ‘missing middle’ or not? – is the subject 
of later chapters, particularly in the context of comparing voter and candidate placement.  
The basic data presented here merely sets up this problem.  While relatively few voters 
select the more moderate or nonpartisan categories on the party identification scale, there 
is some evidence to suggest that the “missing middle” problem may not be as bad as that 
data would imply.  Not only do many voters think of themselves as “middle of the road” 
but there is some evidence based on their responses to the issue questions to back up this 
claim, although the “middle of the road” responses to the ideological questions are still 
likely exaggerated.      
Outlook on California, Political Parties, and Government 
California voters were not happy with the situation in the state in June of 2012.  
The survey includes a couple of measures of voter attitudes towards politics, political 
parties, the future, and the government.  Taken together these questions help form an 
assessment of the voter's view of the world.  Overall, voters seem bearish on the state, 
distrustful of government, and willing to consider alternatives (support candidates of the 
other party, contemplate a third party). 
Two fifths of the voters in the survey report not tending to vote for candidates of 
one party or another.  Some of this may be wishful thinking and cannot actually be 
verified; voters may think it socially desirable to appear open-minded.  However, even if 
just half of these voters actually ever consider candidates of the other party (so, 20 
percent), this could lead to very high levels of crossover voting in the top-two primary.  
While previously partisan voters would have been limited to voting for candidates of the 
other party in the general election, now they can influence the outcome at a much earlier 
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Table 4-14: Outlook and Opinions (Weighted Col. %) 
 
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Voting Habits 
      Always Vote for Democrats 22 28 37 37 51 35 
Always Vote for Republicans 31 24 22 15 12 20 
Always Vote for Third Party Candidates 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Not Tend to Vote for One Party or Another 44 46 37 41 34 40 
Do Not Know/No Response 1 1 2 5 2 2 
Political Parties in California do an… 
      Adequate Job 13 14 15 22 17 16 
Poor Job But No Third Party Needed 53 52 51 46 49 50 
Poor Job And Third Party Needed 29 28 27 24 26 27 
Do Not Know/No Response 4 6 7 9 7 7 
Percent Who Selected Statements about the Future Outlook 
California Headed in Wrong Direction 78 74 74 71 60 71 
CA Economy Worse in Next 12 Months 52 42 39 38 31 40 
Personal Finances Worse in Next 12 Months 38 32 31 34 29 33 
Percent Who Agree with Statements about Trust and Government 
Government Is Too Complicated 72 67 56 57 53 61 
Officials Don’t Care What People Think 76 69 63 71 56 67 
People Are Better Off Avoiding the Gov't 27 22 20 26 17 22 
People Can't Affect What Gov't Does 62 58 49 51 50 54 
Gov't Controlled by Special Interests 84 80 76 71 75 77 
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stage.  In my view, this constitutes evidence that a large section of the electorate remains, 
at least in theory, open-minded. 
Californians do not believe that the two major political parties do an adequate job 
of representing Californians.  Only 16 percent of the voters across all five districts held 
that point of view.  Surprisingly, respondents in AD47 had the most positive view of 
political parties, with 22 percent responding that parties did an adequate job.  While the 
majority in all districts believed that the Republicans and Democrats did a poor job, they 
did split about the appropriate response.  Of those who thought parties did a poor job, 
about one third (27 percent of all respondents) thought that California needed an effective 
third party.  The remainder, generally about 50 percent, did not think a third party would 
help.   
Despite the interest in a viable third party, the disparity between those who think a 
third party is needed and those who always support one is very large.  No more than two 
percent of the respondents always vote for third-party candidates.  One reasonable 
interpretation is that the quarter of respondents who think a third party is needed are at 
least expressing serious dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in California and 
skepticism of the current political process. 
The respondents also got three questions directly about their outlook for the future 
in California.  Table 4-14, above, just displays the negative responses to each of those 
three questions.  Across the five districts, 71 percent think California is headed in the 
wrong direction.  Further, 40 percent expected the economy to get worse over the next 
twelve months; after four years of slow economic growth and high unemployment, an 
expectation for worse economic outcomes is truly frightening.  Nevertheless, a third of 
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the survey respondents expected their own personal economic situation to get worse as 
well.  AD5 had the most pessimistic outlook; 78 percent thought the state was headed in 
the wrong direction, 52 percent predicted the state economy would get worse, and 38 
percent expected their own financial situation to get worse.  The optimists lived in 
AD50–but, even then, a majority thought the state was headed in the wrong direction (60 
percent).   
Table 4-15: Probit for if the CA Economy Will Get Worse in the Next 12 Months 
 
Coef. T-Stat. First Diff. 
Strong Rep. 1.15 19.56 0.43 
Weak Rep. 0.66 9.98 0.24 
Lean Rep. 0.83 13.44 0.31 
True Ind. 0.58 7.52 0.21 
Lean Dem. 0.12 1.96 0.04 
Weak Dem. 0.14 2.38 0.05 
AD5 0.28 4.75 0.09 
AD8 0.11 1.90 -- 
AD41 0.01 0.18 -- 
AD47 0.11 2.01 0.04 
N=5383 
   First Diff. Computed Relative to: 
                 Stg. Dem. from AD50. 
 
There is some sense in which the outlook on the state's future depends on the 
individual's politics.  Table 4-15, above, shows the results of a simple probit that includes 
both subjective partisanship (the ANES 7 point PID Scale) and district indicator 
variables.  Every party category was statistically significantly more likely to think that the 
California economy would get worse when compared to Strong Democrats.  The first 
differences, here computed relative to a Strong Democrat from AD50, give a measure of 
the relative strength of these effects.  The first difference suggests that a Strong 
Republican is 43 percentage points more likely to find that the state's economy would get 
worse (with all other variables set to their medians, which is zero in every case).  In 
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contrast, changing districts to AD5 produces only a 9 percentage point effect.  So some of 
the negative effects in Table 4-14 are likely just partisan interpretations of the current 
situation (which favors Democrats).  Nevertheless, it is difficult to achieve such levels of 
dissatisfaction on the backs of Republicans alone.  Many Democrats are also unhappy. 
The last set of statements included in Table 4-14 measure trust in government and 
also paint an unpleasant picture.  Across all the districts, 61 percent of the respondents 
thought that the government was too complicated.  While once again AD5 led the way 
with 72 percent agreeing, in no district did this dip under 50 percent.  Respondents also 
did not believe public officials cared about what people think (67%).  A surprisingly 
large number of respondents thought that people were better off avoiding contact with the 
government–22 percent overall, with highs of 26 percent in AD47 and 27 percent in 
AD5.  More generally, voters thought that ordinary people could not affect what the 
government does (overall, 54 percent).  Lastly, voters broadly agreed that the infamous 
special interests controlled the government; agreement rates ranged from 71 percent in 
AD47 to 84 percent in AD5.  Californians are very skeptical of their government. 
Information and Participation 
 While the top-two primary does give voters the opportunity to use a wider variety 
of voting strategies than the old semi-closed primary, these strategies require some 
amount of political information.  The survey contains two different measures of political 
information.  First, respondents had what amounted to a direct test: the interviewers 
asked them to identify the office currently held by four political figures.  Second, 
respondents answered a question about ways that they participated in politics beyond 
voting; as a general theory, respondents who participate should possess more information 
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not just about national but also about local politics.  This could be, for example, because 
they learn about politics through the network of people they meet through participating. 
The four questions about politicians covered a range of difficulty.  Identifying Joe 
Biden as the Vice President, for example, is a fair test about whether or not someone has 
any political knowledge at all of national affairs.  Barbara Boxer, the longtime U.S. 
Senator from California, should not have been too difficult.  Antonin Scalia, as a 
Supreme Court Justice, does not have to run for office and was intended to be a more 
difficult question.  Unlike Joe Biden (Democrat) and Barbara Boxer (also a Democrat), 
Scalia is generally considered more conservative–balancing the group ideologically 
somewhat.  The question about Ellen Corbett, the current California State Senate 
Majority Leader, was intended to find respondents with more political information than 
the authors of the survey (as at least one of them had no idea who she was).   
Table 4-16: Identifying Politicians (Weighted Percents) 
 
AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Joe Biden, Vice President of the United States 75 77 80 47 87 73 
Barbara Boxer, United States Senator 75 72 77 52 81 71 
Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice 43 44 48 20 64 43 
Ellen Corbett, CA State Senate Majority Leader 2 2 2 2 3 2 
# Correct: 0 13 13 11 37 6 16 
# Correct: 1 or less 32 30 26 60 19 34 
# Correct: 2 or less 62 62 57 83 43 62 
# Correct: 3 or less 99 99 99 100 97 99 
# Correct: 4 or less 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Joe Biden and Barbara Boxer fared well.  Of all the survey respondents, 73 
percent could identify Biden as the Vice President and 71 percent replied that Boxer was 
a Senator.  Scalia did fairly well too; for a person never on the California ballot, 43 
percent of the respondents could say he was a Supreme Court Justice.  Ellen Corbett was 
virtually unknown, with only 2 percent able to identify her as a State Senator, Senator, or 
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Majority Leader; some of these may have been lucky guesses as well.  Curiously, Boxer 
actually did better than Biden in AD47 (by five percentage points).  Otherwise in all the 
districts the politicians were ordered as expected. 
The districts appear to have very different levels of knowledge about politicians, 
though.  AD50 ranked as the most knowledgeable; only six percent could not correctly 
identify any and only 43 percent could identify two or less.  Voters in AD41 had the next 
most correct answers, followed by AD5 and AD8.  AD47 performed the worst; 37 
percent could not correctly identify any and 83 percent identified two or less.     
Table 4-17: AD47, Correct Politician IDs, and Survey Language (Weighted Col. %) 
 
English Spanish Total 
# Correct: 0 30.5 63.8 36.9 
# Correct: 1 23.2 24.2 23.4 
# Correct: 2 26.0 10.0 22.9 
# Correct: 3 20.2 2.0 16.7 
# Correct: 4 0.2 0.0 0.2 
N= 975 233 1208 
 
Language differences likely play a role in the different levels of political 
information between AD47 and the other ADs.  Table 4-17 shows the percent of 
respondents in AD47 who correctly identified different numbers of politicians, sorted by 
survey language.  While 30.5 percent of the respondents taking the survey in English 
could not identify any of the politicians, 63.8 percent of the respondents taking the survey 
in Spanish failed to identify any.  The identification levels among the English-language 
respondents are still low relative to, say, AD50.  Nevertheless, the Spanish survey-takers 
performed markedly worse.   
While the questions about politicians can roughly measure general political 
knowledge, the important information may be much more district specific.  Voters may 
gather the relevant political information to make the important choices in their own 
215 
 
 
district through their engagement in politics.  Table 4-18, below, shows the results of a 
battery of questions on different political activities.  The bottom half of Table 4-18 then 
shows what percent of the individuals in each district engaged in at least some number of 
these seven activities.  The activities in the top half of Table 4-18 are listed in descending 
order of popularity across all five districts. 
Table 4-18: Participation Beyond Voting (Weighted %) 
Activity AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
Discussed Politics Online 35 37 39 23 45 36 
Bought or Boycotted Goods for Political Reason 35 33 38 19 45 34 
Attended a Political Meeting 37 27 36 20 39 32 
Contacted a Public Official 38 26 35 17 36 30 
Donated Money 29 27 30 15 41 28 
Distributed or Displayed Campaign Materials 20 14 20 11 17 16 
Attended a March, Rally, or Protest 9 10 13 10 14 11 
% Engaged in # of Activities AD5 AD8 AD41 AD47 AD50 Total 
0 Activities 30 33 28 52 22 33 
1 or Less 48 54 43 70 38 51 
2 or Less 63 70 60 81 55 66 
3 or Less 77 83 76 89 70 79 
4 or Less 87 91 87 95 86 89 
5 or Less 94 96 95 98 93 95 
6 or Less 98 100 98 100 98 99 
7 or Less 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
As anyone with a Facebook or Twitter account knows well, many voters 
discussed politics online during the 2012 election cycle.  One in three voters in this 
sample reported having done so.  (A number more impressive because this is a telephone 
rather than an internet survey.)  AD50 sported the most active online participants, with 45 
percent of the respondents reporting discussing politics online.  AD41 was only six 
percentage points behind at 39 percent.  AD5 and AD8 reported 35 and 37 percent.  
AD47 had the lowest percentage, 23 percent.  This is particularly important in AD47 
because it is less well covered by major newspapers.  AD41 has the Pasadena Star News, 
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a relatively large local paper.  AD50 was covered in the Los Angeles Times, the LA 
Weekly, and other local papers like the Santa Monica Mirror.  So in AD47 voters had the 
greatest need for online political engagement–and the least of it. 
A surprisingly large number of voters reported buying or boycotting goods for 
political reasons.  This is a relatively easy form of participation, in the sense that buying 
special organic fair-trade coffee would be sufficient.  Across the board, 34 percent of the 
respondents replied that they considered politics in their purchasing decisions.  These 
rates mirrored very closely the percent who discussed politics online.  Once again, rates 
were highest in AD50 and lowest in AD47.   
Many voters, 32 percent, also reported attending a meeting where politics was 
discussed.  Interestingly, in AD5 attending a meeting proved to be a more popular choice 
than discussing politics online (very slightly).  Once again, AD47 lags behind the rest of 
the districts by quite a bit.  AD8 also had relatively lower rates than AD5, AD41, and 
AD50 on this question as well. 
About one in three (30 percent) of the respondents also said they had contacted a 
public official.  This proved to be the most popular choice in AD5, with 38 percent of the 
respondents reporting this behavior.  In AD50, only 36 percent reported contacting a 
public official, so the online discussions about politics did not always end up with an 
email or letter going to a politician.  Notably, AD47 had once again the lowest rates at 17 
percent.  One of the curious ironies of this survey is that the respondents in AD5 were the 
most likely to report that people were better off avoiding contact with the government 
(Table 4-14)–but also the most likely to have contacted public officials. 
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Donating money also proved a popular choice.  Across all the districts, 28 percent 
reported donating money (in any amount).  AD50, a district referred to in the LA Weekly 
as "Barack Obama's ATM", 41 percent of the respondents reported donating money to a 
campaign.  Only 15 percent of the respondents in AD47 did so, perhaps reflecting 
strategic choices by national campaigns: there is much more money to raise in AD50.  
AD41 showed itself to be fairly politically active as well, with 30 percent donating 
money. 
Surprisingly few respondents distributed campaign materials.  Overall, only 16 
percent did so.  This kind of "boots on the ground" participation proved to be much less 
popular than online participation.  While 45 percent of the respondents in AD50 
discussed politics online, only 17 percent distributed campaign materials.  In AD47, only 
11 percent did.  AD5 and AD41 reported the highest levels, 20 percent each. 
Less surprisingly, participating in marches, rallies, and protests was not 
particularly popular.  Overall 11 percent of the respondents engaged in this type of 
behavior, with a low of 9 percent in AD5 and a high of 14 percent in AD50.  This was the 
one category in which AD47 did not come in last; 10 percent of the respondents from 
AD47 participated in this fashion.  This type of activities takes up much more time than 
making remarks on Facebook, buying fair-trade coffee, or even clicking a link to donate 
five dollars to a cause.  This is probably the most 'expensive' of the activities in general 
and the least chosen. 
Summing up the activities provides an overview of participation rates.  More than 
half of the respondents from AD47 did not engage in any of these activities while only 22 
percent of the respondents in AD50 were totally disengaged.  Looking at the percentages 
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who did no more than three of the seven captures both of the important dynamics here 
fairly well.  First, overall participation rates among the survey respondents were quite 
high: 79 percent did three or less, meaning 21 percent did at least four.  Second, the rates 
do vary quite a bit by district: 89 percent of the respondents in AD47 did no more than 
three of the activities while 70 percent of the respondents in AD50 had done no more 
than three.  Despite the wide participation gap, though, those two districts were the 
strongest Democratic districts in the survey. 
Selecting Districts 
 All of this background information supports a discussion of the candidates in each 
of these Assembly races.  These districts do capture not just the important demographic 
and political diversity of the state but also the critical election-specific diversity required 
to analyze voter behavior in the top-two primary.  In particular, these districts all met an 
important criteria: each included at least three Assembly candidates who, ex ante, seemed 
“credible.”  That is, while those candidates may not have had much of a chance to win 
the election, a credible candidate seemed to have a reasonable ex ante chance of 
influencing in an important way which two candidates made the November ballot.  It 
turns out, each of the districts included in the survey had at least four candidates. 
 The survey data about behavior – crossover voting, for example – is then not an 
estimate of the amount of this behavior in the entire state at this election level.  These 
elections are unusual; a great number of districts had three or less candidates (Figure 4-7, 
below).  Frequently, one of the candidates even in the districts with three would prove to 
be utterly hopeless – and predictably so.  Instead, the survey results show what is possible 
in the interesting districts.  It is not just academics who scan the results looking for signs 
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that some strategies are viable; the potential election year 2014 candidates are also 
weighing their chances.  Further, the notion that a reform may have only had an effect in 
some districts does not disprove the effect, it merely lessens the overall impact.         
Figure 4-7: The number of districts with differing numbers of candidates, CA Assembly.   
 
 In all five of these districts, voters faced choices about whether or not to use the 
new rules to their full effect.  I selected AD5 because it appeared possible to get a same-
party runoff on the Republican side if the Democrats failed to coordinate on one of their 
alternatives.  I selected AD8 for two reasons.  First, AD8 represented one of the few 
competitive districts in the state; while the one Democrat on the ballot seemed likely to 
advance, the relative political strength of the Republican candidate would matter a great 
deal for the final outcome.  Second, AD8 included a large number of Republican 
candidates and a Libertarian candidate; it seemed possible that the Republicans could 
split the vote so finely between themselves that the Libertarian would advance.  While 
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AD41 only had Republican and Democratic candidates, one of the Democrats clearly 
tried to “run to the middle,” the sort of behavior the supporters of Proposition 14 hoped to 
encourage.  In AD47, the drama centered on whether both Democratic candidates would 
advance or if a Republican would get on the ballot.  AD50 sported a similar story, but 
with three plausible Democrats, including an incumbent, and a Republican making a “run 
to the middle” to compete.  Voters in all of these districts faced a complex set of strategic 
choices, if they were inclined to view the election in that fashion.   
AD5: A Republican Runoff 
 Six candidates ran in AD5.  Three Republicans – Frank Bigelow, Rico Oller, and 
Kevin Lancaster – ran for the seat in this Republican stronghold.  Oller, a former 
Assemblyman, and Bigelow, a local county supervisor, had experience as elected 
officials; Lancaster was a taxi driver (see California Target Book).  Mark Belden ran as a 
“No Party Preference” candidate.  Two Democrats, Marc Boyd and Tim Fitzgerald, also 
entered the race; Boyd got the endorsement of the California Democratic Party while 
Fitzgerald had come over from the Green Party (see California Target Book).  This 
presented voters of all types with some interesting conundrums.  If a voter supported a 
Republican candidate, was it better to get a weak Democratic opponent?  That would 
encourage “raiding,” defecting from a strong Republican candidate to vote for a weak 
Democrat to help win the next stage.  Likewise, if a Democratic supporter believed that 
they could select the weakest of the three Republicans, would it be possible to defy the 
odds and get a Democratic winner in November by selecting a weak or extreme 
Republican candidate?  Should a Democratic voter cross over and vote sincerely for a 
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Republican who is perhaps closest ideologically to them – even if that person is from the 
other party?  Should moderate voters support the “No Party Preference” candidate?        
Bigelow and Oller, both Republicans, led the way in AD5.  Table 4-19, below, 
shows the percent of all respondents in AD5 supporting each candidate or not supporting 
any (for reasons including: not voting at all, not voting in this race, not sure).  Bigelow 
and Oller each had about twenty percent, with the closest alternative as Boyd (with 10 
percent).  Note that if the Democrats could somehow get behind one candidate or another 
that the Democratic candidates have in total 19 percent–just one percent behind Bigelow.  
Belden, despite the NPP label (or, perhaps, because of it), only gets four percent.  Still, 
many voters are not sure or not voting; 20 percent of the respondents said that they did 
not know, 4 percent did not plan to vote in that race, 4 percent did not plan to vote at all, 
3 percent refused to answer the question, and around 1 percent intended to vote for 
another candidate (meaning either that they intended to write in a candidate or that they 
were confused).  Taken together, all of those types of voters form the 33 percent who do 
not have a specific candidate preference.   
Table 4-19: Preferences in AD5 
Candidate 
All Respondents 
Survey % 
Respondents with 
Preferences % 
Election 
Result % 
Bigelow (R.) 20 30 29 
Oller (R.) 21 31 34 
Lancaster (R.) 3 5 2 
Boyd (D.) 10 15 13 
Fitzgerald (D.) 9 13 18 
Belden (NPP.) 4 5 4 
No Pref. 33 N.A. N.A. 
Total N= 1080 747  
 
The second column of Table 4-19 merely recalculates the percent of the voters 
supporting each candidate, dropping the voters with no firm candidate preference.  For 
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many of the types of analysis performed in later chapters, a candidate preference is 
required.  For example, to determine if a voter intends to cross over to vote for a 
candidate of the other party, it is necessary to know which candidate the voter prefers 
(given the questions available on the survey).  For that type of analysis, then, the effective 
N for this district is 747.  These percentages are also more comparable to the actual 
election results, shown in the third column of Table 4-19.  The survey had 30 percent for 
Bigelow, who actually got 29 percent of the vote.  Oller got 31 percent in the survey but 
34 percent on election night.  Lancaster did worse in the election than in the survey, 
having 5 percent of the survey vote but only 2 percent of the true vote.  Boyd got 15 
percent in the survey but only 13 percent in the election, reversing places with Fitzgerald 
(13 percent in the survey, 18 percent in the election) as the most popular Democrat.  
Belden got 5 percent of the survey and 4 percent of the election night vote.  The survey 
did fairly well at predicting the election night result, especially given the large number of 
undecided voters in the survey.  
In the general election, Bigelow (and his trademark cowboy hat; see Figure 4-8) 
went on to defeat Oller 52-48.  Both had endorsements from known figures in the 
Republican Party; for example, Oller had Representative Tom McClintock and Bigelow 
had former California Secretary of State Bill Jones – both figures with statewide name 
recognition in Republican circles.  As reported in the California Target Book, one of the 
main political differences between the two candidates is that Oller had signed a “no-tax” 
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pledge while Bigelow had not.  In an article about the “no-tax pledge” in California, the 
Sacramento Bee reported:
191
   
In Sacramento, Democrats hardly bother negotiating with 
Republicans over the budget – the most important 
legislation each year – because Pledge Zombies cannot talk 
about taxes. 
 
As always in politics, there's a money angle. Lobbyists are 
frustrated by the blank stares they get when the topic turns 
to budgets and taxation, and interest groups are using their 
checkbooks to make their views known. 
 
The California Dental Association lobbies heavily for state 
funding for dental services. Worried that the state will cut 
spending deeper, the dentists led a $227,000 primary 
campaign to boost Republican Assembly candidate Frank 
Bigelow, a cowboy-hat-wearing Madera County supervisor 
who rejected the pledge. 
 
Bigelow faces a November showdown for the Mother Lode 
seat against Rico Oller, a former legislator who embraces 
the pledge and holds “red meat rallies” at which he 
barbecues chunks of cattle for his supporters.       
 
Aside from the obvious cultural differences with districts like AD50, the idea that a “no-
tax pledge” signer would be defeated by another fellow Republican who had not signed 
the pledge makes further study of this district interesting.   
The responses to the core survey questions shed additional light on the campaign 
dynamics.  Table 4-20, below, shows some of the basic statistics about the core survey 
questions with regard to this specific race.  The first column of Table 4-20 displays the 
number of respondents who gave approval ratings for each specific candidate in AD5.  
The next column contains the average approval rating.  The remaining columns have the 
numbers who gave an ideological placement, those average ideological placements, the 
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 Morain, Dan.  2012.  "Dan Morain: No-tax pledge losing its grip?"  The Sacramento Bee, September 23.  
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Figure 4-8: Frank Bigelow (Left) and Rico Oller (Right)
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Table 4-20: Rankings and Ratings in AD5 
 
Gave 
Approval 
Rating 
Avg. 
Approval  
Rating 
Gave 
Ideological 
Placement 
Avg. 
Ideological 
Placement 
Gave 
Electoral 
Strength 
Avg. 
Electoral 
Strength 
Bigelow 722 5.51 587 6.19 654 5.93 
Oller 718 5.35 597 6.66 669 6.06 
Lancaster 359 4.94 236 5.18 301 4.47 
Boyd 402 5.34 278 4.54 337 4.6 
Fitzgerald 429 5.13 298 4.61 378 4.65 
Belden 361 4.86 230 4.6 309 4.18 
 
  
                                                          
192
 Ellis, John.  2012.  “Bigelow, Oller bank on experience in 5th Assembly District race.”  The Fresno Bee.  
Posted Online April 25.  Available online: http://www.fresnobee.com/2012/04/25/2814257/bigelow-oller-
bank-on-experience.html (last accessed 12/16/12). 
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number who gave an estimate of electoral strength, and lastly that average strength 
estimate.  Bigelow and Oller are the best known candidates: 722 and 718 respondents 
gave an approval rating for those candidates while the best known Democrat, Fitzgerald, 
got only 429 approval rankings.  Fewer respondents gave estimates of electoral strength 
(probability of winning on a 0-10 scale, were 5 represented a 50-50 chance), although the 
pattern remained largely the same.  Even fewer voters gave ideological placements, with 
Oller leading the way with just under 600.   
Interestingly, the average ideological placement for Bigelow is more to the left 
(towards 0) than Oller's placement.  Since Bigelow did not sign the tax pledge and–in a 
head to head matchup in November, including the Democratic vote–Bigelow defeated 
Oller, there's some reason to believe that the primary worked as intended.  Oller did get a 
higher vote share in the primary but was defeated by a–by some standards, more 
moderate–fellow Republican in November.  This data does require a more detailed 
examination, though.  There is obviously a great deal of non-response, which is not likely 
missing at random.  The data is also very noisy.  Figure 4-9 plots the percent of the 
respondents who gave placements for each candidate at each point.  Not only is there a 
large spike at five but some candidates are placed in very illogical positions.  For 
example, some respondents placed Republicans Bigelow and Oller at zero, or most 
liberal.   
Figure 4-9 helps make the case that more sophisticated methodology is required to 
analyze the data.  There is certainly more information contained in Figure 4-9 than it may 
at first appear.  Take, for example, respondent the respondent with case ID 100160.  This 
voter intends to vote for Oller and lists herself as very conservative on the ideological 
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scale–a score of 10.  She has placed Oller at 10 as well but placed Bigelow at 9.  She did 
not place any of the other candidates.  Nevertheless, this is sufficient really to be very 
suggestive about her behavior: she knew about the two most viable Republicans and 
could identify which was more conservative than the other.  Given her own evident 
preferences, she seems to be supporting the correct candidate (if all she considers is 
ideology).  The respondent with case ID 100336 also plans to vote for Oller.  He too 
ranked himself as very conservative, with a placement of 10.  He placed Bigelow at 5 and 
Oller at 8 and did not place the remaining candidates.  Of course, none of the remaining 
candidates were likely to be closer to his ideological preferences; and, having given his 
own preference, put his vote choice and the main alternative in places on the ideological 
scale that make sense.  The methods used in later chapters will help extract as much 
information from this data as possible.     
Figure 4-9: Distribution of Ideological Placements in AD5 
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AD8: A Competitive District 
Voters in AD8 had opportunities to make use of the new primary election rules.  
One Democratic Candidate, Ken Cooley, faced four Republicans and a Libertarian.  The 
two main Republican candidates were Peter Tateishi and Barbara Ortega.  Tateishi had 
served as the Chief of Staff for well-known Republican Congressman Dan Lungren; he 
could be considered the ‘insider’ candidate.  Ortega, on the other hand, spent nearly 
$100,000 of her own money (as Reported in the California Target Book). 
The other candidates were less viable contenders.  John Thomas Flynn did not 
mount a serious challenge, despite trying to place himself towards the ideological middle 
(“I am a hawk on fiscal issues but a moderate on social ones,” he wrote on his 
website
193
).  Phillip Tufi ran targeting the local Russian community; his campaign 
website was available in both English and Russian version.
194
  The Target Book described 
the Libertarian candidate, Janice Bonser, as a “perennial” candidate for office who was 
the “owner of a garden business.”  Nevertheless, all of these candidates could have 
played an important role under the right circumstances.  If the vote split evenly among 
the Republicans, even Bonser may have had a chance to advance to the top-two – 
especially if some Democratic voters “raided” the Republican side and tried to pick a 
weak challenger.   
Cooley, the Democrat, had little to fear in the primary from any of the other 
candidates.  In the survey, 33 percent of all the respondents in AD8 intended to vote for 
him; this translates into 49 percent of the 748 respondents that had a preference.  He did 
slightly worse in the actual primary election, getting 43 percent of the vote.  Flynn, Tufi, 
                                                          
193
 See his campaign website: http://www.flynnassembly2012.com/issues.html (still available 12/16/12).   
194
 As of 12/16/12, still available here: http://www.tufi4assembly.com/russian/  
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and Bonser together had a very small fraction of the vote.  Tateishi and Ortega ran very 
close, though.  As a percent of survey respondents with a preference, Tateishi had 21 
percent to Ortega's 17.  On election day, Tateishi hauled in 23 percent to Ortega's 20.  
Notably, this three to four percentage point gap is smaller than the total vote for Flynn, 
Tufi, and Bonser.  To the extent that those candidates took votes potentially away from 
Ortega, they may have played a role in swinging the primary to Tateishi.   
Table 4-21: Preferences in AD8 
Candidate 
All Respondents 
 Survey % 
Respondents with 
 Preferences % 
Election 
 Result % 
Cooley (D.) 33 49 43 
Flynn (R.) 5 7 6 
Tateishi (R.) 14 21 23 
Ortega (R.) 12 17 20 
Tufi (R.) 1 2 3 
Bonser (Lib.) 3 5 4 
No Pref. 32 N.A. N.A. 
Total N= 1,094 748 
  
In the general election, Cooley beat Tateishi.  The race was reasonably 
competitive but not, in the end, very close; Cooley won 53-47.  The open question here is 
to what extent Ortega would have done better (if she would have done better at all).  
Further analysis is required to determine how the primary affected the outcome.  The data 
in Table 4-22 is suggestive, though.  Ortega did have ideological placements on average 
farther to the left than did Tateishi (6.31 for Tateishi, 5.64 for Ortega).  In that sense, 
Tateishi may have been an easier opponent to defeat than Ortega.  On the other hand, the 
negative attacks orchestrated by Tateishi's campaign may have had an effect as well, 
since he had higher approval ratings than she did (although she was better known).   
As in AD5, the ideological placements in AD8 are widely scattered.  Figure 4-10, 
below, shows the placements for just Cooley, Tateishi, and Ortega.  Cooley has a small 
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bump around 3.  Ortega and Tateishi have a bump around 8, but Tateishi got a higher 
percentage of his placements to the right of five than Ortega while Ortega had a higher 
percentage to the left of and at five.  This explains why Ortega's score is farther to the left 
(towards zero) than Tateishi's–but some of this may just be driven by uncertainty about 
her true positions. 
Table 4-22:  Rankings and Ratings in AD8  
 
Gave 
Approval 
Rating 
Avg. 
Approval  
Rating 
Gave 
Ideological 
Placement 
Avg. 
Ideological 
Placement 
Gave 
Electoral 
Strength 
Avg. 
Electoral 
Strength 
Cooley 686 5.84 541 4.63 626 5.60 
Flynn 357 4.87 242 5.14 306 4.14 
Tateishi 571 5.61 439 6.31 509 5.48 
Ortega 700 5.17 549 5.64 639 5.26 
Tufi 340 4.71 228 4.95 293 3.97 
Bonser 341 4.66 220 4.57 290 3.55 
 
Figure 4-10: Distribution of (Select Candidates) Ideological Placements in AD8 
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AD41: A Democrat Makes a Run to the Middle 
Assembly District 41 provides a different kind of primary dynamic.  AD41, as 
seen earlier, is a district that tends Democratic but with enough Republicans and 
nonpartisans that they provide opportunities for nontraditional candidates.  Certainly 
AD41 attracted one of those: Democrat Victoria Rusnak.  On the Democratic side, she 
faced Chris Holden and Michael Cacciotti.  Both were strong and credible candidates.  
Chris Holden, the son of Los Angeles City Councilman Nate Holden, had served on the 
Pasadena City Council for twenty years.  He got the endorsement of the California 
Democratic Party before the primary election.  Michael Cacciotti served on the South 
Pasadena City Council.  Rusnak had little political background at all; her political assets 
included lots of her own money and a large amount of name recognition, since her family 
ran several large luxury car dealerships in the district.  The Target Book reported that she 
spent nearly $300,000 of her own money and almost $500,000 overall during the 
primary.  Furthermore, unlike most first time politicians, her name already adorned a 
great number of the bumpers in AD41 before she had even spent one of those dollars.   
The two Republicans on the ballot were also both interesting candidates.  Ed 
Colton was a businessperson on the board of a local Catholic high school (Cathedral High 
School).  AD41 and the area around it has a great number of private schools, so access to 
the private school social network is a strong political asset.  Donna Lowe helped found 
the Claremont Conservatives Tea Party and had the endorsement of the California 
Republican Party.   
Rusnak appeared to make an effort to ‘run to the middle.’  For example, she sent 
mail to Republican households that detailed her interest in education but did not mention 
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her own party affiliation.  Holden appeared to run a more traditional Democratic 
campaign while Lowe committed to her Tea Party base.  In the last few days before the 
election, Rusnak got hit with a series of negative advertisements from the independent 
expenditure group “Alliance for California's Tomorrow,” believed to be done on Holden's 
behalf.
195
  A photograph of one page of one of these ads is in Figure 4-11.  The front page 
of this advertisement showed someone at a car dealership (identified as a “used car 
center”) with the text “take a closer look before you buy.” 
Table 4-23: Preferences in AD41 
 
All Respondents 
 Survey % 
Respondents with 
 Preferences % 
Election 
 Result % 
Holden (D.) 18 31 29 
Cacciotti (D.) 8 14 15 
Rusnak (D.) 12 21 14 
Lowe (R.) 11 18 24 
Colton (R.) 10 16 18 
No Pref. 41 N.A. N.A. 
Total N= 1099 686 
  
Whether on their own, or because they were encouraged to do so, voters certainly 
did take a skeptical look at Rusnak.  Rusnak appeared to be in second place among the 
survey respondents.  Looking at Table 4-23, Rusnak had support of 21 percent of the 
respondents who had a preference, second only to Holden (with 31 percent).  A lot of 
respondents had not yet made up their mind, though.  Rusnak's second place survey finish 
translated to only 12 percent of the total survey respondents from the district.  Many of 
the respondents did not have an explicit preference; 41 percent either did not know, did 
not plan to vote at all or in that race, or did not want to say who they favored.  The 
  
                                                          
195
 For example, see the reference to the negative mailer here: Wilson, Larry.  2012.  “Larry Wilson: Wine-
bar election pundits testify.”  Pasadena Star News.  Posted June 5th, available online at: 
http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/ci_20791049/larry-wilson-wine-bar-election-pundits-testify (last 
accessed 12/16/12).   
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Figure 4-11: Anti-Rusnak Ad 
 
undecided voters really broke for anybody but Rusnak.  As expected, Holden got the 
most votes; Lowe came in second, six points ahead of her closest rival Ed Colton.  Table 
4-24, below, shows the fraction of the vote each candidate received in each day of polling 
in AD41.  There’s not a clear trend day-to-day; nevertheless, the negative advertising 
may have had a bigger effect on the undecided or poorly informed voters.   
 Rusnak and Holden are clearly the best known of the five candidates.  Of the 1099 
respondents from AD41, 669 gave an approval rating for Holden and 663 gave a rating 
for Rusnak (see Table 4-24, below).  For the other candidates, 487 rated Cacciotti, 457 
rated Lowe, and 474 rated Colton.  For all her name recognition, though, Rusnak did lag 
in approval ratings; she was the only candidate with an average below 5.  Interestingly, 
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she does place in the center ideologically of the five candidates.  Furthermore, the voters 
who ranked Lowe and Colton did acknowledge their electoral weaknesses; they had the 
lowest average electoral strength.   
Table 4-24: Vote Percentages by Day in AD41 (Unweighted Row %) 
 
Holden 
% 
Cacciotti 
% 
Rusnak 
% 
Lowe 
 % 
Colton 
% N= 
5/26/2012 18 18 18 18 27 11 
5/27/2012 43 14 7 7 29 14 
5/28/2012 43 27 17 7 7 30 
5/29/2012 22 12 27 24 15 59 
5/30/2012 26 3 23 29 20 35 
5/31/2012 15 10 10 40 25 20 
6/1/2012 29 23 13 17 18 77 
6/2/2012 35 11 24 21 9 149 
6/3/2012 33 15 19 17 16 213 
6/4/2012 32 17 14 22 15 78 
Total 31 15 19 20 15 686 
 
Table 4-25: Rankings and Ratings in AD41 
 
 
 Figure 4-12, below, shows the ideological placements for Rusnak, Lowe, and 
Holden.  The distributions are noisy, as were those for the other candidates in other 
districts, but still intelligible.  Lowe has a “conservative” bump and Holden has a 
“liberal” bump – but Rusnak has neither.  If this data is at all meaningful, then it makes 
some sense out of the tactical spending by independent expenditure groups.  Why should 
they target Rusnak?  If she is more centrally located than Lowe, then she was likely a 
 
Gave 
Approval 
Rating 
Avg. 
Approval  
Rating 
Gave 
Ideological 
Placement 
Avg. 
Ideological 
Placement 
Gave 
Electoral 
Strength 
Avg. 
Electoral 
Strength 
Holden 669 5.71 551 4.21 616 6.00 
Cacciotti 487 5.49 366 4.61 441 5.02 
Rusnak 663 4.80 537 4.92 603 5.09 
Lowe 457 5.25 337 5.87 414 4.78 
Colton 474 5.05 340 5.62 420 4.62 
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bigger threat to Holden than Lowe proved to be.  Holden easily defeated Lowe in 
November.   
Figure 4-12: Distribution of (Select Candidates) Ideological Placements in AD41 
 
AD47: Majority-Minority District and Weak Republican Candidates 
 In November, Democrat Cheryl Brown defeated fellow Democrat Joe Baca, Jr. 
56% to 44% in the race for California’s 47th Assembly District seat.  This contest 
illustrates some of the important changes in California electoral politics with the advent 
of the top-two.  In particular, because the district is a majority-minority district with both 
Latino and African-American populations, the 47
th
 serves as a laboratory to study the 
way a diverse population approaches the new top-two primary.  Baca, a Latino candidate, 
had the highest vote share of the four candidates in the primary and he won the 
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endorsement of the California Democratic Party.  Brown, an African-American 
candidate, managed to overcome those obstacles to win the November election.   
 AD47 started as an open seat, represented by the termed-out Wilmer Carter (also 
an African-American woman).  Four candidates entered the primary: Democrats Baca 
and Brown as well as Republicans Jeane Ensley and Thelma Beach.  Jeane Ensley was 
the most serious Republican contender, as an active member of the Inland Empire Tea 
Party (Target Book, 2012).  Beach did not mount a serious campaign; in her mid-90s, she 
would likely have been the oldest California legislator and local news reports indicated 
her “platform centers on helping out fellow senior citizens.”196  If one of the Republicans 
had managed to make the “top-two” candidates for the November election, the Democrat 
on the ballot would have easily won election.  Nevertheless, they did not; the results of 
the June Primary gave Baca 42%, Brown 29%, Ensley 22%, and Beach 6.5%.  This 
meant Baca and Brown would have to compete in the general election.   
 Baca and Brown represented different factions of the local Democratic Party.  
Cheryl Brown worked for the termed-out Assemblywoman Wilmer Carter and for State 
Senator Gloria Negrete McLeod (Senate District 32).  State Senator McLeod defeated Joe 
Baca Jr. in 2006 for the Senate seat and also ran in 2012 against Joe Baca (Sr.) for U.S. 
House of Representatives (CA 35
th
 Congressional District).  The California Democratic 
Party endorsed both Baca candidates.
197
  The electorate would be less kind; Joe Baca 
(Sr.) lost on election day as well in another Democrat-on-Democrat race (ironically, also 
  
                                                          
196
 Nisperos, Neil and Benjamin Demers.  2012.  “Familiar names lead Assembly District 47.”  Inland 
Valley Daily Bulletin.  May 19th, online at: http://www.dailybulletin.com/ci_20662247/familiar-names-
lead-assembly-district-47 (last accessed 11/17/12). 
197
 (see: http://www.cadem.org/vote?id=0006, last accessed 11/17/12).          
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Figure 4-13: Joe Baca, Jr.
198
 
 
Figure 4-14:  Cheryl Brown
199
 
  
                                                          
198
 Image taken from the front page of his website: (http://joebacajrforassembly2012.com/index.html), last 
accessed 11/17/2012. 
199
 Image taken from the front page of her website: (http://www.brownforassembly2012.com/), last 
accessed 11/17/2012. 
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Figure 4-15: Jeane Ensley
200
 
 
 
Figure 4-16: Thelma Beach
201
 
 
 
56-44%).  For AD47, this meant both Democratic candidates had the background in 
politics and the connections in the Democratic Party to be realistic and serious contenders 
for office.   
 The Politico listed Congressman Baca’s defeat as one of the “5 Biggest House 
Race Surprises.”202  The Politico report noted that Michael Bloomberg (the mayor of 
New York) spent “an astonishing $2.5 million” to buy television advertisement on behalf 
of Negrete McLeod and against Joe Baca (Sr.) before the fall election.  (After the 
election, he reportedly said: “I didn't lose to Negrete-McLeod, I lost to Michael 
Bloomberg.”203)  While the content of the advertisements related to gun control, the 
                                                          
200
 Image taken from her website: (http://www.electjeane.com/), accessed 11/17/2012. 
201
 No candidate website available; image taken from: San Bernardino County Sentinel: “Winkler-Beach 
Making a Stand as Dean of Candidates.”  Posted May 26, 2012.  Available online at: 
http://sbsentinel.com/2012/05/page/2/, last accessed 04/07/13).   
202
 Isenstadt, Alex.  2012.  “The 5 biggest House race surprises.”  Politico, Nov. 7.  Online at: 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/83536.html (last accessed 11/25/12).     
203
 Weeks, John.  2012.  “John Weeks: The prediction here: Baca will be back.”  The Sun: San Bernardino 
and the Inland Empire.  November 13, online at: http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21990177/john-weeks-
prediction-here-baca-will-be-back (last accessed 11/25/2012). 
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motivation may not have.  Joe Baca Sr. was also the subject of an unflattering article in 
the New York Times in September which described a very close relationship between his 
charitable foundation and his political campaign.
204
   
The spending in the Joe Baca Sr.’s race may have also hurt his son, as CD35 
overlaps parts of AD47 in Fontana and Bloomington and the two men share the same 
name.  Nevertheless, Joe Baca Jr. was likely to defeat either Republican candidate in 
AD47, no matter what happened during the general election campaign.  While the race in 
AD47 also sported its own independent expenditures during the general election cycle on 
behalf of both Joe Baca Jr. and Cheryl Brown, Brown had to reach the general election 
stage first.   
Table 4-26: Preferences in AD47 
 
All Respondents 
 Survey % 
Respondents with  
Preferences % 
Election 
 Result % 
Baca (D.) 38 58 42 
Brown (D.) 15 23 29 
Ensley (R.) 7 11 22 
Beach (R.) 5 7 7 
No Pref. 35 N.A. N.A. 
Total 1208 819 
  
The survey results in AD47 looked pretty good for Joe Baca, Jr.  He polled 38 
percent of the total respondents in the district and 58 percent of the respondents who had 
a firm vote preference.  Brown, on the other hand, only got 15 percent of the total 
respondents and 23 percent of those with a candidate preference.  Ensley and Beach 
appeared to be roughly equally hopeless, with Ensley holding a slight edge (Table 4-26).  
While the survey greatly overestimated Baca's support (58 percent of those with a 
                                                          
204
 Lipton, Eric.  2012.  “Congressional Charities Pulling in Corporate Cash.”  The New York Times, Sept. 
5.  Online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/06/us/politics/06charity.html?pagewanted=all (last 
accessed 11/25/2012). 
239 
 
 
preference in the survey, 42 percent on election day), Brown still only beat expectations 
by six percentage points to get 29 percent on election day.  Her reversal of fortune 
remains miraculous. 
Part of the explanation of that miracle likely lies in the lower levels of political 
information and engagement in politics in AD47.  While none of the districts have 
particularly neat answers to the core survey questions, the responses in AD47 do seem 
quite different from those in other districts (see Table 4-27, below).  Many respondents 
rank Baca (975 of 1208) and Brown (653 of 1208) while less rank Ensley and Beach 
(454, 445).  Baca had the highest average approval rating.  Many voters also gave 
ideological placements but the average placements do not make much sense.  The 
average placement for Ensley, a Tea Party Republican, is to the left of the average 
placement for Democrats Baca and Brown.  The electoral strength scores look more 
reasonable; given the way the candidates finished in the primary election, it seems 
understandable that Baca would have the highest average score and Beach the lowest.  
Still, it is somewhat surprising that Beach did not have a score closer to zero.                   
Table 4-27:  Rankings and Ratings in AD47 
 
Gave 
Approval 
Rating 
Avg. 
Approval  
Rating 
Gave 
Ideological 
Placement 
Avg. 
Ideological 
Placement 
Gave 
Electoral 
Strength 
Avg. 
Electoral 
Strength 
Baca 975 5.88 912 5.17 960 6.63 
Brown 653 5.62 556 5.27 632 5.44 
Ensley 454 4.92 372 5.26 426 4.52 
Beach 445 5.00 361 4.98 416 4.33 
 
Figure 4-17 starts to explain the nonsensical means for AD47 on the ideological 
placements.  Quite simply: the means are based on very little information, since most 
respondents who placed each of the candidates placed them at "5."  It is likely some 
respondents also reversed the scale, intending to say "very liberal" when they instead said 
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"very conservative."  The picture in Figure 4-17 is just not terribly informative without 
resorting to more sophisticated methodology (as will be done in the next chapter).   
Figure 4-17: Ideological Placements in AD47 
 
Since AD47 did include surveys in both English and Spanish, there is always a 
concern that the translation may have been less than clear.  Figure 4-18, below, shows the 
distributions for the two Democratic candidates by the language of the survey.  This does 
seem to make something of a difference: note that the percent of the survey respondents 
placing both Baca and Brown at appropriate scores (between 0 and 4) is higher for 
English-language than Spanish-language respondents.  Conversely, the percent of 
respondents placing Baca and Brown at likely inappropriate scores (between 6 and 10) is 
higher for Spanish than English language respondents.  Over twenty percent of the 
Spanish-language survey respondents who placed Baca placed him at 10, or very 
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conservative.  Only just above 10 percent of the English language respondents who 
placed him located him at 10.     
Figure 4-18: Ideological Placements by Survey Language for Baca and Brown in AD47 
 
As a general rule, “Democrats” should be more likely to place themselves on the 
left side of the ideological scale (less than 5).  That observation makes possible an 
analysis of AD47 relative to the other districts, to assess really if voters just did not 
understand this question very well in that district (without the confounding effect of 
observing the “true” ideological placement of candidates).  The responses in AD47 are 
quite different from the responses in the other districts (see Figure 4-19, below).      
A higher proportion of self-identified Democrats in AD47 locate themselves at 5 
on the ideological scale than in any of the other districts.  Furthermore, a higher 
proportion of the Democratic respondents in all the other districts placed themselves 
between 0 and 4.  A higher proportion of the Democratic respondents in AD47 placed 
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themselves between 7 and 10 as did in the other districts.  While it is possible that 
Democrats in AD47 think of themselves as much more conservative–as, indeed, their 
responses on the issue questions would suggest–it still seems that the respondents from 
that district answered the ideological placement questions in a less coherent way. 
Figure 4-19: Democratic Self-Placements in All Five Districts 
 
AD47 appears to be a district with a less informed and engaged electorate in 
comparison with the other districts, with correspondingly less well formed preferences 
between Assembly candidates.  It makes sense, then, that the campaign between the 
primary and the general election would have an effect, with Brown overcoming Baca.  
She made up a lot of ground; Baca only needed to expand his primary election vote share 
by nine percentage points to win the general election.  Regardless of how Brown 
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managed to pull it off, though, she had the opportunity to do so because of the top-two 
primary.  At the primary stage, Baca would have won easily among the two Democrats 
and faced (and assuredly defeated) Ensley in the general election.  So this is yet another 
case where the top-two likely changed who ultimately won and where the endorsed 
candidate of the Democratic Party lost to another Democrat.     
AD50: The Four-Way Split 
 In AD50, the endorsed Democratic candidate also lost to a fellow Democrat in the 
general election, although such a statement hardly does the story justice.  Four candidates 
decided to enter the race in AD50: Betsy Butler, a sitting Assemblywoman and the 
endorsed candidate of the California Democratic Party, Torie Osborn, a local stalwart of 
the activist community, Richard Bloom, the mayor of Santa Monica, and Brad Torgan, a 
Republican and President of the Los Angeles Log Cabin Republicans.  In a contentious 
and expensive primary, Torie Osborn and Betsy Butler vied for the endorsement of the 
Democratic Party; Butler had moved to the district to run after the redistricting plans 
were announced.  No one quit.  At the end of the primary, less than a thousand votes 
separated first from fourth place.  Butler barely came in first and Bloom snuck into 
second.  In the general election, Bloom defeated Butler by slightly more than a thousand 
votes, although the election totals would not be finalized for almost an entire month (at 
one point, it looked like Bloom led by less than 100 votes).  Any of the three Democrats 
had a reasonable shot at winning the district and the Republican, Torgan, put up a very 
credible effort as well.  
The data from AD50 is relatively well-behaved.  Butler did better in the survey 
than she did in the primary; the survey had her much more clearly in first place.  With 40 
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percent of the respondents unsure, though, it seems that those voters broke against Butler 
in the primary (see Table 4-28).  Osborn and Torgan actually did slightly better in the 
election that the survey would have predicted.  Overall, though, the survey still correctly 
ordered the candidates and did predict a close election.   
Table 4-28: Preferences in AD50 
 
All Respondents 
 Survey % 
Respondents with  
Preferences % 
Election 
 Result % 
Butler (D.) 18 30 25* 
Bloom (D.) 15 25 25* 
Osborn (D.) 14 23 25 
Torgan (R.) 14 23 25 
No Pref. 40 N.A. N.A. 
Total N= 1134 730 *=winner 
 
Butler and Bloom had the best name recognition, with more of the 1134 
respondents in the district giving approval ratings, placing them ideologically, and listing 
their electoral strength (see Table 4-29, below).  Osborn was not far behind, though; she 
also had the highest mean approval rating of the four candidates.  Brad Torgan, the 
Republican, lagged far behind the Democratic candidates in terms of name recognition.  
Osborn was placed farthest left, with Butler and the Bloom.  Torgan was placed as the 
right-most candidate.  Bloom's victory did come as a bit of a surprise; Butler and Osborn 
were actually given the highest average electoral strength. 
Table 4-29:  Rankings and Ratings in AD50 
 
Gave 
Approval 
Rating 
Avg. 
Approval  
Rating 
Gave 
Ideological 
Placement 
Avg. 
Ideological 
Placement 
Gave 
Electoral 
Strength 
Avg. 
Electoral 
Strength 
Butler 647 5.90 523 4.17 579 6.23 
Bloom 667 5.67 532 4.54 592 5.87 
Osborn 621 5.93 491 4.16 551 6.04 
Torgan 386 5.08 254 5.62 317 4.13 
 
Figure 4-20, below, plots the ideological placements for each of the candidates in 
AD50.  The data is, as in the other districts, noisy.  Generally speaking, though, the three 
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Democrats did get higher rankings on the more sensible left side of the scale an Torgan 
got higher ratings on the right side.  Torgan's higher proportion on 5 could reflect both his 
positions–Republicans in favor of gay marriage can rightly be considered moderates–and 
uncertainty about his ideological placement.  On the whole, this figure is much more 
readily interpretable than the similar figure for AD47.     
Figure 4-20: Ideological Placements in AD50 
 
Further Investigation 
 The five districts included in this study effectively demonstrate the potential and 
the limitations of the new top-two primary.  In AD5, a solidly Republican district, elected 
a Republican candidate for office who refused to sign the no-tax pledge over an 
alternative Republican candidate who did.  In AD47, a Democratic candidate managed to 
turn a second place finish in June into a victory in November, pulling away votes from 
the endorsed candidate of the California Democratic Party.  In AD50, a local Democratic 
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politician managed to fend off a better funded and veteran Democrat endorsed by the 
California Democratic Party as well.  For reformers who aimed to elect more “pragmatic” 
candidates, these races look to be promising success stories.  In AD8, though, the 
“establishment” Republican candidate held on in the primary, although he lost in the 
general election.  AD41 proved to show the greatest limitation: the two most extreme 
candidates won the primary producing an uncompetitive general election.  So the top-two 
had its apparent failures as well. 
 Nevertheless, these are just first impressions.  The dataset contains variables that 
are both noisy and complicated.  Furthermore, it contains a great deal of data, as is 
evident from this section.  The tables and figures displayed in this chapter are some of the 
most simplified ways of presenting the information.  The relationships between all of 
these variables can explain a great deal more about the dynamics of the top-two, 
analyzing why it seemed to succeed in its aims in some places and fail in others.  In 
particular, there is much more information contained in the individual self-placements 
and candidate placements than is evident from aggregate statistics.  Since each individual 
interprets and answers the question in their own fashion, more sophisticated analysis is 
required to extract more information about what the voter actually means to say.  The 
remaining chapters making use of this survey data will use a variety of methods to 
analyze what happened and why.   
 
 
“The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men / Often go awry.” —Robert Burns205 
CHAPTER 5: VOTER BEHAVIOR IN CALIFORNIA’S 2012 TOP-TWO PRIMARY 
This chapter puts the 2012 survey to use, analyzing how voters behaved in the 
top-two primary.  The way voters make up their minds affects how well representative 
government aggregates citizens’ true preferences, a fundamental question of democracy.  
At issue in particular is the extent to which voters make strategic calculations.  Are voters 
game theorists or mere truthful reporters?  Early spatial models (like Downs, 1957) 
assumed that voters selected the candidate ideologically closest to them and that 
candidates behaved strategically, choosing a location in the issue space.  In recent years, 
particularly following on Cain’s (1978) research on tactical voting in British elections, a 
small but steady stream of papers addressed strategic behavior by voters.  This chapter’s 
emphasis on what voters do under a particular set of election rules places it at the heart of 
central debates in both the study of institutions and political behavior.   
The study of primary elections provides a particularly appropriate context in 
which to contemplate these important questions.  To some extent, proponents of the top-
two staked their hopes on a particular answer, the answer that voters would make well-
meaning strategic decisions to support electable moderate candidates.  The top-two can 
achieve some success without this strategic behavior, depending on how candidates 
decided to enter the process; with it, though, the top-two would likely produce the result 
its proponents desired.  Opponents to the top-two naturally emphasized a different view: 
voters could also engage in “raiding” (see the introduction to Cain and Gerber 2002), 
voting for candidates in the primary that they thought would lose to a preferred candidate 
                                                          
205
 Burns, Robert.  1785.  "To A Mouse, On Turning Her Up in Her Nest With the Plough."  Available 
online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/arts/robertburns/works/to_a_mouse/ (last accessed 03/04/13).  The line in 
Scots-English is: “Gang aft agley” instead of “Often go Awry,” but that is the translation often used.   
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in the next round or otherwise embarrass the party.  Nor is California the only state in 
which debate over the adjustment of state primary law hinges on the assumptions about 
voter behavior in different institutional environments. 
In this chapter, I focus on two related, but distinct, types of behavior: crossover 
voting and tactical voting.  Imagine a Venn diagram: one can cast a crossover vote 
without casting a tactical vote, a tactical vote without casting a crossover vote, do neither, 
or do both at the same time.  In the most general sense, political scientists define 
crossover voting as a partisan of one party voting for a candidate of another party.  A 
voter casts a tactical vote (or “sophisticated” or “strategic” vote) by voting for a “second-
choice” candidate.  A voter may cast a crossover vote but not a tactical vote or cast a 
tactical vote without crossing over.  In this chapter I investigate both crossover voting 
and tactical voting in California’s first use of the “top-two” primary. 
 The new law explicitly removed barriers to crossover voting and makes an 
emphasis on crossover voting appropriate for this study.  Political scientists have not yet 
settled on a single and precise definition of the term “crossover voting” beyond a general 
sense that it implies candidates getting votes from outside their own party.  Researchers 
face an important choice: what constitutes a partisan?  In states without partisan 
registration that conduct open primaries (like Wisconsin, in which many of these early 
studies took place), researchers defined partisans by their subjective personal party 
identification.  As Wekkin (1988) pointed out, political scientists did this inconsistently: 
some included “independents” as crossover voters while others did not.  In states with 
partisan registration, like California (and approximately half of the other states), 
researchers can choose between subjective party identification and voter registration.  In 
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their study of California’s “blanket primary,” Sides et al.  decided to use party 
identification because it “allows for a deeper analysis of… underlying psychology” (2002 
pp. 78).  In this chapter, I use a different approach and focus on party registration.  While 
the underlying psychology remains interesting, the formal legal change removes barriers 
to participation across registration types.  In this context, a voter “crosses over” if a voter 
registered with one party casts a ballot for a candidate identified with the other party. 
 Voters could engage in tactical voting under the old primary system; the new 
primary system merely provided more opportunities and lowered the costs.  The 
definition of tactical voting does not limit it to primaries or even to American elections.  
A large literature follows the study of tactical voting in British elections; Alvarez and 
Nagler (2000) summarized that literature and noted that estimates of tactical voting 
ranged from five to seventeen percent across British elections from 1980 to 1987 (pp. 
74).  British elections are considerably simpler than American primaries because each 
party advances only one candidate and researchers tend to assume that voters prefer the 
candidate of their own party.  In American primaries, voters are selecting among possibly 
many candidates of their own party; it is possible, then, to cast a within-party tactical 
vote. 
Table 5-1: Intersection of Tactical and Crossover Voting  
Objective for Candidate Candidate Type Own Party Vote Crossover Vote 
Victory First-choice Candidate Sincere Sincere 
Victory Other Choice Candidate Tactical Settling Tactical Settling 
Defeat Other Choice Candidate Hedging? 
(Top-Two Only) 
Tactical Raiding? 
Crossover Hedging? 
 
 The study of tactical voting relates to the study of crossover voting in the context 
of American primaries.  Researchers debate what crossover voters intend their ballots to 
do.  Table 5-1 lays out the relationship between tactical voting and crossover voting.  
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Voters may cross over without casting a tactical vote: if a candidate of the opposing party 
is a first-choice (by some metric) candidate, and a voter crosses over to select that 
candidate, this is still a sincere vote.  Voters may also cast a tactical vote without crossing 
over: a voter may settle for an electable alternative within their own party rather than vote 
for their most preferred, but unelectable, candidate.  There are also two kinds of tactical 
voting that involve crossing over: settling and raiding. 
 The voter’s intentions separate the two kinds of tactical crossover voting.  Voters 
who “settle” want that candidate to win, even if they preferred another candidate more.  
The likely explanation for this behavior is that their most preferred candidate appears 
hopeless, so they are trying to select an acceptable alternative.  Scholars tend to treat this 
behavior as harmless; Gerber and Morton (1998) even included this with sincere 
behavior.  On the other hand, researchers and policymakers tend to express more concern 
about “raiding.”  A “raiding” voter specifically aims to nominate a weak candidate of the 
opposing party; a weak candidate in a (one-dimensional) spatial modeling context is far 
away from the median voter.   
 In the “primary” stage of the top-two, voters have more strategies available to 
them than they do under any other system in current use.  Since the general election can 
feature two candidates of the same party, voters can attempt to engineer outcomes 
impossible with a party primary conducted even under the “blanket primary” rules.  For 
example, a voter could desire a same-party runoff (general election) because this ensures 
a victory of their party in the general; this could be called “hedging.”  This would be a 
strategy to reduce the risk to the party in case the selected candidate did something that 
would produce an unexpected negative shock before the general election.  As The 
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Atlantic noted, “Edwin Edwards -- bon vivant, convicted felon, three-time husband, and 
four-time Louisiana governor -- once cracked that he could only lose an election if he 
was ‘caught in bed with either a dead girl or a live boy.’”206  In politics, stranger things 
have happened.
207
  A voter might like to make sure that someone from their party wins, 
just in case Governor Edwards’s worst case electoral scenario occurred (although some in 
Louisiana might have viewed Edwards as the worst case scenario; see Chapter 2).  This 
could, though, have a similar negative effect as “raiding” – voters could end up 
propelling the candidacy of a politician they do not even like.   
 In American primary elections, the evidence for tactical behavior tends to be 
weaker than the evidence for tactical behavior in British elections.  In part, though, this is 
because researchers investigating American elections tend to look for raiding crossover 
voters – only one subset of tactical behavior.  In examinations of crossover voting in 
California’s blanket primary (in use from 1998 to 2000), Sides et al (2002) and Alvarez 
and Nagler (2002) found little evidence for raiding or settling; most crossover voters 
were apparently sincere.  Those findings reflect the general sense of the earlier literature 
as well.  Abramson et al. (1992) found that tactical voting did take place in the 1988 
presidential primaries; while they too found that most voters did not cast tactical votes, 
they also found that some voters took into account the viability of candidates.   
                                                          
206
 Graham, David A.  2013.  “How Much Trouble is Senator Bob Menendez In?”  The Atlantic.  February 
1.  Posted online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/how-much-trouble-is-senator-
bob-menendez-in/272736/ (last accessed 3/1/13).  The quotation attributed to Edwin Edwards may be 
apocryphal.   
207
 For a recent example of a politician doing or saying something incredibly stupid, recall Todd Akin’s 
remarks: “If it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut the whole thing down.”  This is 
widely believed to have cost him a likely electoral victory in his Senatorial campaign.  See Morre, Lori.  
2012.  “Rep. Todd Akin: The Statement and the Reaction.”  New York Times, August 30.  Available online 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/rep-todd-akin-legitimate-rape-statement-and-
reaction.html?_r=0 (last accessed 3/1/13).      
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 This chapter examines both crossover voting and tactical voting in the top-two 
primary.  The first part focuses on crossover voting, emphasizing one of the literal 
changes in law.  The old law prohibited crossover voting and the new law allows it: how 
much crossover voting took place and why did voters do it?  The first part of this chapter 
pools together all the respondents to analyze their choices in their electoral environment.  
The second part emphasizes the recipient of the vote rather than the type of vote cast; this 
focuses on a district-by-district approach for the five Assembly races studied in the 
survey.  
Crossover Voting: How much, of what type?   
 This section begins with a discussion about interpreting the survey responses.  
The data from the survey, described in the previous chapter, contains a puzzle: crossover 
voting takes place, it takes place apparently sincerely, but it takes place when tactical 
crossover voting would be expected.  Table 5-2, below, details the problem.  Using the 
questions about the ideology (on a liberal to conservative 11 point scale) of the 
candidates and the voter, I can determine which voters intend to vote for an 
(ideologically) first-choice candidate or for some other candidate.  Since the survey 
instrument contains both the party registration of the voter and the party of the candidate, 
I can determine if a voter intends to cross over.  I expected to find more tactical voting 
and then to have the empirical exercise be to determine to what extent those tactical 
crossover voters were “settling” or “raiding.”   
 Each column in Table 5-2 displays the percent of the voters of each registration 
type and the type of candidate they intend to select.  So, taking the first column in the 
first section (Assembly District 5), 23.3 percent of registered Democrats in AD5 intend to 
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Table 5-2: Vote by Ideological Proximity, Party of Candidate, and Party Reg. of Voter
208
 
 
Type and Party of the 
Voter’s Choice 
Dem. 
Reg. 
Voters 
DTS/Ind 
Reg. 
Voters 
Rep. 
Reg. 
Voters 
Third P. 
Reg. 
Voters 
All Reg. 
Voters 
AD5 First Choice (Rep) 23.3 42.8 77.3 60.6 56.3 
 
First Choice (Dem) 45.3 14.8 2.8 6.7 17.2 
 
First Choice (Third) 3.3 5.6 0.8 0.0 2.1 
 
Other Choice (Rep) 3.2 21.4 15.5 0.0 11.9 
 
Other Choice (Dem) 23.1 11.2 1.7 21.7 10.0 
 
Other Choice (Third) 2.0 4.2 1.9 11.1 2.5 
 
N= 200 76 359 25 660 
 
% 100 100 100 100 100 
AD8 First Choice (Rep) 10.7 29.6 64.6 0.0 33.5 
 
First Choice (Dem) 54.4 22.4 6.9 27.5 32.0 
 
First Choice (Third) 1.0 3.7 1.2 10.4 1.6 
 
Other Choice (Rep) 9.9 22.6 21.0 6.3 15.5 
 
Other Choice (Dem) 23.6 20.5 2.5 22.4 15.0 
 
Other Choice (Third) 0.4 1.2 3.9 33.3 2.6 
 
N= 304 63 246 14 627 
 
% 100 100 100 100 100 
AD41 First Choice (Rep) 3.7 22.6 52.4 25.5 23.1 
 
First Choice (Dem) 65.3 38.6 19.0 34.9 45.6 
 
Other Choice (Rep) 4.3 9.9 18.4 14.9 10.1 
 
Other Choice (Dem) 26.8 28.9 10.2 24.7 21.3 
 
N= 308 68 203 18 598 
 
% 100 100 100 100 100 
AD47 First Choice (Rep) 2.0 12.5 26.3 0.0 9.7 
 First Choice (Dem) 67.9 58.7 38.7 100.0 59.6 
 Other Choice (Rep) 2.6 4.2 21.1 0.0 7.7 
 Other Choice (Dem) 27.5 24.6 13.9 0.0 23.0 
 N= 459 94 204 14 771 
 % 100 100 100 0 100 
AD50 First Choice (Rep) 1.7 15.2 35.8 0.0 10.8 
 
First Choice (Dem) 67.6 54.0 31.9 56.4 57.7 
 
Other Choice (Rep) 1.8 6.2 25.9 0.0 7.5 
 
Other Choice (Dem) 28.9 24.7 6.4 43.6 24.0 
 
N= 368 81 129 21 598 
 
% 100 100 100 100 100 
                                                          
208
 Note that this table excludes individuals who did have a candidate preference but did not provide 
sufficient information to create an ideological distance for any of the candidates in that district, including 
their choice.  Nevertheless, this does include respondents who ranked at least on candidate but did not rank 
the candidate of their preference.  This is included as an “other” choice.  A “first” choice in this table is a 
vote for a candidate with no closer alternatives.   
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vote for a “first-choice” candidate who happens to be a Republican.  In AD5, 45.3 
percent of registered Democrats intend to vote for a “first-choice” candidate who happens 
to be a Democrat.  On the other hand, only 3.2 percent of registered Democrats intend to 
vote for a non-first-choice (“other choice”) Republican candidate, while 23.1 percent 
intend to vote for a non-first-choice Democrat.  Very few intend to support the third-party 
candidate (either as a first or other choice). 
 I defined the candidate ideologically closest (so, minimum distance on the 11 
point scale) to the voter as a “first-choice” candidate.  Voters need not have ranked all 
candidates to appear in Table 5-2; in Table 5-2 I merely excluded voters who either had 
no candidate preference or who ranked no candidates at all.  An “other” choice in Table 
5-2 can mean anything from a second-closest ideological candidate to an unranked 
candidate (when some other candidate was ranked).  This simple categorization scheme 
should be sufficient to judge the relative amount of crossover “settling” and “raiding.”  
To get a sense of the quantity of crossover voting, one needs just to look down that 
party’s registration in each district to observe how many voted for a candidate of the 
other party (although, in races with multiple candidates of each party, these votes may 
split across several candidates).  In AD5, 26.5 percent of registered Democrats crossed 
over to vote for a Republican – 23.3 percent for a first-choice and 3.2 percent for some 
other choice.  For Republicans in AD5, 4.5 percent crossed over – 2.8 percent for a first-
choice Democratic candidate and 1.7 percent for some other Democrat.  In AD5, a much 
higher percentage of Democrats crossed over than did Republicans, even if almost all the 
crossover vote went to a first-choice candidate. 
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 Table 5-2 presents quite a puzzle.  While many more Democrats crossed over for 
a first-choice candidate in AD5 than did Republicans, crossover rates are much more 
similar between the parties in AD8.  In AD41, AD47 and AD50, the trend reverses.  
While only 2.8 percent of registered Republicans voted for a first-choice Democratic 
candidate in AD5, in AD8 38.7 percent of Republicans voted for a first-choice 
Democratic candidate.  The district-by-district disparity in “sincere” crossover voters 
seems too large to explain entirely by the positioning of candidates or by district variation 
in the character of partisans.  The trend with sincere crossover voting looks like what one 
would expect, theoretically, to find with settling and raiding crossover voting: the 
quantity of sincere crossover voting appears to vary by strategic context.   
Table 5-3: Crossover Voting by Situation: All Five Districts 
 
Strong Party Majority Party Minority Party 
Voted Party 90.9% 94.3% 65.3% 
Crossed Over 9.2% 5.8% 34.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Includes: AD5 (Rep) AD5 (Rep) AD5(Dem) 
 
AD41 (Dem) AD41 (Dem) AD41(Rep) 
 
AD47 (Dem) AD47 (Dem) AD47 (Rep) 
 
AD50 (Dem) AD50 (Dem) AD50 (Rep) 
 
AD8 (Rep) 
  
 
AD8 (Dem) 
   
 Table 5-3 makes the observation from Table 5-2 more explicit: members of the 
weaker party are much more likely to cross over --- and most of this behavior is reported 
as sincere in Table 5-2.  If truly sincere crossover voting were to vary by district at all, I 
would ex ante have expected it to vary in the opposite way: I expected candidates from 
the weak parties to try to locate near the ideological middle, as they would eventually 
need votes from the other party to win the election.  Instead, the “sincere” crossover 
voters appear to abandon their own, weaker party.  This is, to say the least, suspect, and 
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raises two questions.  First, is this apparent trend just a consequence of the way I have 
used the variables?  Second, are the crossover voters plausibly telling the truth?   
 Note in Table 5-2 that the unexpected results are not confined to the district 
variation in rates of crossover voting; surprisingly many voters also appeared to vote for 
an “other choice” candidate within their own party as well.  For example, in AD5 23.1 
percent of Democrats voted for an “other choice” candidate instead of for a first-choice 
candidate.  Without any strong ex ante reason to believe that either of the Democrats, 
Boyd and Fitzgerald, was an obviously stronger or more conservative candidate (see 
Tables 4-19 and 4-20 in the previous chapter) there seems little reason for within-party 
tactical voting.  Similarly, in AD50, 25.9 percent of Republican voters report voting for 
an “other choice” Republican --- and, yet, there was only one Republican alternative.       
 The way I handled missing data provides part of the answer to this puzzle.  
Respondents had an opportunity to place themselves and the candidates on an ideological 
scale; while nearly all respondents placed themselves and most placed at least one 
candidate, very few placed all of the candidates.  This makes sense: few political 
scientists would be surprised that voters do not know a lot about all the candidates in the 
local legislative races.  To determine if the voter had selected a “first-choice” candidate, I 
computed the ideological distance between the voter and each candidate; if the voter 
selected the candidate he placed closest to his own position, I called this a ‘first-choice’ 
candidate.  When comparing distances, I included unranked candidates in the “other 
choice” category – which had the effect of assigning unranked candidates to an infinitely 
far away distance. 
257 
 
 
 Imagine how this would apply to a Democrat in AD5.  Table 5-4 shows the actual 
data from eight Democratic voters in AD5.  My coding scheme would show the first 
voter, ID 100001, as a sincere crossover voter, with Oller as the voter's first-choice.  
Voter 100001 did not give rankings for most of the candidates but this result still appears 
sensible as at least the self-placement and candidate placement are the same and the voter 
knows something about the selected candidate.  Voter 100002 gave the ideal (from the 
perspective of a researcher) responses: every candidate got a unique placement.  These 
are also very reasonable placements; Fitzgerald, a former member of the Green Party, is 
assigned a more liberal value than Boyd, the endorsed candidate of the Democratic Party.  
Voter 100002 voted for a first-choice Democratic candidate, Fitzgerald.  Voter 100003 
did not give a response for Boyd but the coding scheme still produces a reasonable result: 
a sincere own-party vote for Fitzgerald.     
Table 5-4:  Ideological Placements, Selected Registered Democratic Voters from AD5
209
 
 
ID Bigelow Oller Lancaster Boyd Fitzgerald Self Vote 
100001 m 5 m m m 5 Oller 
100002 7 9 8 4 2 1 Fitzgerald 
100003 6 8 5 m 5 5 Fitzgerald 
100004 0 m m m m 10 Fitzgerald 
100005 5 5 5 5 5 5 Boyd 
100006 7 m m 5 m 5 Bigelow 
100007 5 m m 5 4 5 Fitzgerald 
100008 8 10 m m m 6 Oller 
 
Not all voters gave such easily interpretable responses; some responses either 
contain apparent errors or very little information.  Voter 100004 appears to have reversed 
the scale (giving Bigelow a most liberal rating and giving a self-placement of most 
                                                          
209
 “m” = missing; the ID numbers are the individual ID number in the survey results as provided by 
YouGov/Polimetrix.  I did not include placements for the third-party candidate Belden in this table.  A 
placement of “0” is “most liberal” and “10” is “most conservative.”    
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conservative, while voting for the former Green Party candidate).  My coding scheme 
would have Bigelow listed as the first-choice since Bigelow is the only candidate rated; 
so this voter selected an “other choice.”  Voter 100005, on the other hand, shows a 
different problem: this voter just gave the same answer to all the questions.  My scheme 
would have Boyd as a first-choice candidate, but this is almost entirely uninformative.        
The last three voters in Table 5-4 pose a different kind of problem.  These voters 
may be tactical voters or nonsensical voters.  Voter 100006 appears to cast a tactical vote 
for Bigelow; nevertheless, without rankings for Oller or Lancaster, it is difficult to judge 
if this is a settling vote or a raiding vote.  Voter 100007's vote for Fitzgerald makes little 
ideological sense at all: Boyd and Bigelow are at the voter's ideal point while Fitzgerald 
is not.  Since Bigelow had a better chance to win, a voter for Bigelow might have made 
more ideological and tactical sense.  Voter 100008 appears to cast a raiding crossover 
vote for Oller, since Bigelow is ideologically closer.  Nevertheless, conclusions about 
voter 100008 would be easier to draw if the voter also ranked the Democrats.   
 Respondents did not miss giving ideological placements randomly.  Table 5-5 
presents the data on missing candidate placements, separated by district and by the party 
of the candidate.  Each column in Table 5-5 splits those results by the voter’s party 
registration type, showing the percent that missed each number of candidates.  For 
example, in AD5, 17 percent of registered Democrats missed no Republican candidates 
while 19 percent of registered Republicans missed no Republican candidates.  In general, 
voters did better placing candidates of their own party than candidates of the other party.  
However, voters also appear to have done better placing candidates in areas of their own 
party’s strength.   
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 In AD5, the Target Book framed the primary as a contest to see if a Democrat 
could make the November ballot at all.  In that district, 59 percent of registered 
Republicans missed one or less ideological placements for Republican candidates; 40 
percent missed one and 19 percent missed zero.  In contrast, 63 percent of registered 
Democrats missed one or less placements, with 36 percent missing one and 27 percent 
missing zero.  While that may appear to show Democrats as better informed, the 
implication would be misleading: Republicans had three candidates and Democrats only 
two.  One of the Republican candidates was clearly hopeless; the better comparison is 
between the 10 percent of Republicans who could not rank any candidates of their own 
party and the 37 percent of Democrats who could not rank any candidates of their party.  
The “first-choice” versus “other choice” coding scheme used in Table 5-2, for example, 
is the most problematic when voters do not rank any candidates of their own party 
 AD47 and AD50, the safest Democratic seats, show the trend from the other 
perspective.  In AD47, both Republican candidates were beyond hopeless: 47 percent of 
Republicans could rank neither.  Both Democratic candidates, though, had a reasonable 
shot at winning the election and the ideological rankings reflected this; only 5 percent of 
Democrats did not rank both of the Democratic candidates.  In AD50, more than half (54 
percent) of registered Republicans could not rank their only candidate, Brad Torgan.  In 
fact, 43 percent of Republicans in AD50 ranked either all or all but one of the Democratic 
candidates while only 46 percent ranked Torgan.  On the Democratic side, only 14 
percent of Democrats ranked none of their own party candidates. 
 Separating voters based on the information they provided about their selected 
candidate clarifies the picture.  Table 5-6 shows some of the detail missing from the 
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Table 5-5: Missing Candidate Ideological Positions by Party and by Voter Registration 
Dist. Type # Dem DTS Rep 3rd Total 
AD5 Missing Republican 0 17 30 19 37 20 
 Candidates 1 26 27 40 30 33 
  2 32 30 31 32 31 
  3 25 13 10 0 15 
 
Missing Democratic 0 27 34 19 30 23 
 Candidates 1 36 17 17 30 24 
  2 37 49 64 39 53 
  N = 240 85 398 25 747 
AD8 Missing Republican 0 13 22 19 34 17 
 Candidates 1 9 9 16 4 11 
  2 18 25 25 3 21 
  3 23 19 30 21 25 
  4 37 25 11 38 26 
 
Missing Democratic 0 71 56 58 54 64 
 Candidates 1 29 44 42 46 36 
  N = 370 77 278 22 748 
AD41 Missing Republican 0 27 36 27 51 29 
 Candidates 1 19 28 35 8 25 
  2 54 36 37 41 46 
 
Missing Democratic 0 40 37 26 15 34 
 Candidates 1 26 24 20 25 24 
  2 21 23 27 22 23 
  3 12 15 28 37 19 
  N = 342 76 245 23 686 
AD47 Missing Republican 0 32 32 30 0 31 
 Candidates 1 13 11 23 23 16 
  2 55 56 47 77 54 
 
Missing Democratic 0 58 52 51 23 55 
 Candidates 1 38 38 40 77 39 
  2 5 10 9 0 6 
  N = 480 104 221 14 819 
AD50 Missing Republican 0 23 29 46 36 30 
 Candidates 1 77 71 54 64 70 
 
Missing Democratic 0 41 28 31 58 37 
 Candidates 1 24 28 12 25 22 
  2 21 20 21 5 20 
  3 14 23 36 12 21 
  N = 424 103 180 23 730 
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overview table, Table 5-2, for Republican and Democratic registrants and candidates.  
This table also includes the respondents who gave no rankings at all but specified a vote 
choice.  In addition, I divided “first-choice” selections into those who made a comparison 
with at least one candidate from the other party and those who did not.  These categories 
help separate out who casts a “first-choice” – or apparently sincere – crossover vote while 
knowing something about their own party’s candidates and who casts a “first-choice” 
crossover vote while unable to place their own party’s candidates.  A voter has a much 
stronger case for consideration as a sincere crossover voter if the crossover first-choice 
vote comes with an own-party ranking.  Similarly, the data as formulated in Table 5-6 
better distinguishes between clear second-choice candidates and candidates who are 
“other choices” by default, as voters select an unranked candidate.  This helps separate 
more likely tactical behavior from blind party-line voting.    
In AD5, seven percent of the registered Democrats intended to vote for a third-
party candidate; I did not analyze in this table the details of third-party choice.  Seven 
percent of Democratic voters crossed over to vote for a “first-choice” Republican 
candidate, having ranked a Democratic candidate; 13 percent crossed over to vote for a 
Republican candidate without ranking a Democrat.  In the other direction, 29 percent of 
Democrats voted for a Democrat while ranking a Republican while 9 percent voted for a 
Democrat without ranking any Republicans.  Eight percent of Democrats are actually 
selecting a Democratic candidate as a second-choice (having ranked their choice and 
ranked some other candidate closer), and two percent are voting for a third or later (4
th
, 
5
th
, or 6
th
) place Democratic candidate – having placed either the nonpartisan candidate 
or one of the Republican candidates closer to their own position.  Among registered 
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Democrats, 10 percent intended to vote for a Democratic candidate that they did not rank 
(while ranking some other candidates) and 12 percent intended to vote for a Democratic 
candidate (without ranking any candidates).  
Table 5-6: More Detail: Choice Type by Registration and District, Col. %.
210
   
 
AD5  
Reg. 
AD8  
Reg. 
AD41 
Reg. 
AD47 
Reg. 
AD50 
Reg. 
Choice Type (Party) D. R. D. R. D. R. D. R. D. R.  
3
rd
  Party Candidate 7 3 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
First-choice (Rep); Rank (D) 7 23 7 32 2 34 2 24 1 26 
First-choice (Dem); Rank 
(R) 29 2 27 5 25 5 22 11 12 9 
First-choice (Rep); NR (D) 13 47 2 26 1 9 0 0 0 0 
First-choice (Dem); NR (R) 9 0 19 1 34 11 43 25 46 14 
Second Choice (Rep) 3 12 5 11 2 7 0 8 0 7 
Second Choice (Dem) 8 0 9 1 15 6 18 9 18 2 
Third/Later Choice (Rep) 0 1 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 2 
Third/Later Choice (Dem) 2 0 4 1 6 1 4 2 4 2 
Unranked (Rep); Ranks 0 1 1 4 1 7 1 11 1 10 
Unranked (Dem); Ranks 10 1 7 0 3 1 4 2 3 1 
Unranked (Rep); No Ranks 2 8 2 9 0 15 0 6 1 24 
Unranked (Dem); No Ranks 12 0 14 0 10 3 4 1 13 5 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total N =  240 398 370 278 342 245 480 221 424 180 
 
Note that we cannot conclude that all “first-choice” crossover votes without own-
party rankings are truly tactical crossover votes.  That is one possible interpretation, 
which likely applies to some of these votes.  The alternative explanation is that voters 
remain rationally uninformed about candidates they have no intention of selecting: if I 
know I prefer Republican candidates, and I intend to vote sincerely, why should I 
investigate the ideological placement of Democrats?  For the registered Democratic 
                                                          
210
 “3rd Party Candidate:” Voting for an any-place 3rd party or nonpartisan candidate; “First Choice:” 
Closest ideological candidate; Rank (D) means at least one Democrat ranked; Rank (R) means at least one 
Republican ranked; NR (D) means no Democratic candidates ranked while NR (R) means no Republican 
candidates ranked; “Second Choice:” Second closest ideological candidate; “Third/Later Choice:” Third, 
fourth, fifth, or sixth ideologically closest candidate; “Unranked:”  Ranked other candidates, voting for an 
unranked candidate; “Ranks” means some other candidates of any party were ranked and “No Ranks” 
means no other candidates were ranked. 
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“first-choice” voters for Democratic candidates in AD5, 29 percent ranked a Republican 
and 9 percent did not rank a Republican candidate.  For the registered Democratic “first-
choice” crossover voters for Republican candidates in AD5, 7 percent ranked a Democrat 
and 13 percent did not rank a Democratic candidate.  The ratios are different, which is 
suggestive, but we would not interpret all Democratic first-choice Democratic votes 
without Republican rankings as ‘truly’ second place Democratic votes, so it does not 
make sense to interpret all Democratic first-choice Republican votes without Democratic 
rankings as ‘truly’ second place Republican votes either.   
Some fraction of the apparent first-choice crossover votes probably does not 
really represent first-choice preferences.  If the voters know that their own party is 
hopeless, they may not bother to find out much about their own candidates even though 
they would prefer it if one of those candidates won; in that sense, there may be hidden 
tactical voters in that category.  Note, though, that the context-dependent quantity of first-
choice crossover voting remains evident in Table 5-6, even if it is restricted to those who 
ranked a candidate of their own party.  In AD5, 7 percent of Democrats crossed over for a 
first-choice Republican while still ranking a Democrat; only 2 percent of Republicans 
similarly crossed over.  In AD41, 5 percent of Republicans crossed over to select a first-
choice Democrat even after ranking Republicans; only 2 percent of Democrats crossed 
over after ranking Democratic candidates.  In AD47, 11 percent of Republicans selected a 
‘first-choice’ Democrat after ranking a Republican; only 2 percent of Democrats crossed 
over after ranking a Democrat.  In AD50, 9 percent of Republicans crossed over in this 
category while only 1 percent of Democrats did.  The trend is not wholly measurement 
error due to the way I handled missing, then.  And, if even half of the apparently sincere 
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crossover voters who did not rank members of their own party actually represent sincere 
crossover votes, this trend would remain in place and be electorally significant --- at least 
in AD50, a race decided by less than 1000 votes. 
Some of the observed fact – sincere crossover vote rates vary prima facie by 
electoral context – could also be the result of deliberate or unknowing falsification of 
underlying preferences by the voter.  Voters did answer the question about their vote 
intention first and about ideological placement second; it is possible that a voter felt 
pressure from the interviewer to have the ideological placements match their stated 
voting preferences.  Since several other questions intervened and the interviewer never 
explicitly tied the question to a spatial model interpretation, the risk of intentional lying is 
about as small as it could be with a self-reporting system.  It is more likely that a voter, 
through a psychological process, could perceive the candidate they intend to vote for as 
closer to them; that is, choice could precede and cause perception rather than perception 
preceding and causing choice.           
Regardless, the curious fact remains: very little crossover voting is overtly 
“tactical,” yet most crossover voting takes place in a pattern consistent with voters 
making tactical calculations.  While some of this may be the result of the way I handled 
missing data, certainly not all of it is.  Nevertheless, the ‘curious fact’ produces a set of 
easily testable hypotheses, using this intuition: on one hand, to the extent that tactical 
considerations drive the crossover voting, crossover voting should be a function of the 
election’s strategic environment from the voter’s perspective.  On the other hand, to the 
extent that crossover voting is sincere as reported, crossover voting should be a function 
of plausible characteristics involved in finding a candidate of another party attractive.  
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The next section of this chapter aims to establish the extent the apparently sincere 
crossover voting is credibly sincere.   
Crossover Voting: Pragmatic Sincerity (One Approach) 
 What motivates crossover voters?  This section focuses on the 3163 (weighted) 
respondents who satisfy three conditions necessary for crossover analysis: they are 
registered partisans, likely voters, and have preferences among candidates.  In this 
population in total, across both parties and all five districts, a little more than 16 percent 
(513 of 3163) of the voters crossed over.  As mentioned earlier, though, these crossover 
voters are concentrated by party and by district.  The main model in this section uses a 
simple binary probit to study a simple choice: does the voter cross over and vote for a 
candidate of the other party or ‘stay home’ and vote within their own party?  To analyze 
why voters might make this choice, I included in the model five different types of 
variables representing five broad hypotheses. 
 I first hypothesize that demographic information should not help explain 
crossover voting.  I include three different demographic categories, as shown in Table 5-
7.  These categories cover age, gender, and race.  While there are plausible stories to tell 
about how each of these could affect the decision to cross over, I do not have strong 
expectations for any of them.  The first line of Table 5-7 shows that 16 percent of all 
voters crossed over.  Of those voters over age 65, 15 percent crossed over.  For women, 
16 percent crossed over.  For whites, 15 percent crossed over.  These variables remain in 
the model for two reasons: first, the absence of a race result, in particular, informs 
concerns about voting rights; second, since some readers may have expectations over 
these variables, including them builds confidence in the overall result. 
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Table 5-7: Bivariate Statistics for Partisans (Weighted Row Percent); Used for Main 
Binary Probit 
Variable 
Own Party 
Vote 
Crossover 
Vote 
Baseline 84 16 
Over 65 85 15 
Female 84 16 
White 85 15 
College or Graduate Degree 85 15 
# Correct Politician IDs (Range: 0-4):  Identified 1 83 17 
# Correct Politician IDs (Range: 0-4): Identified 3 87 13 
# Political Activities (Range: 0-7): Did 1 82 18 
# Political Activities (Range: 0-7): Did 6 89 11 
Agreement with Party on Issues (Range: -4, 4): score-3 50 50 
Agreement with Party on Issues (Range: -4, 4): score 0 78 22 
Agreement with Party on Issues (Range -4, 4): score 3 94 6 
Self-Reported Party ID Does not Match Registration 33 67 
Minority Party, Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 49 51 
Minority Party, No Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 73 27 
Minority Party, Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 58 42 
Minority Party, No Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 98 2 
Strong Party, Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 35 65 
Strong Party, No Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 75 25 
Strong Party, Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 87 13 
AD5 84 16 
AD8 83 17 
AD41 84 16 
AD47 81 19 
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 Second, I hypothesize that political knowledge and engagement should predict 
crossover voting.  These variables are not contest-specific.  The contest-specific 
information appears in the ratings of candidates’ ideology and electability.  Instead, with 
these variables, I attempt to measure political knowledge more broadly.  I expect that 
greater political knowledge should increase the desire and capability to engage in 
strategic political behavior.  As a base measure of potential political knowledge, I include 
a binary variable to indicate if the respondent has a four-year college or graduate school 
degree.  I also include the number of political figures correctly identified and the number 
of political activities (discussed in the previous chapter).  Table 5-7 shows that there are 
at least differences in information and activities in crossover voting; the multivariate 
analysis will help determine if this is a distinct effect from the contest-specific 
information.   
 Both the first and second set of variables cover general characteristics of the 
voter; the third hypothesis gets right to the heart of the crossover debate.  I hypothesize 
that crossover voters should display some evidence of sincerity, since most crossover 
voters (as described in the previous section) appear to vote for a “first-choice” ideological 
candidate.  I use two measures: first, I use the issue scale (discussed in the previous 
chapter) built on four questions, questions about the budget, immigration preferences, gay 
marriage, and abortion.  I have multiplied the issue scale by negative one for Democrats, 
to make it into a party-neutral scale in which a score of “4” indicates full agreement with 
the voter’s party on all four issues and “-4” indicates complete agreement with the other 
party on all four issues.  A neutral position on all four issues would produce a score of 
“0,” as does a balance of agreement and disagreement.  Second, the survey asked voters 
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about their subjective party identification and acquired their party registration from the 
voting list; I include a dummy variable for if the subjective party ID does not match the 
voter registration.  That would give the respondent a very credible claim to a sincere 
crossover vote; if they now identify with the party receiving their vote, it is a crossover 
vote only in the legal sense (and not in the way Sides et al. 2002 defined crossover 
voting).  These variables, listed in Table 5-7, do appear likely to significantly affect 
crossover voting; 67 percent of those without a registration-PID match crossed over and 
50 percent of voters with major disagreements with their own party crossed over.
211
  In 
the multivariate results, these variables account for an independent effect of strength of 
partisanship, distinct from their judgment about candidates (which can also include 
components of partisanship).  That is, this is the effect of partisanship outside the spatial 
modeling context.           
 Fourth, I hypothesize that the voter’s specific circumstances drive crossover 
voting.  These variables capture the spatial modeling concepts and the notion that voters 
should rationally abandon hopeless causes.  This model combines three aspects of each 
voter’s situation into a single situational variable.  The variables included in the model 
are listed in Table 5-7 and the details of each are listed in Table 5-8, below, including the 
category excluded category.  Since the trend, on its face, was for members of the weaker 
of the Republican and Democratic parties (the “minority party,” in contrast to the party 
holding the majority in the district) to cross over more frequently, one component of 
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 50 percent might seem small for that level of disagreement – but the issue scale treats all four issues 
equally and therefore does not account for salience.  Nor is this an exhaustive list of issue areas.  Imagine a 
Republican who favors strong forward national defense (not asked) and wants large spending cuts for small 
tax increases – but who is otherwise socially liberal (abortion, gay marriage) and wants a solution to the 
immigration problem beyond enforcement.  There are not many people who fall in this category – but, of 
those that do, it is plausible that some would stay within the Republican Party.    
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these variables is an indicator of whether the voter belongs to the minority party.  I 
identified the minority party as the Republicans in AD41, 47, and 50 and the Democrats 
in AD5; in AD8, since both parties were within a point of each other in registration, I 
counted both parties as “strong parties.”  The other two variables capture the voter’s 
perspective: does the voter perceive an ideologically close alternative in the other party 
and does the voter perceive their own candidate to be weak?        
Table 5-8: Situational Crossover Voting 
Type of Voter (By Their Perceived Situation) 
Percent 
of Voters 
Percent of 
Type that 
Crosses 
Over 
Percent of 
X-Over 
Voters of 
Each Type 
Minority Party, Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 15 42 38 
Strong Party, Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 22 13 18 
Minority Party, Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 5 51 16 
Strong Party, Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 3 65 13 
Strong Party, No Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 46 3 8 
Minority Party, No Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 3 27 5 
Strong Party, No Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 1 25 2 
Minority Party, No Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 5 2 1 
Total 100 16 100 
 
   While the minority party component of these variables has no missing data at all, 
the other two variables roll in the missing data problems for both the questions about 
candidate ideology and candidate strength.  The “close alternative” variable has very 
permissive rules about missing data.  To count as having a “close alternative” from the 
other party, the voter (1) did not rank any candidates at all (2) ranked candidates of the 
other party but not of their own or (3) ranked a candidate of the other party as close or 
closer than a candidate of their own.  This is similar to the way I coded “first-choice” 
candidates, with the exception that it also allows an unranked candidate from a 
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completely unranked field to be ideologically close.
212
  With the probability of winning 
question (candidate strength), the voter must have explicitly ranked a candidate of their 
own party below a candidate of the other party.  If the voter does not give a strength 
score, I did not count this as identifying their own candidate as weak, nor did it count if 
the voter only gave scores to the other party (although this is likely a reasonable 
inference).
213
  Overall, a voter who provided no rankings of either kind would be 
considered to have acceptable alternatives but a strong candidate of their own party.      
 I combined these three variables – member of the minority party, having an 
ideologically close alternative, and having a weak candidate – into eight dummy 
variables.  The excluded category in the probit analysis is the category with the strategic 
situation which provides the weakest incentives for crossover voting intended to aid the 
candidate receiving the vote: strong party, no close alternative, and a strong candidate.  
The group with the greatest incentive to cross over, excluding raiding or hedging, would 
be voters from the minority party with a close alternative and a weak candidate.   
No significant effect for these situational variables, in combination with an effect 
for the other measures of partisanship, would suggest that voters ignore strategic 
                                                          
212
 Voter ID#4483, a Republican in AD50 did not rank any of the candidates ideologically and ranked 
himself as an 8; since the voter does not perceive anything about ideological distances, these are treated all 
the same and the Democrats are considered acceptable alternatives.  Voter ID#4633, another Republican 
from AD50, carries this logic to its most extreme conclusion: the voter ranked all three Democrats as 0, or 
very liberal, and himself as 10, very conservative.  However, because this voter did not rank Brad Torgan, 
the one Republican, the three Democratic candidates all perceived as acceptable alternatives.  Republican 
voter ID# 4607 illustrates the reverse of this principle: she did not rank any of the three Democratic 
candidates but did rank Brad Torgan, the Republican; the Democrats are not considered acceptable 
alternatives.   
213
 To make a concrete example, consider the case of ID#5587, a registered Republican in AD50.  This 
voter gave one of the three Democratic candidates a candidate strength score of "5" and did not give a 
response for the other candidates.  This voter did not explicitly say that the Republican (Brad Torgan) was a 
weaker candidate than any of the three Democrats, so I did not score this as a perception of a weak 
candidate.  In contrast, consider the Republican with ID#5613.  This voter gave all three Democrats in 
AD50 a score of 6 and the one Republican candidate a score of 4; in this case, I take it as a clear signal that 
the voter believes the Republican candidate is weaker and I treat it as such. 
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considerations and just cast votes based on their own strength of partisanship.  A 
significant effect for the strategic variables and no effect for the partisanship variables 
would suggest that voters respond to their strategic situation without an independent 
effect of partisanship.  That is, ideological distance might play a role in the strategic 
calculus but, controlling for ideological distance and other factors, partisanship has no 
effect.     
The fifth set of variables includes district controls, comparing each district to 
AD50.  A50 turned out to be the closest race – the race in which crossover voters had the 
highest chance of casting the deciding vote.  I do expect AD8 to have a slightly higher 
rate of crossover voting that the other districts because I did not code either party as the 
minority party in AD8.  Otherwise, I do not expect there to be large differences by 
district; if there were, it would indicate that I had failed to capture an important 
characteristic.  This is especially important as these districts do represent quite different 
populations.    
The results support the hypotheses that partisanship and strategic situations both 
play a role in crossover voting; there is little evidence of demographic, information, or 
district effects.  Table 5-9 contains the results of the main model, including reported first 
differences for changes to the otherwise median individual.  None of the demographic 
variables are statistically significant, nor are the information variables; the absence of a 
result for the information variables does not mean that informational characteristics are 
meaningless, just that any differences in information are better captured by other 
variables.  As expected, there is a small result for AD8 – but no consequence for any of 
the other district controls. 
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Table 5-9: Binary Probit: Did partisan voters cast crossover votes?   
Variable Coef. T-Stat. First Diff. 
Over 65 -0.06 -0.79 
 Female -0.08 -1.13 
 White 0.01 0.17 
 College or Graduate Degree 0.07 0.89 
 # Correct Politician IDs (0-4)  0.00 0.06 
 # Political Activities (0-7) 0.02 1.08 
 Agreement with Party on Issues (-4, 4) -0.16 -7.87 0.02
† 
Self-Reported Party ID Does not Match Registration 1.55 16.11 0.18 
Minority Party, Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 1.87 13.11 0.28 
Minority Party, No Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 1.29 7.22 0.12 
Minority Party, Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 1.70 15.91 0.22 
Minority Party, No Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 0.18 0.74 
 Strong Party, Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 1.95 10.63 0.31 
Strong Party, No Close Alternative, Weak Candidate 1.09 4.01 0.09 
Strong Party, Close Alternative, Strong Candidate 0.63 5.97 0.03 
AD5 0.22 1.77 
 AD8 0.49 3.69 0.02 
AD41 0.14 1.14 
 AD47 0.18 1.37 
 †This reflects a change from “2” to “-2”; that is, from moderate agreement to moderate 
disagreement.   
N= 3163.  First differences computed using Clarify by setting other x values to their 
median and altering that variable from “0” to “1.”  Median values: A white woman under 
the age of 65, with less than a college degree, two correct politician IDs, performing 2 
different political activities, scoring a +1 on the partisan issue scale, and facing a situation 
of: majority party, no credible alternative candidate, and a strong own-party candidate.    
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The strategic situation variables have a large effect.  A voter from the minority 
party, with a close or at least equal ideological alternative in a strong party, and known 
weak candidate, is 28 percentage points more likely to cross over than an otherwise 
median individual from a strong party, with no close alternative, and a strong (or strong 
by default) candidate.  A voter from a strong party but who otherwise perceives their 
situation similarly (close alternative, weak candidate) is 31 percentage points more likely 
to cross over.  That is, the voters with the best incentives to either vote sincerely or settle 
for a candidate of the other party – do.  The other minority party categories also have 
significant effects, except for those who do not perceive a close alternative but do not 
acknowledge weaknesses in their own party candidates; those voters are no more likely to 
cross over than voters from a strong party with the same characteristics. 
Note the order of the magnitude of the effects for the four minority party types.  
The largest effect, 28 percentage points, is for the group with both a close alternative and 
a specifically noted weak candidate.  The next largest effect, 22 percentage points, is for 
those with a close alternative but a ‘strong’ candidate; recall, though, that the permissive 
coding of this variable would designate a voter’s party as having a strong candidate if the 
voter merely failed to rank all candidates of their own party (a very, very weak standard).  
The third largest effect, 12 percentage points, is for a voter with no close alternative and a 
weak candidate: that is, despite the recognition the voter is in the frying pan, the voter has 
no desire to jump into the fire.  A minority voter with no close alternative but a strong 
candidate had no effect at all; this voter has no desire to jump into the fire and is not even 
sure that she is in the frying pan.  Voters seem to pragmatically respond to their situations 
by crossing over when it is sensible to do so. 
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Despite the evidence for some kind of pragmatic behavior, there seems to be an 
independent effect of partisanship that demonstrates some aspect of sincerity as well.  
Voters who are registered with the party they no longer prefer are unsurprisingly likely to 
cross over; the 18 percentage point first difference is for an otherwise median individual.  
Note that this is independent of their perception; these voters are more likely to “go 
home” to the party they prefer than other voters who perceive the strategic situation 
identically.  The party issue scale variable also has a significant effect; individuals who 
agree less with their party are more likely to cross over to vote. 
Figure 5-1: Interpreting the Issue Scale Results 
 
 
The first difference for the issue scale may be misleading.  It shows the percent 
difference in crossover probability for an individual with the baseline characteristics to 
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Scale of Agreement on Four Issues: 4 is complete agreement with "Most 
Partisan" of Respondent's own party and -4 is agreement with "Most Partisan" 
of the other party.    
Strong Party, No Close Alternative, Strong Candidate
Minor Party, Close Alternative of Other Party, No Strong Own Party Candidate
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cross over if that voter goes from a score of “2” to “-2.”  The baseline individual, though, 
has the excluded strategic characteristics: strong party, no close alternative, and a strong 
candidate.  That is, for a person otherwise unlikely to cross over, differences in issue 
preferences have a very modest effect.  Figure 1shows that the size of this effect is much 
more meaningful for voters who are already likely to cross over.  The lighter dotted lines 
in Figure 5-1 represent the 95 percent confidence intervals --- these two lines are really 
quite different.  For those likely to cross over, issue divergence has a bigger effect.   
Given the evidence both for an independent issue or partisanship effect and an 
independent strategic situation effect, I conclude by observing that crossover voters 
exhibit “pragmatic sincerity.”  There are just aspects of both notions present in the 
results.  Furthermore, both major findings – for individual partisanship and voter situation 
– help make this model a reasonably good predictor of voter behavior.  Likelihood ratio 
tests on more restricted models (dropping off either the strategic situation variables or the 
partisanship and issue variables) indicate that the full model fits significantly better than 
either of the restricted models (at p=.001).  Additionally, the model correctly predicts the 
outcome for 90% of the respondents; it falsely predicts less than 3% of the time that 
voters who stayed with their party would cross over and correctly identifies about half of 
the less numerous crossover voters.
214
       
The potential power of crossover voters is greatly limited by the diffusion of their 
efforts, though.  The variables used for the calculations presented in Table 5-9 use two 
key measures from the perspective of the voter: the viability of the candidates and the 
ideological proximity of the candidates to the voter.  While those results are very strong, 
the voters all have different perspectives.  Table 5-10 shows the percent of each  
                                                          
214
 Estimated using STATA’s “estat classification” post-estimation procedure.   
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Table 5-10: Crossover Voting, Candidates, and Election Results 
  
Survey Results 
Election 
Results 
District Candidate Name 
Row % 
of Vote: 
Other 
Row % 
of Vote: 
Partisan 
X-Over 
Number 
X-Over 
Number 
Voters 
Col. 
% of 
Vote 
Col. % 
of Vote 
AD5 Bigelow (R.) 84.9 15.1 34 225 30.1 28.9 
 
Oller (R.) 91.6 8.5 30 233 31.2 33.4 
 
Lancaster (R.) 89.5 10.5 4 36 4.8 2.1 
 
Boyd (D.) 95.0 5.0 6 114 15.3 13.5 
 
Fitzgerald (D.) 88.9 11.1 11 97 13.0 18.0 
 
Belden (NPP.) 29.6 70.4 29 41 5.5 4.1 
 
Total 86.2 13.8 103 747 100 100 
AD8 Cooley (D.) 93.5 6.5 23 363 48.5 42.7 
 
Flynn (R.) 79.5 20.5 11 52 6.9 6.4 
 
Tateishi (R.) 86.9 13.1 20 156 20.8 22.9 
 
Ortega (R.) 70.8 29.2 38 129 17.2 20.6 
 
Tufi (R.) 86.4 13.6 2 11 1.5 3.1 
 
Bonser (Lib.) 48.7 51.3 19 37 5.0 4.4 
 
Total 84.9 15.1 113 748 100 100 
AD41 Holden (D.) 89.7 10.3 22 211 30.8 29.1 
 
Cacciotti (D.) 83.0 17.0 16 97 14.1 15.5 
 
Rusnak (D.) 79.9 20.1 28 142 20.7 13.8 
 
Lowe (R.) 92.5 7.5 9 126 18.3 23.7 
 
Colton (R.) 86.1 13.9 15 111 16.1 18 
 
Total 86.7 13.3 91 686 100 100 
AD47 Baca (D.) 83.9 16.1 76 474 57.9 42.2 
 
Brown (D.) 82.3 17.7 34 191 23.4 28.9 
 
Ensley (R.) 88.0 12.0 11 93 11.4 22.4 
 
Beach (R.) 80.3 19.7 12 60 7.3 6.5 
 
Total 83.8 16.2 133 819 100 100 
AD50 Butler (D.) 94.5 5.5 12 216 29.6 25.9 
 
Bloom (D.) 84.2 15.8 29 181 24.9 25.6 
 
Osborn (D.) 90.1 9.9 17 168 23.0 24.2 
 
Torgan (R.) 90.1 9.9 16 165 22.6 24.3 
 
Total 89.9 10.1 74 730 100 100 
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candidate’s vote share made up of partisan crossover voters, the distribution of crossover 
voters across candidates, and the election results (both as measured in this survey and the 
final actual election results).  The crossover voters in all of these elections failed to 
coordinate (within each party) on a single candidate when a party had multiple 
alternatives.  While in some close races even a slight preference by crossover voters for 
one candidate would be enough to change the outcome, the difficulty of coordinating 
does temper the effect of crossover voting somewhat – especially in races with large 
numbers of candidates.   
 AD8 provides an example of a case where Democratic crossover voters failed to 
coordinate to change the outcome.  Registered Republicans had a clear candidate 
preference: Peter Tateishi, the former Chief of Staff to longtime Republican politician 
Dan Lungren.  Amongst registered Republicans (of whom 66.1% expressed a candidate 
preference), 29.2% preferred Tateishi while only 17.6% preferred his closest Republican 
rival, Barbara Ortega.
215
  In the survey results, Tateishi bested Ortega for the second spot 
in the top-two by only 3.6%; in the actual election, the results were even closer: only a 
2.3% gap separated Tateishi from Ortega.  If the crossover voters had managed to 
coordinate on Ortega, they might have switched the outcome.  Of the 113 crossover 
voters in this study in AD8, 71 were Democrats who voted for one of the four Republican 
candidates.  While Ortega got the largest share of these, 38 or 53%, a large fraction 
spread out across the remaining Republicans, including 20 to Tateishi.  If Ortega could 
have secured all the crossover votes, she would have won.  Nevertheless, she did not and 
the two candidates who reached the top-two represent the candidate preferred by the 
                                                          
215
 For a full table of candidate preferences by party registration, see Appendix 1.    
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majority of Democrats (Cooley) and the candidate preferred by the majority of 
Republicans (Tateishi).   
 The race in which crossover voting made the largest difference, somewhat 
ironically, also had the least crossover voting: the very close contest in AD50.  Registered 
Democrats in the survey had a clear preference for Butler with Osborn second and Bloom 
in a close third.
216
  Since the district is heavily Democratic, in a more traditional semi-
closed primary, Butler would likely have easily won the Democratic primary and then 
easily go on to win the general election.  In this case, though, Bloom secured half of the 
crossover Republican votes (29 of 58).  While almost 16% of Bloom’s vote came from 
crossover votes, his rivals for 2
nd
 place – the Democrat Torie Osborn only had 10% of her 
vote come from Republican crossovers and the Republican Brad Torgan only had 10% of 
his vote come from Democratic crossovers.  While this difference is small, the separation 
between second and fourth place in the survey results is only 2.3%.  The true election 
results are even closer: Bloom came in second with 25.6% of the vote and Osborn came 
in fourth with 24.2%, a difference of only 1.4 percent.  Crossover votes almost certainly 
helped put Bloom into the top-two; he narrowly defeated Butler in November when both 
of the other candidates would likely not have overcome her considerable strength.  
 Richard Bloom possibly benefited from the ‘pragmatic sincerity’ of crossover 
voters.  In the future, as more candidates learn the lessons of 2012, more candidates may 
be able to win with the help of these voters.  The results from this section provide some 
advice for an aspiring centrist candidate: it is important not just to appear moderate but 
also to appear credible; a ‘pragmatically sincere’ voter will consider both aspects.  
                                                          
216
 See the previous chapter for a primer on each race, including the preference distribution by party 
registration.     
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Furthermore, candidates should not rely on widespread raiding to advance their cause; the 
evidence in this section supports the assertion that most crossover voting was sincere, or 
at least intended to help the selected candidate.   
Crossover Voting: Other Model Specifications 
 I have also used alternative specifications for the main crossover probit model.  In 
Table 5-9, the model treats the possible combinations of minority party, close alternative, 
and weak candidate as separate and unrelated categories.  The model does not include a 
main effect for registration with the smaller of the two parties, for example.  The two 
models presented in this section build the effects through interactions, starting from the 
main effect building blocks.  Table 5-11, below, contains two different models.  The first 
includes just the main effects and no interactions; for that model, I calculated the usual 
first differences.  The second model includes the interaction effects; to help interpret 
those results, I display predicted probabilities for different combinations in Table 5-12. 
 The more limited model in Table 5-11 only includes the main effects: minority 
party, close alternative, and weak candidate.  The results of that model are pretty much as 
expected and nothing radically changes from the model presented in Table 5-9.  None of 
the first differences on the three variables of interest is particularly large (for an otherwise 
median individual, including having the other of those three categories set to zero) but 
they are all about the same size as moving on the issue scale from “-3” to “3” (the first 
difference of agreement with party on issues shown here).   
 The results from the interactive model are also mostly as expected, with one 
exception.  First differences do not have quite the same interpretation in the interaction 
model presented in the right columns of Table 5-11.  For the conditions to be met for the  
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Table 5-11: Alternative Crossover Probit Specifications 
Variable Coef. T-Stat.  FD Coef. T-Stat. 
Over 65 -0.07 -0.99 
 
-0.06 -0.79 
Female -0.07 -0.96 
 
-0.08 -1.13 
White 0.03 0.37 
 
0.01 0.17 
College or Graduate Degree 0.07 0.95 
 
0.07 0.89 
# Correct Politician IDs (0-4)  0.00 0.08 
 
0.00 0.06 
# Political Activities (0-7) 0.02 0.80 
 
0.02 1.08 
Agreement with Party on Issues (-4, 4) -0.16 -8.10 -0.03 -0.16 -7.87 
Self-Reported Party ID Does not Match Registration 1.55 16.32 0.17 1.55 16.11 
Minority Party 0.76 8.48 0.04 0.18 0.74 
Close Alternative (Or Equal Judgments) 0.83 10.48 0.05 0.63 5.97 
Explicitly Identified Weak Candidate 0.67 7.45 0.03 1.09 4.01 
Minority x Close Alternative 
   
0.90 3.49 
Minority x Weak Candidate 
   
0.02 0.05 
Close Alternative x Weak Candidate 
   
0.23 0.71 
Minority x Close Alternative x Weak Candidate 
   
-1.18 -2.66 
AD5 0.19 1.59 
 
0.22 1.77 
AD8 0.52 3.98 0.02 0.49 3.69 
AD41 0.11 0.91 
 
0.14 1.14 
AD47 0.16 1.22 
 
0.18 1.37 
    
-2.26 -13.54 
      N =   3163 
  
3163 
 % Correctly Predicted 89.19 
  
89.63 
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interaction of all three variables to equal one, all the others have to equal one; it is 
important to change the ‘otherwise median’ individual to make the display meaningful.  
Table 5-12, below, displays the predicted probabilities of crossing over for each 
combination of variables at two different levels of party agreement.  The surprising effect 
is that the probability of crossing over is actually slightly less with all three variables 
equal to one (Minority Party X ideological close alternative X no strong candidate) than it 
is for one of the combinations of two --- the majority party, with an ideologically close 
alternative and no strong candidate.  With mild issue agreement (=1), the strong party, 
ideologically close alternative, and no strong candidate category has a crossover 
probability of about 32 percent.  If all three categories are set to yes, the probability is 
about 29 percent.  Nevertheless, it is a very rare member of a strong party who explicitly 
identifies a candidate from the other party as strictly more likely to win than any 
candidate of their own party.  Generally speaking, someone with all three characteristics 
and mild party agreement has about a 29 percent chance of crossing over and a person 
who has none of the characteristics has less than a 1 percent chance of crossing over.   
Table 5-12: Predicted Prob., Interaction Model; Differing Levels of Issue Agreement 
Single Characteristics 
    Minority Party NO YES NO NO 
Ideological Close Alternative NO NO YES NO 
No Strong Candidate NO NO NO YES 
Probability (Issue Agreement = 1) 0.008 0.015 0.037 0.102 
Probability (Issue Agreement = -2) 0.026 0.043 0.095 0.203 
Combinations of Characteristics 
    Minority Party YES YES NO YES 
Ideological Close Alternative YES NO YES YES 
No Strong Candidate NO YES YES YES 
Probability (Issue Agreement = 1) 0.234 0.132 0.316 0.287 
Probability (Issue Agreement = -2) 0.403 0.261 0.498 0.466 
 
282 
 
 
 Specifying the models in this way nests the limited model inside the more 
expansive interactive model.  This allows me to conduct a likelihood ratio test to see if 
the complicated interactions improve the fit of the model.  The results indicate that they 
do, although the added complications do not add much.  The percent correctly predicted 
improves only very slightly in the second model (one might almost say “imperceptibly”).  
The limited model works just about as well as the more complicated model with the 
interactions.  That suggests it is appropriate to just talk about the main effects 
independently: registering with the minority party increases the likelihood of crossing 
over and identifying your own candidates as weak increases the likelihood of crossing 
over.  Neither of those considerations has anything to do with ideological distance --- 
those are purely tactical considerations.  When combined with incentives from the spatial 
model (ideological proximity of acceptable alternative) those variables are more 
powerful; still, taken individually, they provide evidence that some tactical consideration 
takes place.    
District-Level Analysis: Data and Procedure 
 
 In this part of the chapter, I examine voter behavior in five Assembly districts in 
California’s top-two primary at the district level.  The earlier analysis in this chapter 
pooled respondents together – a strategy that comes with certain advantages: the ability to 
examine differences based on district context, a large sample size to examine rare 
behaviors, and binary dependent variables (did you cross over or not?) that are well-
suited to models that do not ask too much from noisy data.  That type of analysis, while 
possessing great advantages, also comes at a high cost: it only makes sense with that 
approach to examine types of behavior rather than specific candidate preference.  This 
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section looks at preferences for specific candidates, reversing the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the previous section.   
 The obvious approach to study within-district voting behavior involves using a 
statistical model with vote choice as a dependent variable and voter characteristics as 
independent variables.  Since all of the interesting Assembly races under the top-two had 
at least three candidates, and of the five races in this study all had at least four candidates, 
I need to use some kind of multinomial model.  Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 2000) argued 
for multinomial probit instead of multinomial logit or ordered logit as the 
econometrically correct approach in these situations; in their case, they studied vote 
choice between Bush, Clinton, and Perot in the 1992 presidential election (1995) and in 
British elections (2000).  They noted that scholars should use multinomial probit when 
the dependent variable does not satisfy the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) 
property: that the relative odds of choosing one alternative over another remained 
unaffected by the presence or absence of a third alternative.  In elections with multiple 
candidates, and particularly in the top-two primary setting, the failure to satisfy IIA is 
precisely the point: tactical voting, especially ‘settling,’ should occur because one 
candidate is a better substitute than another for a third, unelectable, alternative.   
 While multinomial probit (MNP) does not assume IIA, unlike the alternative 
multinomial logit (MNL) model, the relaxed assumptions ask more of the data.  To 
estimate how well one alternative substitutes for another, multinomial probit models 
estimate more parameters than a multinomial logit would.  MNP models in this setting 
need an “alternative specific” variable to help identify the model; these variables (one or 
many) must vary by the alternatives that form the dependent variable.  In the 
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documentation for the particular statistical software I use to implement MNP in this 
chapter, Imai and van Dyk (2005) give an example of choice between detergent brands 
with price as the alternative specific variable.  Every brand of detergent has its own price, 
but the ‘price’ dimension can help the algorithm figure out which kinds of detergent are 
closer substitutes.  Alvarez and Nagler (1995) used ideological distance from the voter to 
the candidate on a single-dimension ideological scale, which rather obviously inspires the 
analysis in this chapter.   
 Not all data well suits a MNP model.  Due to the larger number of parameters 
(coefficients for the alternative specific variables and estimating parameters for the 
covariances), MNP models are more difficult to estimate than MNL models.  Alvarez and 
Nagler (2002) – presumably aware of Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 2000) – used a 
multinomial logit model to analyze exit poll data from a California Assembly district (in 
a study on the blanket primary).  They only had about 600 voters per Assembly district; 
in the survey sample from 2012, I generally have about 700 voters with distinct 
preferences per district.  As I will show below, the MNP models do not necessarily work 
very well with that few voters in districts with many candidates or candidates that seem 
similar.   
 Before I attempted to implement MNP models for the five districts in the 2012 
survey, I had to deal with a different problem: the missing responses to candidate 
placements.  As I noted earlier in the chapter, most respondents ideologically placed at 
least one candidate but few placed all of them.  Only using the sample of respondents 
who placed all the candidates reduces the sample size for each district dramatically.  
Coding unplaced candidates as “far away” does not solve the problem either; many voters 
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selected a candidate they did not rate, seemingly using party cues rather than specific 
ideological knowledge.  Furthermore, the strategy I used earlier of creating binary 
variables (‘first-choice or not?’) would theoretically work to generate an alternative 
specific variable but it loses most of the spatial modeling value of the 0-10 ideological 
placement scale.  Such an alternative specific variable would not provide much 
information. 
 To solve this problem, I imputed the missing candidate ideological placements.  I 
used STATA’s “multivariate normal regression” imputation alternative with four pieces 
of additional data: the respondent’s placement on the left-to-right issue scale, dummy 
variables for Republican or Democratic registration, and the respondent’s self-placement 
on the 0-10 ideological scale.  While examining the raw data, much of the missing data 
appeared to be reasonably missing – that is, it seemed many voters tended to be unable to 
place candidates for one of two understandable reasons: (1) the voter intended to vote 
party line for some candidate of her party that she had previously heard of or (2) the voter 
intended to cross over because he knew his own party to be so hopeless as to not merit 
investigation.  Information about the voter’s own party and ideological positions would 
help produce meaningful guesses in both of those cases, although there remain other 
reasons for the respondent to fail to answer the question.     
 The imputed data sets are not restricted to a 0-10 range, nor are they necessarily 
ordinal.  Figures 5-2 through 5-5 show the distributions of the final imputed data and the 
original unaltered data for two candidates from AD50.  The “bins” for the imputed data 
are set to [x-.5, x+.5] for each x on the 0 to 10 scale to make the displays as comparable 
as possible; the data itself will have a large mass directly at each integer and then many 
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Figure 5-2: Imputed Betsy Butler Placements 
 
Figure 5-3: Unmodified Betsy Butler Placements 
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Figure 5-4: Imputed Torgan Placements 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Unmodified Torgan Placements 
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single estimates between integers.  Since the ideological placements will be used to 
estimate distance, leaving an imputed response as 5.432 preserves more information 
about the respondent than rounding that response to 5.  For that reason, I did not alter the 
imputed placements before moving on to the next step of the analysis.  The imputations 
look relatively reasonable; the imputed scores for Betsy Butler tended to be more on the 
left than on the right (the Democratic Party endorsed her) and the scores for Brad Torgan 
tended to be more on the right than on the left (he identifies as a Republican).  The 
imputed scores also retain the relatively centrist tendency (high concentration near “5”) 
and wide dispersion (including responses that appear “flipped” in the wrong direction) 
evident in the raw data.   
 Respondents may have answered the ideological distance questions in their own 
unique way; while those individual responses may be of interest, so too is the ‘wisdom of 
the crowds.’  I next ran the imputed candidate placements and self-placements on the 0-
10 ideological scale through the R package “basicspace” (see Poole et al., 2012).  This 
package implements a rescaling technique pioneered by Aldrich and McKelvey (1977); 
the Aldrich-McKelvey method “assumes that candidates occupy fixed positions in an 
issue space and that the individual perceptual data arises from this via a two-step process, 
the first step consisting of ‘true’ error in perception, and the second step consisting of 
distortion introduced in the actual survey situation” (pp. 112).  They observed that 
respondents could “anchor” their survey responses differently; a “10” to one person could 
be equivalent to a “5” for another.  Some voters might also have answered the scale 
backwards (which, from the raw data, some voters in this sample very obviously did); the 
procedure assigns them a “negative weight” to re-orient them in the same direction as the 
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other respondents.  The “basicspace” package implements this rescaling technique to 
place all the individuals and candidates into a common ideological space appropriate for 
applying the spatial model. 
 To implement the MNP models, I used the common-space estimates produced 
through the imputation and Aldrich-McKelvey steps to generate the ideological distance 
“alternative specific” variable.  For every individual in each district, I computed the 
distance between their scaled self-placement (varied by individual) and the estimated 
“true” candidate position (does not vary by individual).  This does remove variation in 
perception, which could be considered something like private information about 
candidates or different notions of ideology (“while other people might think this 
candidate is moderate, I know she is a true conservative because of x.”).  Nevertheless, in 
a setting in which so many of the ideological placements are imputed anyway, and 
therefore not reflecting private knowledge, using a single point estimate for candidate 
location gains a great deal in interpretability with little lost meaningful information.   
After building the measure of ideological distance, in each district I analyze 
candidate choice with multinomial probit.  Using the Bayesian “MNP” package in R (see 
Imai and van Dyk, 2005), I tested a very simple model.  I used just two individual 
specific variables: Republican Registration and Other Non-Democratic Registration.  The 
“alternative specific” – read “candidate specific” – variables were the measure of distance 
between self-placement and candidate ideological placement I created using “basicspace” 
and an indicator for whether or not the candidates had been given a favorability score.  I 
interpret these two measures as “ideological distance” and “have you heard of this 
candidate before?”  The inclusion of the binary alternative specific variable helps to 
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recover what the imputation procedure lost: in these relatively low information settings, 
voters may not know about ideologically close candidates.    
 This procedure uses the data in a very different way than the pooled-across-
districts approaches in the first part of this chapter.  The multinomial probit models, as 
specified here, theoretically provide an opportunity to test more specific notions about 
crossover voting.  Distinguishing between the tactical crossover behaviors – “settling” 
and “raiding” – remains difficult; nevertheless, the models do provide a cleaner test for 
whether tactical crossover voting of any type had a noticeable effect on the election.  If 
only the alternative-specific variables of ideological placement and specific knowledge of 
candidates (that is, the spatial model with sincere voting between known candidates) 
explain candidate choice, then tactical voting from one party to another (if present at all) 
did not tend to go more towards one candidate or another.  If, on the other hand, the party 
registration variables exercise a significant independent effect for voting for one 
candidate of another party, this would strengthen the case for ‘pragmatic’ tactical 
behavior possibly changing the outcome.  That is, controlling for ideological distance and 
candidate knowledge, are Republicans in AD50 more likely to vote for Richard Bloom 
than Torie Osborn or Betsy Butler?  Asked more directly: how plausible is it that Richard 
Bloom, Democrat and liberal mayor of Santa Monica, owed his election to the State 
Assembly to Republicans? 
The Aldrich-McKelvey Results 
 The procedure outlined above provided some additional analytical benefits.  The 
Aldrich-McKelvey rescaling results by themselves explain a great deal about what 
happened both in June and in November.  The figures in this section plot the distribution 
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of common-space ideological self-placements and the point estimates of the true 
candidate locations.  Note that the “0” in each of these figures represents the mean 
candidate position in the district, not the mean or median voter; in almost all cases, the 
distribution of voters skews away from the “0.”  Also, since no candidates are placed 
across districts in a common space, the “0” of each figure represents a different 
theoretical point: the mean candidate position in AD5 should be farther to the right than 
the mean candidate position in AD50.   
 In AD5, it should be little surprise that Bigelow defeated Oller in the runoff: 
voters perceived Bigelow as much closer to the center of the distribution of voters.  
Figure 5-6 plots the location of all six candidates in this safe Republican district.  The 
surprise, from a typical spatial modeling perspective, is that Bigelow made the top-two at 
all: with perfect information and sincere spatial voting, Boyd and Oller should have 
advanced.  This suggests a role for information and uncertainty over candidate placement, 
as well as some tactical voting.  Belden, a nonpartisan candidate, and Lancaster, a taxi 
driver, had lower visibility or credibility as serious candidates; furthermore, Boyd and 
Fitzgerald are placed very close together on this plot.  If I reimagine Figure 5-6 with 
Boyd and Fitzgerald placed ideologically in the same location, and without Belden and 
Lancaster included at all, then the actual election results become quite easy to imagine 
with a spatial modeling approach: Fitzgerald and Boyd together split 31 percent of the 
vote, Bigelow got 29 percent of the vote, and Oller earned 34 percent.  To get exactly 
those totals Bigelow would have to draw some tactical (“settling”) within-party 
Republican votes or some crossover tactical Democratic votes --- but the election results 
at least still make sense.  Furthermore, from the perspective of reformers who favor 
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moderate victors, Bigelow meets the minimum qualifications: he is viewed as more 
centrist and (as discussed in the chapter describing the survey) he also took more 
moderate positions during the campaign on a key issue, taxes.       
Figure 5-6: Candidate Placement in AD5 
 
 
 In contrast with AD5, the result in AD8 looks more like what the spatial model 
with perfect information and sincere voting would predict: the two extreme candidates 
won.  Figure 5-7 plots the candidate placements in AD8.  Bonser, Flynn, and Tufi were 
not very serious candidates.  That still leaves three: Democrat Cooley and Republicans 
Ortega and Tateishi.  Cooley and Tateishi squeezed the more moderate Ortega and then 
Cooley went on to defeat Tateishi.  This is the clear theoretical problem with the top-two: 
with enough information, enough candidates, and strong enough extreme candidates, the 
extreme candidates actually possess a spatial advantage.  In AD8, the new primary failed 
to produce a different result than likely would have occurred under the old semi-closed 
partisan primary.      
 AD41 produced a ‘squeeze’ on the main moderate alternative similar to what 
occurred in AD8.  Figure 5-8 plots the locations of the five candidates from AD41; 
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Figure 5-7: Candidate Placement in AD8 
 
Figure 5-8: Candidate Placement in AD41 
 
 
  
294 
 
 
Holden and Lowe won the primary and Holden bested Lowe easily in the general 
election.  In this case, Rusnak did even worse than Ortega from AD8; Rusnak, a 
Democrat making an effort to run to the middle, actually placed last in the primary.  
Cacciotti and Colton both picked up votes from constituencies that knew them.  Holden’s 
camp also hit Rusnak with a series of negative ads right before the election (as described 
in the last chapter), demonstrating that they likely understood that Rusnak might have 
posed a real threat in the general.  Of all the candidates Holden would have preferred to 
face, Lowe certainly headed the list.  Again, the evidence for overall sincere voting is just 
reflected in the outcomes and the predictions from the basic spatial model: given these 
locations, sincere voting should produce the actual election result.  Notably, both Holden 
and Lowe would also likely have won under the old system.  So, while the top-two failed 
to elect Rusnak, it did not produce a noticeably worse outcome either.   
 Assembly District 47 more resembles AD5, in that the top-two produced a same-
party runoff that benefited the more centrist candidate.  Baca did better than Brown in the 
primary, as Figure 5-9 suggests should have happened.  Both Beach (a candidate in her 
90s, and certainly not a serious contender) and Ensley (a Tea Party Republican totally 
unsuited for the district) had low enough name recognition and a small enough 
constituency to allow Brown through – although it was a close run thing.  Despite the 
utter hopelessness of the Beach and Ensley causes, together they had 29 percent of the 
vote, the same percent Brown got in the primary.  If only one hopeless Republican ran, 
instead of two, AD47 might well have looked much more like AD8 or AD41 – with a 
credible centrist alternative coming up short.  Once Brown got through the primary, 
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though, she easily defeated Baca 56 percent to 44 percent, as the Figure 8 would also 
suggest. 
Figure 5-9:  Candidate Placement in AD47 
 
 
 
 On the surface, reformers achieved their aim in AD50 as well: the most centrist 
candidate won.  Voters placed the ultimate winner, Richard Bloom, as the right-most of 
the three Democrats in Figure 5-10.  The results from AD50 challenge the applicability of 
the ‘full information, sincere voting’ version of spatial model; the basic spatial model 
would predict that Torie Osborn and Brad Torgan would advance to the second round.  
Instead, Richard Bloom and Betsy Butler advanced to the runoff.  Referring back to the 
previous chapter: in a district with over 1000 survey respondents, 523 placed Butler, 532 
placed Bloom, 491 placed Osborn, and 254 placed Torgan on the ideological scale.  More 
voters gave candidate approval ratings: 647 ranked Butler, 667 ranked Bloom, 621 
ranked Osborn, and 386 ranked Torgan.  Still, in the ‘best case’ scenario of the approval 
rankings, only about one-third of the voters had heard of Torgan.  So, while it would 
seem that Osborn should capture most of the more extreme leftward votes, for voters who 
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had not heard of her, those votes might go to Butler instead even if all voters who had 
heard of the candidates placed them at these point estimates.  Not all voters agree, 
though, about the ordering of these candidates.  The ideological placements and approval 
ratings for the three Democrats were all over the map.  It makes sense here to think about 
the three Democrats, as it did with Boyd and Fitzgerald in AD5, as located in roughly the 
same place.  Then the final results do make sense: the primary split almost perfectly 
evenly four ways.           
Figure 5-10: Candidate Placements in AD50 
 
 The spatial modeling conundrum from AD50 helps to explain the methodological 
choices I made in specifying the multinomial probit model.  There are two explanations 
for the failure of the basic spatial model in AD50 that do not resort at all to tactical voting 
arguments.  First: from an individual perspective, the ideological ordering of Democratic 
candidates might well be different from the aggregate point estimates of their true 
location.  Second: voters missing knowledge about candidates might be making spatial-
modeling type decisions over a space that includes fewer than four candidates, passing 
over ideologically closer but unknown to them candidates.  By using distance as an 
alternative specific variable, I minimize the order effects for similarly placed candidates.  
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If one candidate is distance x away and another candidate is distance x + z away from the 
voter, for very small “z” which candidate is assigned x and which is assigned x + z will 
little impact the estimation.  The ideological distance variable will not add much to 
explain who votes for Osborn, Butler, or Bloom.  On the other hand, it will do much 
more to control for the large gap between the three Democrats and the Republican 
Torgan.  Other variables will have to separate the choice between Democrats, like the 
dummy for having ranked the candidate on the approval scale – the other alternative 
specific variable.  Having included both of those controls, then, it is still interesting to 
look at the independent effects of registration type; a positive and meaningful coefficient 
on Republican registration in voting for Richard Bloom would suggest that he benefited 
from some kind of tactical crossover.   
 The figures created by the Aldrich-McKelvey common space technique as 
provide a warning against over-enthusiasm for the new primary.  These figures 
demonstrate some successes for reformers who preferred more moderate candidates – but 
also some failures.  The “successes” came in AD5, AD47, and AD50.  By generating a 
same party runoff, the more moderate candidate won.  AD8 and AD41 show the 
difficulties in getting to the same party runoff, though; in both cases a relatively credible 
moderates (Ortega in AD8 and really all three candidates shut out of the AD41 runoff) 
failed to get through the primary.  Flynn in AD8 and Rusnak in AD41 made explicit 
centrist efforts, neither which amounted to much of anything at all.   
 These five elections also suggest – although, with the usual caveat of ‘small 
sample’ – that certain conditions help propel moderates forward.  In AD5 and AD47, 
similarly located candidates from the minority party split the minority party vote.  In 
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AD5, Boyd and Fitzgerald split the Democratic vote; if unified, the Democrats would 
likely have had enough votes to keep Bigelow off the top-two.  In AD47, Beach and 
Ensley were not viewed as ideologically distinct enough for Ensley to get all of Beach’s 
votes.  In both of these districts, lack of information also aided the moderate: Ensley and 
Beach were just unknown; only about a quarter of the respondents ideologically placed 
both Republicans and many of those placements had to be guesses based on very little 
information.  Beach did not even have a campaign website and, to the best of my ability, I 
was able to only find a single photograph of her anywhere on the internet with extensive 
Google searches (the one referenced in the last chapter).  A single slightly stronger 
Republican candidate could very well have kept Brown out of the top-two in AD47.  In 
AD5, Bigelow benefited from the obscurity of Lancaster and Belden as well; 
furthermore, Boyd and Fitzgerald were not well known either.   
 In AD8 and in AD41 distinct, well known, and ideologically extreme candidates 
overwhelmed the moderates.  With those three conditions met, and without extensive 
tactical “settling” crossover voting from the minority party targeted at an agreed-upon 
moderate alternative, the top-two primary system is unlikely to help moderates at all.  
The exception would be if relatively few candidates entered in the middle and the 
extreme candidates took very extreme positions; however, with more than three 
candidates and the extremist candidates just adopting the pure ‘party line’ stance of their 
own party, the top-two’s rules do not advance the cause of a centrist candidate.   
 AD50 may count as a success for the reformers but it should also count towards a 
more cautionary tale, tempering expectations.  Torie Osborn, Brad Torgan, and Brian 
Ross Adams (a campaign consultant for Richard Bloom) all examined Figure 5-10 and 
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said that it captured their beliefs about the locations of the candidates.  While the point 
estimate for Richard Bloom placed him as more moderate than Betsy Butler or Torie 
Osborn, he still sat as the mayor of Santa Monica, a very liberal politician, and not all that 
different than Butler or Osborn.  The amount of difference Bloom will provide in the 
legislature will depend to what extent the party leadership can co-opt him; how quickly 
both sides can put aside lingering suspicion based on a hard election fight and how much 
the institutional rules in the legislature provide incentives to operate as if Bloom had been 
the preferred candidate both will affect the level of independence and ‘pragmatism’ he 
displays in office. 
 Unless candidates are committed through their campaign promises to a program 
radically at odds with their party leadership, the election of more moderate candidates 
may not be enough to generate more moderate votes in the legislature.  Legislative 
institutions may mute the effects of the top-two.  The figures in this section give 
legislators and future candidates a good reason to get along with their party, as well; a 
candidate faces a hard road to win an election as a centrist and the formal party apparatus 
can provide access to many resources to help with name recognition and get-out-the-vote 
efforts.  Until California has used the top-two for more years, researchers will have to 
advance only very tentatively assertions that former House Speaker Sam Rayburn’s 
comment no longer applies: “To get along, go along.”217         
The Multinomial Probit Results 
                                                          
217
 This comment is widely attributed to Rayburn.  The quotation is currently included in the description of 
an exhibit about him at the Capitol Visitor Center: http://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/online/1913-
to-1945/house-1913-1945/additional-information-house-1913-1945/sam-rayburn.html (last accessed 
03/10/13).   
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 I estimated a simple multinomial probit model in each of the five districts.  I used 
the Bayesian “MNP” package in R (Imai and van Dyk, 2005), a package that includes 
procedures both to estimate the models and then to test if the models converged on a 
stable solution.  The individual characteristics included in the model are just two binary 
indicators for party registration: Republican and “Other”; most of the “Other” registrants 
are “Decline to State” (nonpartisan).  Just like with any other model in which categorical 
variables are included, these included categories compare to the excluded category of 
Democratic registration.  The coefficients reported in the table of results for AD41 and 
AD50 (Table 5-13) are for each included candidate against an excluded candidate.  In 
AD41 I left out Chris Holden and in AD50 I left out Betsy Butler, both representing the 
endorsed Democrats in the district.  The alternative specific variables theoretically apply 
the same to all alternatives, so there are not separate coefficients by candidate for the 
ideological distance and rated variables.  Since the MNP package employs a Bayesian 
framework, Table 5-13 reports 95 percent credible intervals rather than point estimates.    
 Table 5-13 presents four key results.  First, the 95 percent credible intervals for 
the “alternative specific” distance variables in both models lie entirely off zero; I 
conclude that voters made up their minds at least in part based on ideological distance in 
the manner of the traditional spatial model.  Second, the dummy “rated” variable, 
indicating if the voter gave a favorability rating to the candidate, has a 95 percent credible 
interval entirely above zero.  Voters tended to select candidates about whom they could 
say something.  Both of those findings validate the extended discussion of those concepts 
in the previous section.  Third, in AD41 Republican registration exercised an independent 
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Table 5-13: Multinomial Probit Regression Results for AD41 and AD50 
AD41 CI AD50 CI 
Characteristic: Candidate 2.50% 97.50% Characteristic: Candidate 2.50% 97.50% 
(Intercept):Cacciotti -0.22 0.08 (Intercept):Bloom -0.50 -0.09 
(Intercept):Rusnak -0.62 -0.20 (Intercept):Osborn -0.33 0.02 
(Intercept):Lowe -1.58 -0.61 (Intercept):Torgan -2.08 -0.91 
(Intercept):Colton -1.49 -0.65    
Rep. Registration:Cacciotti 0.00 0.66 Rep. Registration:Bloom -0.42 0.60 
Rep. Registration:Rusnak 0.14 0.88 Rep. Registration:Osborn -0.71 0.40 
Rep. Registration:Lowe 1.43 2.49 Rep. Registration:Torgan 2.20 3.48 
Rep. Registration:Colton 1.23 2.16    
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Cacciotti -0.13 0.43 DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Bloom -0.10 0.49 
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Rusnak 0.00 0.65 DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Osborn -0.37 0.24 
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Lowe 0.64 1.61 DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Torgan 0.74 1.80 
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Colton 0.18 1.16    
Alternative Specific Variables   Alternative Specific Variables   
Distance -0.43 -0.14 Distance -0.68 -0.28 
Rated 0.96 1.39 Rated 0.91 1.49 
Covariances   Covariances   
Cacciotti:Rusnak 0.17 0.63 Bloom:Osborn -0.19 0.42 
Cacciotti:Lowe 0.14 0.67 Bloom:Torgan -0.76 0.48 
Cacciotti:Colton 0.37 0.96 Osborn:Osborn 0.29 1.02 
Rusnak:Rusnak 0.51 1.23 Osborn:Torgan -0.97 0.32 
Rusnak:Lowe 0.17 0.83 Torgan:Torgan 1.13 2.34 
Rusnak:Colton 0.17 1.01 
   Lowe:Lowe 0.62 1.57 
   Lowe:Colton 0.14 1.18 
   Colton:Colton 1.14 2.22 
   N = 668   N = 700   
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effect from distance or ‘knowledge’ (via the “rated” variable) in a decision to support 
Rusnak over Holden.  While there are other meaningful coefficients in the model, this is 
an important measure of crossover voting; it provides evidence that some tactical voting 
took place to Rusnak’s benefit (although clearly not enough for her to win).  Fourth, there 
is no comparable result in AD50 for Richard Bloom.  This does not mean that Bloom 
received no benefit from crossover voting; this result merely implies that there is no 
evidence outside of his better name recognition (my interpretation of the “rated” variable) 
and ideological distance to explain his superior performance in Republican crossover 
votes.   
 A table of predicted probabilities of candidate support can help clarify these 
results.  Table 5-14, below, displays the probabilities that an otherwise median individual 
selects each of the candidates in each districts – for differing types of partisan 
registration.  Note that this means that all three of these hypothetical individuals hold the 
ideological location of the median voter.  In AD41, the median voter is ideologically 
close to Rusnak, generating relatively high probabilities of support for Rusnak and low 
probabilities of support for Cacciotti and Colton in particular.  In AD50, the ideologically 
median placement steered even Republican voters away from Torgan.  Nevertheless, the 
probabilities in Table 5-14 still illustrate the main differences between Rusnak’s fortunes 
and Bloom’s.  The Democratic and otherwise median voter had a 38 percent chance of 
selecting Butler and a 27 percent chance of selecting Bloom --- as is evident in just the 
descriptive statistics, Bloom comes in third among Democrats.  For the same individual 
with the party registration switched to Republican, Bloom comes in five points ahead; for 
any other registration category, Bloom came in 3 points ahead of Butler.  In AD41, 
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Holden comes out ahead of Rusnak by thirty points even though this hypothetical voter is 
much closer to Rusnak.  Rusnak does only marginally better than Holden if the individual 
is now considered a Republican and does worse than Holden with a “other registration” 
otherwise median individual.  If the candidate closest to the middle of the distribution 
doesn’t have similar support probabilities compared to the more extreme establishment 
candidate for voters located close to them, how can they possibly win an election?  In 
Rusnak’s case, she also suffers from the relatively powerful effects of ideological 
distance; while the median voter is very unlikely to support Cacciotti, someone closer to 
Cacciotti than to Rusnak is likely to do so.     
Table 5-14: Probability of Candidate Support for Otherwise Median Individual 
 
AD41 AD50 
 
Holden Cacciotti Rusnak Lowe Colton Butler Bloom Osborn Torgan 
Dem. Reg. 0.64 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.02 0.38 0.27 0.34 0.01 
Rep. Reg. 0.31 0.00 0.38 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.38 
Oth. Reg. 0.47 0.00 0.44 0.05 0.04 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.08 
 
 The models for AD41 and AD50 present a bare-bones view of the election.  
Nevertheless, Table 5-13 displays estimates for 16 different parameters (with 700 
observations that had enough data to be included) for AD50 and 23 parameters (with 668 
observations) in AD41.  The estimation procedure, because of the model complexity, 
demands a lot out of any data set; in this case, there are many parameters for relatively 
small amounts of data.  The models will not necessarily produce reliable results; the 
estimation procedure relies on a numerical optimization routine (Markov chain Monte 
Carlo) that may not always converge.  The MNP package in R provides a routine to 
check for convergence.  I ran each model three times with different starting values for 
50,000 draws.  Then I compute the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic statistic as described in 
Imai and van Dyk (2005).  With the MNP package, I could combine the results of all 
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three sets of estimates and check to make sure that all of the parameters reached under the 
desired 1.1 (or less) level in the Gelman-Rubin test.  In AD41 and AD50, only the Lowe 
intercept in AD41 came in above the acceptable 1.1 level (and then only slightly); the 
results of the Gelman-Rubin test are displayed below in Table 5-15. 
 At this point, a reasonable reader may wonder: what about AD5, AD8, and 
AD47?  In AD5 and AD8, because each election had six candidates, the model had to 
estimate 31 parameters.  In AD5, AD8, and AD41 both the “distance” and “rated” 
alternative specific variables had the same kinds of results generally as in the models in 
AD41 and AD50.  However, in all three cases, the models failed to converge.  In AD5 
and AD8 this likely had to do both with the number of parameters to estimate and the 
relative weakness of the imputed and rescaled ideological distance as an alternative 
specific variable as a tool to sort through relatively closely-placed candidates.  Both AD5 
and AD8 have many candidates in the center of the distribution for which there were 
relatively few actual placements: in AD5, for example, very few voters placed Belden or 
Lancaster.  Belden and Lancaster is also placed close to the center of the distribution of 
voters and candidates once the imputation and Aldrich-McKelvey scaling procedures are 
complete.  Despite this, nobody is voting for them.  In AD47 I suspect it is a similar 
problem; Ensley and Beach are just too weak of candidates for the spatial model 
component (the alternative specific variable) to really distinguish between the 
alternatives.  The presence of very weak candidates in these districts also complicates 
estimation: with very few respondents selecting some of the alternatives, there just is not 
enough data to reliably estimate their behavior.  
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Table 5-15: Did the models converge?  Is the Point Estimate under 1.1? 
AD41 
Point 
Est. 
Upper 
CI AD50 
Point 
Est. 
Upper 
CI 
Characteristic: Candidate   Characteristic: Candidate   
(Intercept):Cacciotti 1.00 1.01 (Intercept):Bloom 1.00 1.00 
(Intercept):Rusnak 1.00 1.01 (Intercept):Osborn 1.01 1.02 
(Intercept):Lowe 1.14 1.30 (Intercept):Torgan 1.01 1.03 
(Intercept):Colton 1.00 1.01    
Rep. Registration:Cacciotti 1.00 1.01 Rep. Registration:Bloom 1.00 1.00 
Rep. Registration:Rusnak 1.00 1.01 Rep. Registration:Osborn 1.01 1.03 
Rep. Registration:Lowe 1.03 1.08 Rep. Registration:Torgan 1.00 1.01 
Rep. Registration:Colton 1.03 1.05    
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Cacciotti 1.00 1.00 DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Bloom 1.00 1.00 
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Rusnak 1.00 1.00 DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Osborn 1.00 1.00 
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Lowe 1.02 1.06 DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Torgan 1.00 1.01 
DTS/3rd Party Reg.:Colton 1.00 1.01    
      
Distance 1.00 1.00 Distance 1.00 1.00 
Rated 1.02 1.02 Rated 1.01 1.02 
      
Cacciotti:Rusnak 1.00 1.01 Bloom:Osborn 1.01 1.02 
Cacciotti:Lowe 1.01 1.03 Bloom:Torgan 1.01 1.02 
Cacciotti:Colton 1.01 1.03 Osborn:Osborn 1.00 1.01 
Rusnak:Rusnak 1.02 1.03 Osborn:Torgan 1.01 1.05 
Rusnak:Lowe 1.00 1.01 Torgan:Torgan 1.00 1.01 
Rusnak:Colton 1.01 1.02 
   Lowe:Lowe 1.02 1.06 
   Lowe:Colton 1.10 1.22 
   Colton:Colton 1.01 1.04 
    
  
  
306 
 
 
 The multinomial probit modeling approach had advantages and limitations – and 
these results demonstrated both.  The specifications that included all the candidates and 
used ideological distance as the alternative specific variable, in the manner of Alvarez 
and Nagler (1995), did not always converge.  As is evident throughout these chapters on 
the 2012 survey, the data is very noisy – reflecting the divergent views and low levels of 
information in these contests.  This approach pairs difficult data with models that place 
high demands on that data; that the results are mixed should be unsurprising.  On the 
other hand, these models did provide at least two pieces of information that help 
substantively advance the argument about the top-two in these districts.  Finding that 
Rusnak did derive support from Republicans over and above the spatial model suggests 
that the proportion of tactical voters of the overall total was too small to overcome 
Rusnak’s deficiencies with her own party.  Also, finding no similar evidence in AD50 
suggests that Bloom owed his election less to tactical Republican crossover voting and 
more to his slightly more centrist position and his higher name recognition.   
Conclusion 
 The top-two primary seems to be a moderate success for its proponents – so far.  
The evidence reviewed in this chapter does not indicate widespread, or even really 
‘detectable,’ mischief-making or “raiding.”  In the five districts included in this study, no 
more extreme candidates won than would likely have won under the old system; the top-
two seems to not have made things worse.  In a few districts the new primary seems to 
have enabled the victory of a more moderate candidate who would not likely have won 
otherwise.  To some extent this occurred just because of the structure of the primary, 
although some kind of pragmatic voter behavior may have made small contributions.   
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 “Our results, then, suggest that it is problematic to lump together various 
primary election systems when studying their effects on candidate choices.  
Indeed, subtle differences in the rules surrounding primaries can create 
large differences on candidate policy choices.”  
– Kanthak and Morton218 
 
“As these questions are attacked it is not improbable that other and better 
types of nomination may emerge and take their place in the political 
world, competing with the older for survival under new conditions.” 
 - Merriam and Overacker
219
  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I wholeheartedly agree with Kanthak and Morton’s contention that the details 
matter.  The challenge is, of course, deciding when to stop and how to set up the analysis.  
Using my own best judgment, I developed a slightly different scheme than other authors 
used, captured a longer period of time, and deployed a different ideological measure.  
Like Gerber and Morton (1998), Kanthak and Morton (2001), and McGhee et al. (2012), 
I at least come away with a similar conclusion in one respect: the original notion that 
open primaries would produce more moderate candidates than closed primaries seems off 
the mark.  While those three papers arrive at a diverse set of specific conclusions, and my 
results differ from all three, I think it is safe at this point to express a healthy skepticism 
that switching from a partisan closed primary to a partisan open primary will make such 
of a difference.  In my results, I find the opposite: open primaries produce more extreme 
representation. 
In my view, political scientists should not consider the question closed.  There’s 
not clearly a consensus – either in the empirical literature or in the theoretical literature – 
about how to categorize primaries.  Nor have political scientists adopted a uniform 
measure of candidate ideology, or come to an agreement about when to measure it (as 
                                                          
218
 Kanthak and Morton (2001, pp. 129).    
219
 Merriam and Overacker (1928, pp. 358).   
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scored during a campaign by an outside interest group?  By actions while in a legislature?  
Over the course of a whole career?).  McGhee et al. took advantage of a new database of 
state legislators; as database like that expand to cover more years (and as more time 
passes) the field will be able to get more precise estimates. 
The data I collected on election competitiveness helps to put the debate about 
ideological location in some perspective.  The truth is that no system does a particularly 
good job at producing reliably competitive elections for the U.S. Senate; anecdotally, I 
imagine the same holds true (or worse) for other elective offices.  It may be the case that 
other considerations intervene to prevent parties from well-responding to their electoral 
environments and putting forth competitive candidates.  That closed primaries should 
produce more competitive candidates on average than open primaries, as described in 
Chapter 3, piles on to the disappointing performance of open primaries.       
Reflecting on the data I collected – the anecdotes about how state primaries 
worked in practice and why rules changed and the empirical multi-state results – brought 
to mind the quotation from Merriam and Overacker (1928) included in the epigraph of 
this chapter.  It may be the case that open and closed primaries do not produce results that 
are all that different.  Taking in my own results, and the others in this field, with larger 
view, it may be the case that “early experiments” with different primary elections did not 
produce large politically significant results --- and that “early experiments” may include 
all the primaries used from 1945 to 2010. 
The results in the five Assembly districts studied in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 
stand in stark contrast to the more negative results about non-closed primaries in Chapter 
3.  It seems, on the face of things, like in three of five districts that a more moderate 
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candidate won an election who would not have won under a closed or semi-closed 
primary.  While certainly these were unusual districts, they are not so different from other 
seriously contested districts.  Given the success of some of the challenges, more 
candidates may consider an outside challenge in 2014.           
The top-two primary is a radical break with the past.  In some sense, the 2012 
results in California (and what has happened in Washington since 2008) are not quite the 
“full effect” of implementing a top-two.  The political structures of the Ancien Régime 
still existed in California in 2012; the strongest players in state politics all rose through a 
party-primary system.  It is difficult to predict what will happen in the future but it 
certainly seems possible that the specter of repeated same-party runoffs will split 
dominant parties into factions, or at least generate distinguishable within-party brands. 
The development of within-party brands to support centrist candidates – if such a 
thing did occur – might help make crossover voting a bigger deal.  Most of the “benefits” 
– again, only “benefits” if one believes that electing centrists is a benefit – accrued from 
divided opposition rather than from tactical crossover voting for moderate candidates.  
Little formal structure existed to help candidates coordinate their likely supporters.  
Given the amount of weak party crossover voting described in Chapters 4 and 5, those 
crossover voters only may have been pivotal in one of those races.  With more time to 
coordinate and plan, perhaps the top-two will have an even larger effect. 
The conclusion of Merriam and Overacker’s book, in the epigraph for this 
chapter, phrases competition between primary types almost as if it is evolutionary 
competition between species.  Here, though, primary laws may not be selected for 
whether or not they are “better” than previous laws.  There is a key question to ask with 
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politics: “better for whom?”  Those who would lose out under a new primary law can be 
expected to oppose it, even if such a law would produce net benefits for the whole 
society.  Additionally, there may be divine intervention from the Supreme Court to rescue 
an endangered type of primary from an apparently strong competitor.  So far the top-two 
has survived the courts --- but the more ideological wings of both California major parties 
may do their best to replace the top-two with an alternative initiative more to their liking. 
The usual call for “further research” is particularly important in this case.  The 
database of state laws and the multi-state analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 adds to the existing 
literature, particularly by using a much longer time period.  The analysis of the top-two in 
Chapter 4 and 5 also uses a unique dataset to advance our understanding of how this new 
institution works.  Nevertheless, the story is nowhere near finished.  While there is much 
more to learn about what has already happened, the future will undoubtedly provide 
unexpected twists and turns; in the ongoing struggle between rival interests, politics will 
produce new strategic innovations.  What makes the future somewhat unpredictable is 
what also makes this research timely: as voters and policymakers must make decisions in 
the present, they must do so with a ‘best guess’ about the effects of different institutions.   
So far, this work represents mine. 
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